For many years the Mubarak regime was able to dodge domestic and international pressure for greater democracy by holding up the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood, its apparently assured victory in open elections and the Islamic state it would subsequently create. This strategy was very successful as the coverage of the January 25 Revolution illustrates; fear of the Muslim Brotherhood was a significant subtext in government statements and national and international media coverage. Many of those who demonstrated against the government therefore had to conquer not only their fear of the regime, but their fear of the MB being the biggest beneficiary of greater democracy. The demonstrators’ clear and consistent call for a democratic and civil (madani), rather than Islamic, government exposed the weakness of Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood. The weakness of the MB was important to the success of the Revolution and paved the way for the MB to be accepted as a legitimate voice in post-Revolution Egypt. How was the Muslim Brotherhood portrayed during the Revolution in Egyptian state and opposition press? How was it portrayed in Western media coverage of the Revolution? How did the Brotherhood respond to the negative press? How did the Muslim Brotherhood participate in the Revolution, both in demonstrations and negotiations? What evidence emerged of internal cohesion and division within the MB? Did the Revolution change the impression of the Brotherhood or did a rising tide of democracy merely lift all ships, including the Brotherhood? In this paper I analyze statements about and by the MB in Egyptian and Westerns media during and immediately following the Revolution (Jan 25-Feb 11). This includes Egyptian state and opposition newspapers, especially al-Ahram and al-Masry al-Yom, as well as coverage, interviews and editorials in the major international news networks and newspapers. I analyze also the efforts by the MB to respond to the negative press coverage through interviews, articles, and its English website. I compare its outreach in English and Arabic with its actions during the Revolution. The revelation that the MB is not the largest or opposition force in Egypt helped to end decades of political stalemate. The MB’s recognition of the forces lined up against it and its response in the media and in the street has secured the MB a continuing role in a rapidly changing Egypt. Egypt is being transformed by a youth revolution, the MB is as well.

Al-Lijan Al-Sha`biyya in Egypt’s Revolution: Adjusting Relations between Police and People In the 25 January movement in Egypt, the police were thrown on the defensive by demonstrators’ defiance; on Friday 28 January, the Minister of the Interior, Habib al-`Adli, decided to withdraw police from residential and business districts of Cairo, indeed throughout much of Egypt. The disappearance of the police, along with prison breaks, led to a surge in armed robbery and looting. The void in public security was filled by the formation of al-lijan al-sha`biyya (“people’s committees”), which took on the role of protecting neighborhoods, repelling intruders, policing traffic, etc. This paper argues that the formation of these groups, and the new assertiveness of Egypt’s citizenry, are redefining the relationship between police and people. The questions that guide the investigation are: (1) What were the reasons for the police’s failure to contain the 25 January movement? Why did al-`Adli act suddenly to withdraw the police? (2) How did al-lijan al-sha`biyya come into existence and how did they function? What was their attitude to the return of the police after a period of absence? (3) How did the media represent the actions of al-lijan al-sha`biyya? How did intellectuals and publicists interpret this striking episode of spontaneous neighborhood organizing? The documentation for this study rests on newspaper reports and commentary in al-Ahram, al-Masri al-Yawm, Nahdat Misr, al-Ahrar, al-Wafd,al-Shuruq, in late January/early February. Also, the author was present in Cairo and was able to observe first-hand al-lijan al-sha`biyya. Findings indicate that the police failed because rallies were larger and better organized than expected, and demonstrators showed unprecedented perseverance. It appears that `Adli’s controversial action was a cynical attempt to foment chaos in order to undermine public sympathy for demonstrations and divert energies away from protests and toward protecting families and property. Al-lijan al-sha`biyya took various forms, depending on relations within neighborhoods and external threats; their attitude toward the police also varied, since not all police abandoned their posts. As in the protests themselves, al-shabab (young men, mostly unmarried) played a disproportionate role in community defense. State-sponsored and independent media differed in many ways, but coverage of al-lijan al-sha`biyya was positive in both categories of media, with commentators suggesting the beginning of a new, respectful, cooperative relationship between police and people. However, a legacy of profound mistrust, due to past abuses by the police, remains to be addressed.

