The Arab spring, and in particular the rapid fall of Tunisian President Ben Ali, surprised and worried Morocco’s monarchy. Especially given that the ruling RCD party and the methods of state management in neighboring Tunisia were considered models by Moroccans close to the palace. The Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM, founded by close personal friends of the King in late 2008 and which won 2009 municipal elections) drew heavily on the RCD’s discourse and secularist vision. Most of Morocco’s political parties, the administration and the media were mobilized by the regime in January 2011 to prevent the spread of the revolutionary contagion to Morocco. The call for protest in Morocco posted on YouTube and then replicated by hundreds of young people on social networks triggered a strong reaction from the state and independent media close to power, which attacked movement organizers and stigmatized them as immoral traitors. The pressure of the state was so intense that the moderate Islamist PJD party opted not to participate in the demonstrations. However, the popular success of the first February 20 event changed everything; the government decided to respond positively, including proposing constitutional and political reforms. The PJD would be perceived by the regime as an unexpected “savior.” Revolutions and upheaval in neighboring countries deeply affected the King’s close aides and advisors. El Himma, for example, resigned from his position as leader of the PAM. The regime transitioned into full crisis mode. The King appointed an advisory committee for constitutional revision, which completed its work in record time under intense pressure from street protest. In July 2011, a referendum was held for the adoption of the constitution, after which tensions began to fall in the country and protests became less massive. Early parliamentary elections gave power to the PJD, a party previously considered “recalcitrant” by the monarchy. This paper will focus its analysis at first on the semi-conflictual, semi-collaborative relationship between the PJD and the monarchy. The second part deals with the consequences of the election of an Islamist-led government bent on exercising “real” power within a Moroccan political framework and the makhzenian habitus. The paper will also attempt to answer the question as to whether this experiment will lead to a parliamentary monarchy. The paper is based on extensive fieldwork in situ in Morocco, including interviews with all of the key political stakeholders.

Amidst the turbulent transitions in several Arab countries, Morocco likes to tout its current transition as more durable than other more radical transformations. Despite the fact that it allows for limited practice of democracy, most of the political class, including the Islamist party of the Justice and Development (PJD), maintain that political transformations are only likely to succeed if they are spaced out over a long period of time. Adl Wal Ihsane, the nation’s largest Islamist opposition group, challenges this view. It contends that the limited scope of political concessions embedded in pacts with the system does little to promote democratic practices, combat corruption and clientelism, or reinforce the rule of law. Indeed, it serves only to subvert the popular upsurge for political freedoms by demobilizing pro-democracy protesters while strictly controlling the extent to which political actors, interest groups, and civil society participate and influence public policy. The recent death of Abdessalam Yassine, Adl Wal Ihsane’s founder, however, has brought the movement to a crossroads. There is a great deal of speculation that the movement might choose to opt into the political process, as the PJD did. It is no secret that some members within Yassine’s organization, especially those that belong to its political circle, have expressed interest in legal political participation. Some analysts think it is possible that Al-Adl will split into a political organization and a religious one, similar to what occurred with the PJD and its parent organization, the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR). Thus far, however, the group doesn’t want to integrate into a political system where the king and royal cabinet exercise de facto veto power which weaken elected institutions. The problem for Al-Adl, however, is that it remains isolated and marginalized. This paper examines the strategic dilemmas of Adl Wal Ihsane. The group is banking on the failure of the PJD and hopes for another outbreak of mass protests in the wake of that failure. But its refusal to compromise has only benefited the Palace and the PJD. This paper is based on ongoing fieldwork in Morocco, including with Adl Wal Ihsane’s leadership and rank and file members.

