The literatures on democracy promotion (Carothers and Ottaway 2005; Anderson 2006; Finkel, Pérex-Liñan and Seligson 2007) and peacebuilding (Call and Cook 2003; Posner 2004; Uvin 2006) see civil society as a fertile terrain to achieve democracy and sustainable peace. A strong and vibrant civil society is a credible bulwark against state authoritarianism (Burnell and Calvert 2004; Hawthorne 2004); it also underpins societal reconciliation and peacebuilding (Kassis 2001). Civil society is a locus of donor-led democratisation and peacebuilding efforts but we know relatively little about the conditions under which it actually fulfills these expectations. Lebanon provides a good case to investigate these conditions. Historically, its vibrant civil society (Salem 1999) has been ‘colonized’ by communally-organized logics, resulting in a strong communal mujtama’a ahli versus a weak mujtama’a madani (Traboulsi 2004). Civil society actors that tried to cross-cut sectarian lines often lacked of a strong enough sense of common purpose or common cultural frames of reference to bring –and keep– them together (Kingston 2007). Recent events in Lebanon have triggered the rise of “claims-based” NGOs (Karam 2005) that share the explicit or implicit goal of challenging the sectarian-based system. They ignited new hope of building bridges across sectarian lines to build a more democratic future. Several received considerable foreign aid. A few short years later, many are closed, defunct or inactive. Why have these efforts faltered despite donor support and a public that seemed ready for political change (Baladi, Sparks 2007)? Previous studies examined the internal challenges that these NGOs have confronted (Kingston 2007). Few questioned their commitment to the end of a sectarian-based political system. To our knowledge, none investigated the role of the state and donors in strengthening or weakening the prospects of these NGOs. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2007 and 2008, we ask: why have these organizations failed to meet expectations as to their role in democracy promotion and peacebuilding? In answering this question, the paper will look at: 1) NGOs’ relationship to sectarianism; 2) their relationship to the state; and 3) their relationship to donors. Taken together, these factors allow us to develop a typology of civil society organizations, highlighting the diversity inherent in their structures, strategies and objectives. They allow us to refine the expectations of the democracy promotion and peace building literatures, identifying the kinds of civil society organizations most likely to have transformative potential and thus opening new lines of empirical inquiry.

The literatures on democracy promotion (Carothers and Ottaway 2005; Anderson 2006; Finkel, Pérex-Liñan and Seligson 2007) and peacebuilding (Call and Cook 2003; Posner 2004; Uvin 2006) see civil society as a fertile terrain to achieve democracy and sustainable peace. A strong and vibrant civil society is a credible bulwark against state authoritarianism (Burnell and Calvert 2004; Hawthorne 2004); it also underpins societal reconciliation and peacebuilding (Kassis 2001). Civil society is a locus of donor-led democratisation and peacebuilding efforts but we know relatively little about the conditions under which it actually fulfills these expectations. Lebanon provides a good case to investigate these conditions. Historically, its vibrant civil society (Salem 1999) has been ‘colonized’ by communally-organized logics, resulting in a strong communal mujtama’a ahli versus a weak mujtama’a madani (Traboulsi 2004). Civil society actors that tried to cross-cut sectarian lines often lacked of a strong enough sense of common purpose or common cultural frames of reference to bring –and keep– them together (Kingston 2007). Recent events in Lebanon have triggered the rise of “claims-based” NGOs (Karam 2005) that share the explicit or implicit goal of challenging the sectarian-based system. They ignited new hope of building bridges across sectarian lines to build a more democratic future. Several received considerable foreign aid. A few short years later, many are closed, defunct or inactive. Why have these efforts faltered despite donor support and a public that seemed ready for political change (Baladi, Sparks 2007)? Previous studies examined the internal challenges that these NGOs have confronted (Kingston 2007). Few questioned their commitment to the end of a sectarian-based political system. To our knowledge, none investigated the role of the state and donors in strengthening or weakening the prospects of these NGOs. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2007 and 2008, we ask: why have these organizations failed to meet expectations as to their role in democracy promotion and peacebuilding? In answering this question, the paper will look at: 1) NGOs’ relationship to sectarianism; 2) their relationship to the state; and 3) their relationship to donors. Taken together, these factors allow us to develop a typology of civil society organizations, highlighting the diversity inherent in their structures, strategies and objectives. They allow us to refine the expectations of the democracy promotion and peace building literatures, identifying the kinds of civil society organizations most likely to have transformative potential and thus opening new lines of empirical inquiry.