Recent popular protests in Egypt were met with diverse responses from official and independent ulema, offering support or condemnation. Al-Azhar issued statements supporting the government, but internal divisions resulted in a number of scholars, including official spokesman Mohamed Rifa' al Tahtawy, resigning and participating in the protests. In contrast, Salafi preachers such as Mohammed Hassan initially pleaded with demonstrators to return home, but later praised them for fighting injustice. This paper argues that conflicting statements from Muslim leaders regarding protests reduced their overall credibility, resulting in failure to drive the movement. Main issues discussed are: What effect did official responses from state-sponsored institutions, including al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti, have on the protests, if any? What comments came from independent scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi who have long-standing disagreements with the former government? How did “evangelical” preachers such as Amr Khaled interact with protestors, given that they have been regarded as symbols of a new, youthful Islam? What was the position of conservative groups such as the Salafis, who usually take a firm stance against protests based on classical rulings? Finally, after the President’s removal, what role have these institutions and scholars played? The sources for this study are statements from Islamic authorities as published in government newspapers including Al-Ahram and Al-Akhbar, as well as opposition newspapers Al Dustur, al-Masri al-Yawm, and al-Shuruq. Additional data is gathered from interviews and sermons by religious officials on state television, Nile TV and other Arab news outlets such as Al Jazeera. From the data gathered, it appears that traditional institutions such as Al Azhar were split between official support of the regime and increasing internal demands for change. Independents like Yusuf al-Qaradawi attacked the government and have made moves to play a role in the post-Mubarak Egypt. Newer Islamic preachers such as Amr Khaled supported youth power, organizing volunteers to rebuild the country. Ultimately, this paper argues that the contradictory statements issued by Muslim authorities resulted in their failure, as a body, to have a significant impact on the protests. Demonstrators acted without direction from the ulema, leaving state-sponsored and independent religious institutions in a weakened position to guide political change. This may also contribute to changes in the relationship between ulema and laity, reinforcing an already pronounced populist influence on discourses and decisions of Muslim authorities.

Egyptian Christians and the Revolution From the onset of the January 25 protests, the Coptic Orthodox Church asked its followers to pray but to abstain from participation. In fact, Christians from other denominations adopted a similar position; however, participants did so as masriyyin and not as masihiyyin. This changed gradually after January 28, the “Friday of Wrath.” Indications of increased Christian presence in the protests appeared; however, public disappointment with Copts’ involvement remained because of perceived “apathy,” which was encouraged by pro-Mubarak statements of Pope Shenouda III and which contrasted with the demonstrations in major cities after the Alexandria church bombing (January 1). This paper argues that, in spite of such early perceptions, Copts were not seen as traitors, but rather were portrayed as an integral element of the Egyptian Revolution, largely because non-Orthodox Christians, especially Evangelicals, took a prominent role in the protests. There are three questions guiding this research: (1) Why did Christians participate in the protests, albeit in small numbers? Why did their numbers increase over time? (2) How did Evangelicals come to dominate the scene in Tahrir? (3) How did the media represent Christian involvement in the protests? The present study depends on Egyptian newspaper coverage of Christian participation during and after the Revolution (January/February) in al-Ahram, al-Masri al-Yawm, al-Akhbar, al-Shuruq; etc.; independent Coptic websites; and first-hand experience and personal interviews with various Coptic Orthodox and Evangelical participants in the protests. The investigation shows that Copts participated as individuals; the Church hierarchy had little influence. Evidence indicates that the number of Copts increased as a reaction against the Patriarch’s support of the regime after Mubarak’s speech on February 1. Later, Christians had a bigger presence in Tahrir because of Evangelical efforts culminating in what was mistakenly publicized as “mass,” as well as commemorations of the Martyrs of the Alexandria bombing on February 6 and 9. Perhaps ignorant of denominational differences, the media hailed “Coptic” participation in the Revolution and the unity of the nation. Lastly, in spite of their somewhat marginal position within the protest movement, Christians in general and Coptic Orthodox Christians in particular, have now seen the need for their direct involvement in the public sphere and are actively discussing possible modalities for such involvement – a fact that may redeem their slowness in endorsing the Revolution.