Moroccan Amazigh activists take particular umbrage with the term “Arab Spring”, indeed at anything which categorizes Morocco and the North Africa region as “Arab”. Hence, they characterize the wave of popular protests which swept across Morocco in early 2011as the “Democracy Spring”. Young Amazigh movement activists actively participated in the amalgam of groups which constituted the “February 20th Movement” that sought to achieve a genuine transformation of Moroccan political life. Worried by the swelling protests, the Moroccan authorities acted swiftly to contain the demonstrators, through a mixture of reform measures, cooption and repression. For the Amazigh movement, the resulting constitutional reform which recognized Tamazight as an official state language and Amazighité as an integral component of Moroccan identity was a historic achievement, but realities on the ground remained cloudy. Morocco has now entered into a more contentious era, posing new challenges and opportunities to the Amazigh movement. What is the meaning, or meanings, of this moment for Moroccan Amazigh? This paper will provide provisional answers to this question, through a critical examination of the Moroccan Amazigh movement's varied responses to the ‘Democracy Spring’ events: vis-à-vis allies and rivals within civil society, vis-à-vis state authorities, and within the movement itself. Topics to be addressed will include: the nature of Amazigh movement participation in Morocco's broad-based "February 20th" protest movement, and the responses to it by other civil society groups; the multiple, rival viewpoints within the movement regarding the recognition afforded by the Moroccan state and the efforts to mobilize politically on behalf of Amazigh rights within a genuinely democratic, pluralistic Morocco; and the impact of developments in other Amazigh spheres – Algeria, Libya, Tunsia, the European Diaspora and, most recently Mali – on the Moroccan Amazigh movement. The study will be based on on-site and written interviews and observations and an analysis of the wealth of published materials, in both traditional media outlets and social media sites.

Youth in the Arab world are playing a prominent role in the popular uprisings against entrenched autocratic regimes. While the Moroccan monarchy looks stable, the old legitimacy formula is lagging behind profound normative changes among Moroccan youth. Based on student surveys at three different universities, this paper compares youth attitudes toward non-conformity with religious, social, and legal norms. It seeks to identify and explain variations in responses to norm violations. Participants were divided into five groups and given different questionnaires to suppress or trigger social norms associated with social identities. They were then given different scenarios where fundamental social and religious norms are violated. Participants were then asked to react to instances of non-conformity. The main finding from the survey conducted between December 2011 and April 2013 is that Moroccan youths are more tolerant of non-conformity with religious norms than with non-conformity with social norms associated with family matters. Another major finding is that toleration or non-toleration of non-conformity is not associated with group identity. In other words, respondents are not tolerant of non-conformity because it is simply committed by an outside group. The paper contributes to research on the effect of social norms on behavior in contemporary Muslim societies. Islam has been posited as a variable in explaining economic stagnation, democracy deficit, and ideological extremism since at least the 19th century. More recently, social scientists have focused on specific institutions, networks, and cultural values to assess the effect of Islam. But empirical findings are inconclusive, often contradictory. One of the major difficulties has been the inability to disentangle social norms from religious norms to assess their respective influence in a given situation. We simply do not know whether attitudes about political authority or individual autonomy, for example, are a function of religious or social norms. We also do not know when and why the social and the religious trump each other. But this paper offers new evidence regarding the higher prevalence of religious non-conformity over social non-conformity.

The February 20 movement, the most significant challenge to the Moroccan monarchy and political system since independence, has often been cast as a reformist movement. Both Morocco’s political establishment and the movement itself have contented themselves have collaborated in elaborating a narrative of successful reform movement that pried and accelerated much needed constitutional and political reforms from a recalcitrant, risk averse, conservative system and polity. But there is considerable evidence that the movement, which brought together an unprecented diversity of views ranging from Salafist to radical leftist, was a non-violent revolutionary coalition that seeks not to reform the Moroccan regime but to replace it entirely. Based on hundreds of interviews with movement activists and Moroccan and international political stakeholders over a two year period, this paper finds that the February 20th movement seeks to upend and supplant the Moroccan makhzenian system not through reform but through non-violent revolution. From the outset, the movement expressed little interest in Morocco’s constitutional reforms, referendum, and early elections, all of which it boycotted. Youth from all quarters brought together under a common banner of regime rejection challenged every aspect of the makhzen system, from its political hegemony to its economic predation and from its symbolic foundations to its very religious sacrality. While various supporters of the moments have different opinions on the role of the King as commander of the faithful, all agree that the usurping of political authority from the claim to religious infallibility and the imposed oath of fealty is no longer acceptable for the Moroccan monarchy. This descralization of the makhzen, as stated by Prince Moulay Hicham, third in line to the Moroccan throne in public and private interviews and an outspoken supporter of the movement, is the beginning of the end of the Moroccan monarchical system as currently configured. Even the PJD, the victorious moderate Islamist party in November 2011 elections, are playing a double game vis a vis the makhzen and monarchy of both carrying out its duties and ruling party and leading an oppositional force against a recalcitrant monarchy, successfully building on deep and widespread frustration of the Moroccan population with a corrupt political and economic system which many of its supporters believe needs not reform but replacement.