The Western allies and the neighboring regional states created a perception of the Kurds before, during and after WW1, as being unworthy of having their own state. Although it took the better part of an entire century, the Kurds finally proved them wrong by skillfully establishing and then managing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) following Saddam's 1988 genocidal Anfal campaign and the failed 1991 Kurdish uprising. The KRG, however, alarmed the neighboring regional states who feared that the 2003 war had created favorable conditions for Kurdish independence via the new Iraqi constitution which enshrined democracy and federalism. This alarm prompted them to hold a series of conferences in Sharam al-Sheikh, Damascus, Tehran, and Istanbul in order to prevent the Kurds from declaring independence. Iraqi Arabs were active participants in these conferences. The Kurdish leadership, however, carefully trod Middle Eastern minefields in order to neutralize internal and external opposition to Iraq's new constitution. This Kurdish diplomacy has vigorously campaigned for consolidating their military and diplomatic gains in advance of the March 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections and the subsequent scheduled U.S. combat troop withdrawal from Iraq in August 2010. Following six years of a cordial relationship with the United States, the KRG President Massoud Barzani also traveled to Washington on January 25, 2010 in order to gather support for his regional government. However, Washington refrained from making any explicit promise to Barzani. U. S. President Barack Obama simply encouraged Barzani to "take constructive actions on issues that divide Iraq [Arbil and Baghdad]," especially issues related to disputed areas and the oil law. Barzani called for the protection of Kurdish rights within the framework of the constitution, which Arabs wanted to revise. Not having better options, the Kurdish leadership continues navigating the Middle Eastern muddy waters with caution and exploiting Iraq's internal Arab division for their survival. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the recent skillful KRG diplomatic interactions with the Western and neighboring regional states. To do so, this paper will employ objective content analysis of KRG documents as well as scholarly and media articles form various Western and regional sources.

Turkey and Kurds in post-US Iraq Since 2008, Turkey's relations with Iraqi Kurds have shown significant improvement, culminating in the establishment of a Turkish consulate in Arbil. This paper will analyze the various factors that contibuted to the changes in Turkey's policies toward Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government. Based on historical event analysis, interviews with Turkish policy makers, and systematic examination of Turkish mainstream social-political discourse, the paper will discuss that four main factors were influential in these changes: developing economic relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds that increased the perception of positive-sum interests and created a business lobby for better relations; the regional political context including the planned US withdrawal from Iraq, Turkish-US relations and US policies toward Iran; Turkey's new and more activist foreign policy in its region targeting zero-problems with its neighbors; and the changing domestic balance of power in Turkey in favor of civilian politics and religious-conservative nationalists. The paper will argue, however, that the sustainability of improving relations continues to depend on two critical factors: peace and stability of Iraq as a state, and the resolution of Turkey's domestic Kurdish conflict, which in turn requires ideational-discursive changes that should change the perception of Kurds and the Kurdish question by the mainstream society.

For several decades, Kurdish civil society actors in Europe identified innovative political spaces, pursued alternative options for collective mobilization, and articulated less openly segregationist and nationalist principles in pursuit of political goals. An emphasis on cultural recognition including language rights led to increasing levels of collaboration among Kurdish activists in Europe. The Diaspora Kurdish movement's critical examination of Turkey's conduct toward the Kurdish minority served as a constant reminder that the implementation of legal and political reforms had yet to be realized. Europe's Kurds predominantly pursued ethnic and cultural recognition for Kurdish communities inside Turkey and for themselves in Europe. To achieve this aim, they utilized legal training and technological skills. At the same time, demands for a territory-bound Kurdish homeland were fading away in Europe. Ethnic Kurdish citizens in Europe, and in particular their European-born children, had little incentive to physically relocate to an impoverished 'Kurdistan' that lacked employment opportunities, basic amenities, and the requisite technological infrastructure. The emergence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has created new political opportunities for Kurds in a broadly defined democratic sense. But these new political opportunities for Kurds in Iraq also weakened the once powerful influences of Kurdish Diaspora activists on Kurdish mobilization inside Turkey. Their dominance over both militant and civically engaged Kurds in Turkey has ended since Kurdish leaders in Turkey are less interested in developing common political strategies in collaboration with the Kurdish Diaspora. Instead, Turkey's Kurds seem to prefer alternative political strategies by looking to strengthen their relationship with the KRG. The presenter will examine these new dynamics and their influences on relationships between Kurdish leaders in Europe and in Turkey. The central question guiding this presentation will be focused on the KRG as a competitor to the political sway of Diaspora Kurds. Leaders within the Kurdish Diaspora assumed for a long time that Turkey's pursuit of full membership in the EU would eventually push the country to commit to a multiethnic and multicultural social construct. But Turkey's Kurds seem to look toward the KRG rather than the European Union for inspiration and political leverage.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolving relationship between Iran and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The main thesis of the paper is that despite some initial reservations about the emergence of an autonomous government in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran has now accepted the permanency of the KRG. Consequently, Iran and the KRG have focused on commonalities of interests and have developed a framework for expansion of their socioeconomic relations. The evolving relationship between the KRG and Iran has already resulted in a thriving trade relationship between the two sides. Although trade remains the most significant economic medium linking the border regions of Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan, Iranian investment is also increasing. Regular contacts involving official and private economic delegations between the two sides are now routine. Politically, the two sides have established legations in their respective territories. Both sides are keenly aware of a number of political issues that are inherently destabilizing and can strain relations between the KRG and Iran. In particular, the presence of Iranian Kurdish opposition forces in the areas controlled by the KRG have led to raids by the Iranian security forces inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Also, Iran is weary of threats to its national security that may come from the activities of American and/or Israeli intelligence in the border areas. These variables will be analyzed in my paper, using primary and secondary Iranian, Kurdish and Western sources.

Approximately 1.5 million Kurds live in Syria, a much smaller number than in Turkey, Iran, or Iraq. Furthermore, the Kurds in Syria live in three non-contiguous areas and, therefore, historically have been much less successfully organized and developed than in the other three states. Nevertheless, the Kurds in Syria constitute the largest minority in Syria. For many years the repressive Syrian governments of the Assads have sought to control their Kurdish minority by various oppressive means including an Arab belt between its Kurds and those living in neighboring Turkey and Iraq. Some Kurds have also been denied Syrian citizenship (the so-called ajanib), while others have been stripped of their basic civil liberties (the so-called maktoumeen). However, the emergence of the KRG has helped begin to change this situation. For example, within days of becoming the president of the KRG in June 2005, Massoud Barzani demanded that the Syrian Kurds be granted their rights peacefully. This call has helped galvanize the Kurds in Syria into creating new pro-Kurdish organizations and taking a more active role in demanding changes to their previous situation. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the specific steps that have been taken by the Kurds in Syria in response to the next-door model of the KRG and what has been the response of the Syrian government. To do so, this paper will employ objective content analysis of KRG documents as well as scholarly and media articles from many of the various actors in Syria.