Mubarak spirit on its way to its Creator met with two other spirits: Nasser's and Sadat's. They asked: Poison or bullet? He answered: Facebook. Maria Fahmy As millions in Cairo were calling for regime change, bloggers, rappers and facebook(ers) were articulating their visions of the new order to emerge. These virtual spaces of revolution have been sites for “deliberations” about the meanings of citizenship and rights by a new generation of politically engaged yet marginalized urban youth. I argue that the use of the new social media has not only been central to the rise of discursive communities and social networks, but also to the formation of the new subjectivities of Arab youth, as agents of social change. Are we witnessing the rise of a “revolutionary” virtual public sphere? In this paper I will answer this question by exploring two places in which youth’s desire for new modes of sociability and political expression were enacted under the form of political mobilization and action. I propose a content analysis of women’s blogs in Egypt and Moroccan rap. My goal is to show the limits of the rhetoric of political freedom, as a unique lens to understand the current appraisals in North Africa and the Middle East, by showing how these freedoms have been articulated by young men and women in the realm of 1) “responsible” citizenship and social solidarity; 2) plural identities; 3) ethical economic practices and demands for social welfare. Hence, by stressing regime change in ongoing protests in the Middle East, this generation of revolutionaries is requesting the end of an area in which corrupt local elites seem to be the expression of global capitalist interests and interventions.

Authoritarian Regimes, Religion and Revolts: The Case of Algeria Issam Aburaya The major purpose of this essay is to explore the transformation of the Algerian Islamic movement from a body that focused mainly on social, religious and cultural reform in the 1960s into a radical (and very popular) political opposition in the late 1980s. More specifically, I contend to highlight the connections between the structural characteristics of the post-colonial Algerian political regime, its policies and contradictions that led eventually to the mass rebellion in October 1988 followed by political liberalization measures on one hand and the changing nature of the Algerian Islamic opposition, its shifting aims and strategies on the other. I aim to demonstrate this by highlighting the two major factors that turned the Algerian Islamic movement into a significant force in the mass rebellion against the authoritarian regime in October 1988 and subsequently into the main benefactor of the first fair and democratic municipal and national elections in postcolonial Algeria (1990-1991). I argue these factors were: First, the Islamic movement’s effective cooptation of the legacy, symbolism and aims of the Algerian revolution and the national liberation struggle which in the Algerian consciousnesses are tantamount to national pride, egalitarianism and social justice. Second, the Movement’s impressive capacity of combining organic and modern mobilizing structures. Of special interest for this essay is what is depicted in the vernacular Algerian language the Huma (Le quartier). The Huma allowed Islamic movement to produce an extensive and sophisticated communication networks in its opposition to the current ruling elites. This is in addition to its successful combination of universal Islamic ideals and values with local identities and connections such as the family and the neighborhood

One of the most significant developments in the ongoing Jasmine Revolution has been the emergence of Tunisian rappers as political actors. Much has been made of the use of social networking websites and services in the recent upheavals, with many taking issue with the overemphasis on American-invented social networking sites. However it is undeniable that throughout the Tunisian uprising, music videos and video messages of support have been disseminated via Facebook, YouTube, MySpace and the like. Tunisian hip hop heads have demonstrated themselves to be particularly adept at harnessing the web, deftly skirting government-imposed internet censorship, to establish a community that is at once virtual, tangible, and very much attuned to the country’s vicissitudes. The Tunisian rapper El Général, author of songs such as“Tounes bledna” (Tunisia’s our homeland), attracted the ire of the Tunisian government following the release of the hard-hitting song “Rayes lebled” (The President of the Country). During the height of the uprising that first spread from Sidi Bouzid, Tunisian security forces arrested the rapper on January 3, 2011 and he was held and eventually released by the Ministry of the Interior later. Meanwhile, the public could track his detention via his Facebook updates and interviews given by his family to the international press. Tunisia’s biggest rapper, Balti, recorded and spread a statement of support with regard to his protesting countrymen via Facebook shortly after Ben Ali’s ouster. Ultimately I will examine the ways in which Tunisian hip hop offers an important, new chapter in the short history of Maghrebi hip hop. If we accept that these Tunisian rappers have become political actors in the country, it would behoove us to determine to what extent they themselves embrace or refuse this role? Indeed, what does it mean to produce street rap (with its heavy connotations of the “Arab Street”) in the midst of civil unrest and veritable chaos? This paper will engage the concept of Arab Revolt by examining these questions. Do revolutions have a soundtrack? Did/does Tunisia have one?

In light of social upheaval and protests in both Tunisia and Egypt, one cannot ignore their power and the yearning of Arab youth for political expression. Many argue that the current events in the Arab world would be replicated in other countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen. However, I argue that despite the outcomes of the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, Morocco remains one of the most complex countries in which it would be difficult to see organized massive uprisings. This is because one needs to better understand the different contexts and dynamics in which social movements germinate and operate. While Moroccan youth refuse to engage in the “silencing of the self” as a way to internalize repression and exclusion, they are also caught in the dilemma of co-optation and the pitfall of irrelevance. There are intrepid attempts by youth activists to assert themselves, including the formation of several youth organizations calling for youth civic and political empowerment. Yet, youth continue to be excluded from the position of political power. One should cast a critical perspective on the “menace of exclusion” and state policies of bricolage towards youth demands. The inadequacy of state policies in addressing youth issues or including them in policy formation processes is among the main factors that trigger discontent. With the increasing strength of reactionary government policies, and the parallel focus on stability discourse, youth issues in Morocco were increasingly ignored and the distinctive role of youth in policy never has been seriously considered. The contribution youth movements are making to political and social change includes the call for youth political inclusion. Youth in Morocco are learning how to shutter the symbols of power that most Moroccans revere, and continue to push the boundaries to have their voice heard. This paper will offer an in-depth look at the youth consistent involvement in demanding political change, and their work as activists in the political and civic milieu in Morocco. It will also examine state policies that respond to youth demands, their effectiveness and success, and examine how youth view these policies in light of the current state of affairs in the Arab world. To what extent would youth be successful in altering and changing the political reality in Morocco? And what is the nature of this change? are two questions that this response will also try to answer.