The Islamist Parties in North Africa and Their Strategies of Normalization
Panel 035, 2014 Annual Meeting
On Sunday, November 23 at 8:30 am
Panel Description
This panel will attempt to look at the different strategies of normalization of Islamist political parties in North Africa. While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is facing a major crackdown by the newly established military regime, Islamist parties in Morocco and Tunisia are looking for different ways to normalize their presence in the political sphere vis-à-vis an established regime in Morocco and vis-à-vis different political forces aspiring to create a more democratic order in Tunisia. Implicit in this argument is that the nature of normalization of Islamist political parties will depend on the nature of the political regime within which they operate. Even in Egypt after the coup d’état, the attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to stress peaceful political protest is revealing in terms of its long-term goal not to be excluded from power or to be sidelined as a major political force. This panel seeks to analyze the transformative organizational aspects of Islamist parties, their ideological metamorphosis (in relation to liberal political and economic discourses) and their changing strategies to be accepted as part of the mainstream political parties. Another important element for the search for normalization of Islamist political parties is their evolving relationships and changing discourse and behavior vis-à-vis Europe, the US and major institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF. The strategic goal of normalizing their presence in the political sphere locally and in the international scene will more likely create avenues for political success or failure with clear opportunities and potential constraints. This panel intends therefore to analyze also the varying degrees of constraints and opportunities facing the Islamists as they seek to normalize their presence as political parties.
Panelist 1: The rise of political Islam throughout the region poses an important question : to what extent could Islamists respond to the high expectations of the people in the region?
Panelist 2: contrary to the expected outcome of their moderation strategy, how is it possible to explain that paradox and these parties loss of Algerian Islamist voters?
Panelist 3: the changes made by the ruling Moroccan Islamist Party of Justice and Development do not reflect the process of “normalizing” itself in order to more effectively govern, but rather one of compromising its long-held positions in order to be able to hold on to political power
Panelist 4: Arguments used by Islamist parties regarding secularization and separation of religion and the state.
Islamic Parties of North Africa and the Concept of Secularization
Islamic parties typically denounce the concepts of secularism and the separation of religion and the state as western concepts that have no role in the Muslim world and that are antithetical to Islam. This paper will examine closely the arguments and rhetoric that are used by Islamist political parties in the Maghreb regarding secularization and separation, particularly with regard to: (a) historical and scriptural references to Islam and the state; (b) comparisons between Islam and “the west”; (c) arguments used to justify explain the combination of religion and the state – particularly in light of there being no successful examples – indeed possibly no examples – in the modern world of religion (or religious parties) controlling the state apparatus. (Of course this assumes that they do not think of Shi’a Iran, Sunni Saudi Arabia, or Morsi’s Egypt of being successful examples of religion controlling the state.)
The Moroccan Islamist “Party of Justice and Development” (PJD) became the dominant party in the governing coalition following the adoption of a new constitution and the elections of 2011. King Muhammad VI appointed the PJD’s leader, Abdellah Benkirane, to be the Prime Minister, a post he has held since 2011.
Although the current PJD was launched officially in 1998, it has effectively existed under other names since 1969, including Ach-Chabiba al-Islâmiyya, Al-Jamâ'a al-Islâmiyya and Al-Islah wa Tajdid. When it came to power in 2011, it was sharply debated whether the PJD would attempt to adhere to the Islamist doctrines it had developed and professed during the previous 40 years when it was out of power, or whether it would “normalize” itself by “adapting” to Realpolitik and by “modifying” its positions in order to more pragmatically govern.
The PJD has, indeed, changed many positions that it long held after it came to power. This paper suggests, however, that the changes made by the PJD do not reflect the process of “normalizing” itself in order to more effectively govern, but rather one of compromising its long-held positions in order to be able to hold on to political power. The changes thus reflect not an attempt to better govern in the complicated world of politics, but of abandoning long-stated principles in order to be able to obtain the benefits that come from holding onto power.
The first post Arab Spring elections in North Africa witnessed the victory of most of the moderate Islamist parties. Hoping to capitalize on that “Islamist wave” their Algerian counterparts created an alliance called “The Green Alliance” that was, nonetheless, severely defeated in the May 2012 Legislative Elections.
In Algeria, the moderate Islamist parties were created in 1989, further to the so-called country’s democratic opening and were centered on two main parties, HAMAS , and NAHDA , both very close to the Muslim Brothers. Since then, adopting a non-violent political opposition posture towards the regime, these two parties have rejected the FIS radical strategy that plunged the country into a ten-year civil war. However, recruiting essentially among the pious bourgeoisie and calling for a political compromise, they gathered little support within the Islamist camp during the 1989-1992 years, compared with FIS quasi-hegemony. Yet, after the 1992 FIS political ban and the ongoing the dramatic civil war, they attracted the Islamist voters, especially, HAMAS, as witnessed by the 1995 presidential election outcomes, where its candidate ranked second to the regime candidate with 25% of the votes. Hence, from 1997 to 2012, HAMAS supported President Bouteflika’s National Reconciliation policy, whereas NAHDA maintained its non-violent political opposition. But, contrary to the expectations, the moderate Islamist camp fragmented into 25 political intensely competing parties.
Thus, contrary to the expected outcome of their moderation strategy, how is it possible to explain that paradox and these parties loss of Islamist voters?
Since January 2011, the Arab region has been shaken by a wave of political unrest. The protest movements that took place throughout the region toppled autocrats in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt and brought into the circles of power rulers from Islamists movements. In Morocco, following the 2011 legislative elections, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has won a majority of seats in parliament and is currently leading the government. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood -affiliated Freedom and Justice Party won the 2012 parliamentary elections with 47,2% of seats and the presidential elections.
In Egypt and Morocco, Islamists are confronted with at least a three set of interrelated challenges: 1) Internal challenges: Islamists in Morocco and Egypt have shown a limited capacity to govern and to run their countries, 2) Islamists are participating in a transitional context which is characterized by high expectations from the people and 3) they do not have control over power and have been facing strong resistance from their regimes. In this paper, we will look at the strategies through which the Islamists in both countries try to deal with this set of challenges. Taking the concept of normalisation a key element of the new forms of Islamist politics, the paper takes a comparative approach in to dealing with how Islamists in two different political contexts confront common problems and propose solutions. For Egypt, we will start examining the strategies adopted by Muslim brotherhood in two controversial positions: firstly, when they ascended to power marking the passage from being excluded to being included in the political arena (before July 3rd ,2013). Secondly, after the ouster of the President Morsi and being declared as a banned terrorist group marking the passage from being included to being excluded from the political arena (after July 3rd ,2013). This will help us look at the strategies they have used to gain power and the strategies they are currently using in order to survive as a political force. For Morocco, the paper will look at how the PJD has attempted to normalize its political presence in a context dominated by the makhzen and politically divided parties. Part of the process of normalization of the PJD is his gradual detachment from a religiously oriented discourse and his willingness to play the political game as imposed by palace politics.
