The division of Kurdistan, a historic and a geographic region, between the semi-sovereign states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria after the end of First World War excluded Kurds from the right to full 'citizenship' and the right to a Kurdish state 'a homeland'. These states governed Kurds and Kurdistan through most repressive techniques of political economy, apparatuses of security, and communication technology. Kurds challenged these states' exercise of sovereign right over Kurdistan, and they deemed the borderline drawn between parts of Kurdistan unjust, against rules of natural law, natural justice, and cause of instability to Kurdish and Kurdistan society. In the present, most democratic member states of the international community favour a lasting settlement to the Kurdish Question through the foundation of Kurdish right to a sovereign 'homeland'. What is sovereigntyi Sovereignty is a Westphalian conceptualization of 'juridical-political-social' autonomous administrative structure founded on non-intervention principle. Any empirical and, or, imagined engagement with sovereignty needs to be realized in the context of its domain time, space and its people, citizens. Time and space history and geography-territory are critical for the realization of sovereignty. They are indication of sovereign's period-duration, province and allocation of the right to citizenship for its residents. The passage of Westphalian sovereignty begun after the end of the Cold War, and practices of post-sovereignty in the Middle East emerged. Post-sovereignty is a global governance model. It is synonymous to post-colonialism, cosmopolitics and diaspora. It is an approach and a practice concurrent with the emergence of globalization, global governance of the fragile and failed states through defence, diplomacy, prevention of refugee exodus, humanitarian intervention in conflict areas, and development through aid. Has the emergence of post-sovereignty in the Middle East contributed to improvement of justice, human rights, stability and inclusive societies

In the contentious literature on the linkages between economic and political development (Lipset 1959; Diamond 1992; Przeworski et al. 2000; Epstein et al. 2006), the Gulf state of Qatar is an important test case. One of the most interesting debates has centered on a particular type of "anomaly": those authoritarian regimes that appear able to pursue a selective reform agenda that increases economic development and transparency while leaving in place the political structures that maintain and even strengthen the authoritarian system. The true puzzle is the high economic growth of many of these countries even as the political systems remain propped up by "crony capitalism," in which the political authorities bestow favors of high economic value (e.g., grants of free money or favorable credit, monopolies and trade protections, selective awarding of contracts and import licenses) on the basis of personal ties or favoritism. We see this type of behavior in all areas of the world---Latin America (Haber 2002), Africa (Bates 1981 and 1989), East Asia (Kang 2002), and the Middle East (Heydemann 2004)---but, unsurprisingly, findings differ as to how economic growth succeeds in this environment, how needed economic reforms are passed, and whether this pattern is sustainable over time. My goal is to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the economic and political processes in the Gulf region. Using Qatar as an in-depth case study, my work asks an important question: How are the authoritarian regimes of the Gulf maintaining political control while simultaneously expanding their economies through regulation, transparency, rule of law, and other measures that normally erode authoritarian strengtht And then: Is this sustainable over timem Using network analysis (Heydemann 2004), I study how networks of state and business actors work together to preserve and privilege their economic access. I supplement the network analysis of cronyism with the literature on legitimacy and state-building to explain continued political control (Alagappa 1995; White 2005). I am combining field research with secondary literature, positioning Qatar within the Gulf regional context and as part of a wider case selection of authoritarian regimes that seek to balance increased economic complexity and transparency with politically closed---yet still legitimate---regimes. I aim to contribute to the underdeveloped academic literature on Qatar as well as situate it more firmly amid contemporary debates on economic and political policy in the Gulf region and the world as a whole.

With the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world, despite political liberalization in much of the region in the 1990s, scholars have shifted their analytical lens from examining the prospects of democratization to the reasons for democracy's failure and finally to the reasons for authoritarianism's success in the region (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). The conditions under which authoritarian regimes persist, how they adapt, and the mechanisms they use to maintain control increasingly are the subjects of debate. However, the literature on strategies of state control deals almost exclusively at the national level (Lust-Okar 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 2006; Bank 2004; Bank and Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2004, 2007; Albrecht 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) with little research available on the municipal level (Tajbakhsh, 2000; Baylouny 2005). This paper questions the role municipal governments play as instruments of authoritarian state control. Based on fieldwork conducted in Jordan, this paper argues that municipal governments act as instruments of state control through three primary means. The first is the de-politicization of municipal politics through changes to the laws (1955 and 2007) that govern municipalities. Legal amendments have restricted the scope of municipal responsibilities, and, as a result, have confined the role of municipal governments to service provision. Without any significant legislative or governance role, municipal governments provide a weak base for political parties or potential opposition leadership. The second is the appointment of pro-regime figures to municipal governments by the central government and/or the approval by the central government of appointments of regime-loyal figures at the municipal level by regime-loyal mayors. The result is a municipal government over which reform-minded mayors have little authority. The third form of state control is via municipalities' local development projects. Responding to the central government's call for municipalities to generate their own revenues, municipalities are engaging in public-private investment projects. Fieldwork indicates that these projects provide another means through which regime-loyal figures, in the form of investors, are strengthened. Significantly, the role of municipalities as service providers and, consequently, as instruments of state control is being indirectly entrenched by foreign donor programmes engaged in local development projects. This process will deepen with the implementation of Jordan's decentralization law which strengthens municipalities' service and income-generation roles. Interviews for this paper were conducted in municipalities throughout Jordan. In-depth case studies were conducted in eight municipalities engaged in public-private investment projects.