This paper analyzes the deeper reasons and the political motives which made the Hamas leadership in Gaza opt for a military strike against the Fateh-dominated security forces as well as against Fateh’s leadership and some of its militants and members in June 2007. At the same time, a critical look is taken at some of the violent action taken during Israel’s war against Gaza (2008/2009) by Hamas against Fateh-members accused of being Israeli spies or collaborators. This paper starts with the assumption that Hamas had been able to take over full control over Gaza already in 2005, after Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas, however, rather opted for political participation and ran in both local and parliamentary elections in the period between December 2004 and January 2006. The successful showing of Hamas in the parliamentary elections transformed it from an opposition movement into the ruling party. This very transformation and the concomitant refusal of Fateh to accept its defeat at the ballot boxes created the basis for the subsequent fighting between the two movements. While Hamas tried to keep up its principled stand of not attacking other Palestinians until early 2007, despite continuous provocations on the part of Fateh, the situation changed after the breakdown of the unity government of spring 2007. When it became obvious that Fateh was preparing a coup against the elected Hamas-government in Gaza, a coup which was supported if not completely organized by international (USA) and regional actors (Egypt, Israel), Hamas felt cornered and forced to act. The previous challenges against Hamas by Fateh in both the West Bank and Gaza, on the level of strikes, a full media war, the creation of chaos, and even assassinations, contributed to this. Still, there are voices inside Hamas, which criticize the resort to force in dealing with the serious challenges posed by Fateh. This paper will present and critically analyze both positions, the one justifying the fighting against Fateh as a last resort, and the one criticizing it as being the wrong reaction which made it give up a central ideological and political principle and ultimately backfired against Hamas. The paper will use internal Hamas papers, published analyses and interpretations, as well as interviews with leaders and activists in order to arrive at a satisfactory explanation at what happened in 2007 and in early 2009.

After Hamas gained military control over Gaza through the fighting with Fateh in 2007, the split with Fateh/PA in Ramallah became almost insurmountable. However, during Israel’s war against Gaza 2008/2009, the relationship between the two movements changed to a degree forcing us to question the assumption of an insurmountable split. For despite this split since 2007, Fateh’s field leaders in Gaza and Hamas joined forces to resist the Israeli army when it attacked Gaza. Still, Fateh’s clientelist elites in Ramallah supported the colonial occupation by blaming Hamas and accusing it of being at least partially responsible for Israel’s war and even its war crimes in Gaza. This paper will analyze in depth the reasons which led to this “split” inside Fateh between the armed Fateh forces in Gaza who joined in with Hamas, and the political elites in Ramallah, who took the opposite position blaming and criticizing Hamas even in the middle of the war. The question which results from this analysis will obviously be if this inner-Fateh split could deepen, leading to a Gaza-Fateh and a Ramallah-Fateh. Another scenario might be an inner-Fateh revolt against the clientelist and collaborationist Fateh/PA elite in Ramallah. And the last scenario, obviously, would be a return to the pre-war situation with the major conflict being between Hamas and Fateh over internal Palestinian leadership. Therefore, the central research question of this paper is: what will be stronger in the long run, the challenge of the occupation (which might re-unite Fateh and Hamas, as happened on the ground in Gaza), or the never-ending process of negotiations with the occupation, cementing the rule of the Ramallah Fateh/PA elite and the split between Fateh and Hamas. To answer this question, it is crucial to explore the undergoing transformations within the Fateh movement, which undoubtedly contribute in shaping the different political decisions of its rentier elite and its field leaders. In addition, for an accurate understanding of the conflict in the context of the rentier-clientelist system, it is essential to investigate beyond the Israeli colonial context, i.e. to analyze the post-colonial policies adopted by international actors intervening in the conflict. This paper uses both the study of colonialism and of post-colonialism and its concomitant methodologies. Also, because the Palestinian case is an extremely complex case, it can only be understood by a deconstruction of existing power relations.

This Paper aims to study the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) as part of the Palestinian national movement (PNM). The analysis focuses on the ideology and thought of Hamas as an Islamist social movement, part of other movements of Political Islam, on the one hand, and as a nationalist and resistance movement on the other. A critical analysis of the relations between Hamas and Fatah will be very relevant in this context. Through its electoral victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections Hamas moved to the centre of the political discourse and of political developments in Palestine. At the same time, the relationship between Fatah and Hamas changed radically. The former ruling party did not accept the change of power in favour of Hamas. As a result, a deep political split developed, while at the same time the geographical separation between West Bank and Gaza transformed into a political separation, to fit neatly the policies of the colonial occupier. Therefore, new questions in the study of the PNM have been raised regarding nationalism and Islamism: the main question is whether Hamas is more of an Islamic movement or a nationalist one. This paper proposes to show how Hamas moved gradually to be like any other nationalist movement which builds not only on its ideology but also on political opportunities, while being controlled by changing constraints. ‘Hamas in power’ marked remarkable developments towards a more national movement, influenced by politics. The political program, discourse, and official speeches of the 10th Palestinian government formed exclusively by Hamas, focused mainly on civil issues facing Palestinian society rather than was the case with the dogmatic Islamist discourse of the 1980s. As a certain climax in this ongoing transformation, Hamas spokesperson in Gaza, Ismail Radwan, said on Aljazeera during the war on Gaza that “Hamas is a Palestinian national movement”. All these political developments require an in-depth study of Hamas’ discourse and thinking through discourse analysis based on Hamas-media, Hamas-publications, internal papers, as well as interviews. A comparison with other movements of Political Islam such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and additional movements originating in the Muslim Brotherhood will be relevant in this context.

This paper is building its analysis on empirical and analytical research data (collected by the author over the years when researching both Fateh and Hamas)as well as on the results of the first four papers in this panel which examine in detail either Fateh or Hamas, respectively the relationship between Fateh and Hamas, and finally between the two movements individually and the PNM. The last war against Gaza has somehow crystallized a perception that Hamas represents the option of resistance, while Fateh stands for authoritarian cooperation with the Israeli occupation and its supporters in the North, in particular the USA and the EU. Both conceptions will be examined critically and in detail, working with the same approaches as the previous papers, i.e. colonialist domination/occupation, authoritarian rule in a colonized context, and Political Islam in both an authoritarian and colonized environment. It will be argued, that the political elite in Fateh respectively in the PA has opted for authoritarian cooperation. This has been facilitated by the rentier-character of the PA and the concomitant "buying up" of its political elite. Assuming there are no changes pending in international policies towards the PA (and towards Israel), no changes are to be expected from the PA and from Fateh. The political leadership of Hamas, on the contrary, has clearly opted for resistance. However, while clearly popularly based, Hamas has also shown increasing signs of authoritarian tendencies, clientelist practices, and dogmatic approaches to the concept of resistance. This will lead to the final argument of this paper focusing on future scenarios in the development of the PNM. From the perspective of early 2009, it would seem that the split in the PNM is going to increase, short of clear changes in external approaches to the problems and challenges in Occupied Palestine. On the other hand, if those voices inside Fateh who criticize and oppose the current elite and its policies do gain ground, and if Hamas is building on these very voices, a unification of the major forces inside the PNM and the construction of a new PNM respectively a new PLO integrating all forces from the Islamic Jihad to Fateh and the old Palestinian Left, might seem possible. It will be argued, that this unification and the building of a new PLO are a necessary prerequisite for a potentially successful resistance option against the Israeli occupation.