This paper examines the ethical-legal theory of the "divine scales" of the Egyptian jurist, Sufi shaykh and theologian 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha‘rani (d. 1565). Scholarship on al-Sha'rani traditionally focused on the first part of his treatise "Kitab al-Mizan" (“The Book of Divine Scales”), which contains a theoretical introduction to his legal hermeneutics. However, the second part of the book, in which al-Sha'rani applies his theory in practice, considering rulings from all categories of Islamic law, has not been studied yet. Through an analysis of the published edition and manuscripts of "al-Mizan", this paper contends that al-Sha'rani went beyond the esoteric Sufi interpretation of legal rulings. He created unique legal hermeneutics successfully integrating Sufi theory into the methodology of Islamic law (usul al-fiqh). According to his Sufi-legal synthesis, there is an “internal” rationale (‘illa) behind every ruling that has been established within the framework of four schools of Islamic law. The founders of the four schools (Abu Hanifa, Malik b. Anas, Muhammad Idris b. al-Shafi‘i and Ahmad b. Hanbal) were able to define this rationale through near-prophetic inspiration ("kashf") from the divine. “Al-Mizan” shows that the “inner” rationale, which lies behind every Islamic ruling, could bear ethical, esoteric and social aspects and could be identified only by those who achieved the highest level of spirituality. Al-Sha'rani argues that often jurists and common folk believe in irreconcilable contradictions between the legal schools because they can see only the "external" rationale of the rulings without seeing their "inner" rationale. From the earliest period of Islamic history, Sufis expressed their own vision on the legal rulings. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) provided an extensive esoteric interpretation of Islamic norms, while Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240) created a distinct Sufi “madhhab” (legal school). What is unique about al-Sha'rani’s contribution, is that it integrates Sufi concepts and Islamic legal theory (in predominantly Shafi'ite interpretation) employing such legal notions and maxims as “urgent necessity” (darura), “need” (haja), “necessities permit the forbidden” (al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat), “objectives” (maqasid) and “means” (wasa'il) through the framework of Sufi hermeneutics (introducing the concept of ruhaniyya “spirituality” of legal rulings). One could say that “al-Mizan” offers Sufi interpretation of the objectives, wisdom or rationale behind each ruling of shari‘a, which was established within the framework of four schools. Therefore, al-Sha‘rani’s legal theory can be considered as a Sufi alternative to maqasid al-shari‘a (higher objectives of Islamic law).

Although the Qizilbash founded the Safavid state and constituted the backbone of its military during the sixteenth century, we know little about their beliefs, rituals, and organizational structure. Scholars envision the Qizilbash as militant, extremist Shi‘ites (ghulat) whose excessive beliefs in the persons of the Safavid shaykhs/shahs created an outburst of politico-military potency that eventually carried the Safavid dynasty to imperial rule. Common wisdom also holds that undisciplined Qizilbash religiosity was incompatible with the regular state order and therefore waned as Twelver Shi'ite ulema and Persian bureaucrats gained the upper hand in the governmental apparatus during the early decades of the sixteenth century. Challenging this vision, the present paper argues that Qizilbash religiosity, which was epitomized in the Safavid Sufi Order, did not wane after the foundation of the state but was transformed into a particular form of religious system that functioned as the unofficial law of the military class. The Qizilbash considered themselves as the disciples of the Safavid Sufi Order until the demise of the dynasty, and the doctrines and rituals of this order, termed "S?figar?” in contemporary Persian sources, provided the organizational infrastructure for the Qizilbash army. Safavid sources include little information about the inner world of the Qizilbash for several reasons. Yet a careful reading of historical works such as ‘?lam?r?-ye ‘Abb?s? of Iskandar Beg Munsh? and Khul?sat al-taw?rikh of al-Qumm? reveals some valuable details concerning their organization, internal discipline, and related matters. Surprisingly, Ottoman sources, such as spy reports, records of the decisions of the imperial council, and chronicles of court historians give more information on the religiosity and organizational structure of the Qizilbash. More importantly, recently discovered literary sources that have been produced and preserved by the Alevi community in Turkey, who are the descendants of the Qizilbash, provides us with a relative wealth of insider information about beliefs and rituals of the Qizilbash. Among them, a book called Man?qib-i Shaykh ?af?, commonly known as Buyruq (Commandment) among Alevis, is particularly important as it explains fundamental beliefs, rituals, and socioreligious institutions of the Qizilbash in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Combining these three groups of sources, this paper offers a preliminary look at the principal rituals and organizational institutions of the Qizilbash in Iran roughly between 1501 and 1590, from the foundation of the Safavid state to the reforms of Shah ‘Abbas.

While the great diversity and vitality of thought in the early modern Ottoman Empire has been recognized, the relationship between ??fism, invigorated by Ibn ?Arab?’s ontological and epistemological framework, and the law remains poorly understood. Sixteenth-century Ottoman jurists levelled many criticisms against Ibn ?Arab? and philosophical mysticism, wary of the subversive potential of ??f? epistemology for their traditional authority. In particular, the capacity of an advanced ??f? to perceive the hidden “reality” (?aq?qa) underlying the shar??a through kashf (unveiling) or ilh?m (inspiration) threatened the necessity of recourse to legal reasoning as developed in works of u??l and fur?? al-fiqh, while the individualistic nature of ??f? “reasoning” undermined the communal nature of Islamic rule-derivation and verification. This tension was not ignored by early-modern ??f?s and jurists. Thus far, some attention has been paid to the 16th-century Cairene Sh?fi?? jurist ?Abd al-Wahh?b al-Sha?r?n? (d. 973/1565), whose al-M?z?n al-kubr? sought to accommodate ??f? ontology and epistemology to the traditional strictures of the law. The present paper focuses on a less-studied work by al-Sha?r?n?’s contemporary, the Meccan Sh?fi?? jurist Ibn ?ajar al-Haytam? (d. 974/1566), whose al-Fat?w? al-?ad?thiyya contains fat?w? that similarly sought to bridge the gap between ??fism and the law. However, while al-Sha?r?n?’s work is clearly aimed at potentially transgressive ??f?s, seeking to keep them within the fold of the law, Ibn ?ajar’s fat?w? aim to legitimize ??f? doctrines and scholars, particularly Ibn ?Arab? and Ibn al-F?ri?, in the eyes of the more conservative Meccan ?ulam??. His frequent citation of authorities recognized by the Meccan community as orthodox Sunn?s, such as the Meccan-Yemeni scholar-??f? ?Af?f al-D?n al-Y?fi?? (d. 768/1367), certainly belies his awareness of his environment. He cites these authorities to justify a number of controversial mystical doctrines in his day. Most importantly, he constrains the potential for ??f? transgression by not only attesting that kashf or ilh?m could never contradict the shar??a, but that knowledge gained through such supra-rational means cannot constitute a ??f?’s legal education. Rather, knowledge of the shar??a – its methods and rulings – can only be attained through instruction (ta?l?m). Because God never adopts an ignorant saint, the latter’s legal authority necessarily rests on his knowledge of the exoteric legal sciences, rather than his capacity for kashf and ilh?m. In sum, Ibn ?ajar’s fat?w? illustrate how widespread paradigms of belief in his day could be reconciled with those that came before, thus safeguarding both extra-textual and textual modes of authority.