The United States, France and the Cedar Revolution: The assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005 triggered a wave of anti-Syrian protests and demonstrations in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon, which official Washington hailed as the Cedar Revolution. Almost instantly, Washington and Paris declared their support for the protesters, endorsing their demands for a speedy Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon and an international investigation into Hariri’s murder. Although the United States and France had been collaborating over Lebanon since at least early 2004 and were the driving force behind the adoption by the UN Security Council in September of that year of Resolution 1559 – which called, inter alia, for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon, the disarming of all militias on Lebanese soil and the extension of government authority over all of Lebanon – the Cedar Revolution provided the backdrop for deepening their involvement in internal Lebanese affairs. Thus, after years of internationally uncontested Syrian hegemony, Lebanon was transformed in the spring of 2005 to a stage on which an intricate set of local, regional and international games and alliances that transcended its national borders was played out. While the United States and France were the key international players in this game, they were joined by a cohort of regional and local players, each pursuing its interests. Focusing on the period between 2004 and the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, this paper explores a number of questions regarding US-French collaboration over Lebanon: why did the United States and France choose to work in unison over Lebanon after drifting apart over the US invasion of Iraq? What alliances they did they build with Lebanese, regional and international players in pursuit of their common goals? And what impact did their collaboration have on the politics of Lebanon and the Middle East, as well as the overall US-French relationship. In light of the paucity of academic writings on this subject, I will rely primarily on the statements of US and French leaders, US, French and Lebanese newspaper coverage and interviews with selected key players.

The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon on 26 April 2005 unleashed an overlapping regional and domestic struggle over post-Syria Lebanon. At the regional level the geopolitical confrontation involved the US, France, and the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states against a regional axis including Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hizbullah. Domestic Lebanese actors bandwagoned with external actors on either side of the regional divide to balance against local opponents. The ensuing domestic contest over the post-Syria Lebanese state has brought the country on the verge of sectarian civil war, remilitarized Lebanese society, and hardened sectarian fissures. This paper examines the domestic struggles over the institutions of the post-Syria Lebanese state. It investigates the contest between the 14 March alliance and the opposition – led by Hizbullah, Amal, and Awn’s Free Patriotic Movement – over both the civil and military institutions of post-Syria Lebanon. The state bureaucracy, the judiciary, the multiple security apparatuses, and civil society organizations but especially the labor unions and professional syndicates have all emerged as sites for this confrontation. Sectarian leaders have used neopatrimonial strategies to colonize state institutions, packing them with sectarian loyalists. This, in turn, has led to the atrophy of state institutions and their fracture along sectarian lines, thus hardening sectarian sentiments at the expense of national ones. In the process, the imperative of postwar state building has been replaced by the logic of sectarian chauvinism and clientalism. Research for this paper is based on primary material, namely personal interviews by the author with pertinent political actors and newspaper coverage in the past three years. The paper’s conclusions contribute to the substantial theoretical literature on the role of external intervention in postwar state building and democratization. It demonstrates how in Lebanon’s case external actors have spoiled the post-Syria state building process, supporting local actors who have undermined the prospects of a transition to truly accountable and representative democratic politics.

The thirty year period of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, from 1975-2005, ended with the withdrawal of the Syrian army and its intelligence network as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1559. For thirty years Syria succeeded to stabilize Lebanon to prevent the return of conflict between the Lebanese groups and pursue its political agenda but failed to contribute to state-building in post-war Lebanon. The withdrawal of the Syrian troops in April 2005 under the pressure of the international community, particularly the United States and France, left a negative impact on Lebanese domestic politics and inter-communal relations. Post-Syria Lebanon has turned out domestic conflict over issues of foreign and domestic policy and the role of the state to spread its authority over Lebanese territory. Hence, domestic conflict over who should buid and control the state overlapped with international and regional dynamics. On the one hand the United States and France with their the so-called moderate Arab allies wanted to intervene to pursue their interests and on the other handSyria and Iran wanted to counterbalance international intervention and support their Lebanese allies. This regional international intervention sharpened further the divisions between the Lebanese people who were divided, after the assassination of Rafic Hariri on 14 Feb. 2005, between the March 14 Forces and the anti-government oppostion orMarch 8 Forces. The summer 2006 Hizbullah-Israel war further deepened the rivalries between the Lebanese groups. Consequently, state institutions were paralyzed, the government was unable to rule and in May 2008 Lebanon was on the brink of civil war. Lebanon was rescued again by the Arab and Qatari mediated Doha Agreement to prevent war. elect a new President and prepare for parliamentary elections that will take place in JUne 2009. This research concludes that post-Syria Lebanon failed to mainain the peace and bolster the role of the state. This study explores a number of questions: How external intervention has contributed to the heightening of sectarian tensions? why the Lebanese have been unable tp peacefully coexist and build the strong state? why external powers failed to deliver on their promises? This research gathers its data from a number of Lebanese newspapers, books, journals and personal observations.