A broad literature on state-labor relations (Bellin 2000; Murillo 2001; Collier and Collier 1991) argues that state-corporatist institutions can be utilized to restrain workers’ collective action, particularly in authoritarian contexts. However, when these institutions break down, considerable rank-and-file militancy can result (Aidi 2008; Hartshorn 2018; Bishara 2018). While confirming these expectations, this paper goes a step further to ask: What are the broader social implications when workers decide to (finally) break away from authoritarian state-corporatist institutions? In Jordan, the late-2000s saw marked increases in labor protests and strikes over previous years, with incidences of labor protests peaking in 2011 and 2012 (Adely 2012b; Jordan Labor Watch 2011). Among these, two major protest waves broke out among workers in two of Jordan’s most economically vital sectors: The Port of Aqaba (between 2009 and 2012) and the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) (between 2011 and 2012). These cases were similar in that labor unrest did not immediately emerge following the privatization of the two companies (in 2006 and 2007, respectively), but when workers did mobilize, they did so by rejecting state-corporatist labor institutions—actions which reflected their growing illegitimacy in the eyes of workers. Additionally, by challenging both state-corporatist institutions and neoliberal policies, workers’ movements also precipitated the breakdown of regime hegemony locally, spurring mass popular resistance in regions impacted by privatizations. Utilizing process tracing methods and interviews conducted during fieldwork in Jordan, this paper elucidates the mechanisms connecting corporatist breakdown to the outbreak of localized resistance against authoritarian rule. In doing so, this paper contributes to broader conversations in comparative politics regarding the nature of institutional modes of authoritarian control, while also drawing connections to localized sites of resistance in other cases, such as Tunisia’s Gafsa Mining Basin and al-Mahalla al-Kubra in Egypt.

When does a democratically elected government ban labor strikes? Which factors may influence the post-strike ban responses of striking unions? Students of labor politics in the developing world have not reached a consensus on whether repression of organized labor is a prerequisite for economic development in the Global South. Benefiting from a novel labor strike dataset, this paper provides a fuzzy-set QCA analysis of strike bans and post-strike ban activism in Turkey after 2015. I argue that the current government issues strike bans when a small but non-collaborative union leads a strike in times of economic stability. Additionally, strike bans are used in AKP stronghold cities if the striking union is not large in membership. Moreover, I suggest that these conditions also shape the emergence of post-strike ban activism'. this research helps us better understand more subtle forms of labor repression. Keywords: strike ban, post-strike ban activism, Turkey, labor, fsQCA

Labor unrest reached the public and private transport sectors in Egypt in the build-up to the uprising of 2011. While scholars have focused on how neoliberal policies aggravated economic and union related grievances, I point to workers’ power resources to explain unrest. I show that for some transport workers the neoliberal changes increased their power resources and capacities to protests, and for others, the fact that by the 2000s neoliberalism was incomplete explained workers’ power. For example, the acceleration of neoliberal policies and the growing importance of international trade for the Egyptian economy empowered private cargo workers to make radical demands and gain concessions. The neoliberal turn was also associated with the predominance of informal transport in some areas empowering them to protests. For others, such as public bus workers, the fact that the neoliberal turn was not completed yet, explained their remaining role in the economy and their ability to resist privatization, make radical demands, and gain concessions. This paper contributes to the literature on labor in Egypt by showing that power resources, and position in the economy are key for understanding unrest. I also contribute to the literature on labor in the Global South that focuses on how union power and coalitions with ruling elites allowed workers to resist attacks on workers’ rights under neoliberalism. I show that the unevenness of neoliberal policies and its impact on workers’ economic position influenced workers’ capacities.