Do citizens in autocracies believe official discourse? Existing literature has shed light on how autocratic elites use propaganda and rhetoric more broadly to cement their rule and manufacture consent to their policies. Target audiences of such discourses can be the international community and state actors abroad, but also domestic populations. The communication of autocrats has been studied in the context of legitimation strategies. This paper gives a twist to this research by not investigating “positive” legitimation but focusing on justifications of repression in times of contention, and on how such justifications are received by domestic and international audiences. This paper asks 1) how autocrats try to garner legitimacy even for their repressive actions, and 2) how citizens and target groups abroad receive such arguments. We analyze the speeches by officials in Morocco and Tunisia during the Arab uprisings in late 2010 and early 2011 and how they were received by domestic and international audiences. In bringing together both the senders and the audiences of official narratives surrounding the protests in 2010-2011, we differentiate between recipients on the domestic and international levels. The main argument of our paper is that the variance in the responses towards the rhetoric strategies in the two countries also influenced the dynamics of protests leading to divergent outcomes, paving the way for democratic transition in Tunisia and autocratic regime renewal in Morocco. We adopt a qualitative approach employing methods such as event and frame analysis based on the content analysis of speeches by officials during the protests in 2010-2011. For studying the responses of domestic audiences, we have conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with activists and observers of the uprisings in Tunisia, Morocco, and Brussels between 2012 and 2022. Interviewees include representatives from NGOs, political parties, women’s and youth movements, professional associations, as well as officials, journalists, academics, and bloggers. This paper is the first to dig into the meso-level of audiences of discourses in autocracies. This adds to our understanding of the nexus of political communication, contentious politics, and state violence under authoritarianism. At the same time, we also shed light on the international dimensions of external support for autocrats or their opponents. This contributes to adding a piece to the puzzle of autocratic resilience and breakdown in the modern Maghreb.

Research Question: This study explores how civil society in Afghanistan has adapted and sustained itself in the face of extremist governance under the uncivil society structures the Taliban has sought to impose. It seeks to understand the strategies used by civil society actors to navigate the constraints of authoritarianism and maintain and develop their roles in promoting social cohesion and human rights. Thesis Statement: Drawing on the concepts of third space (Chamberlain, 1940; Van Til, 2008), collaborative commons (Rifkin, 2014), and new commons (Lohmann, 2015), this research argues that civil society in Afghanistan has evolved innovative approaches to operate within and beyond traditional structures. Despite facing repression, civil society remains a vital force for social change and resistance to extremist ideologies. Through an analysis of intermediary structures and third spaces, this research highlights the innovative strategies employed by civil society actors to sustain their activities and influence within a repressive environment. Methodology: This qualitative study utilizes a literature review, expert interviews, and analysis of primary sources such as social media and organizational documents. Well established practices of civil society are contrasted with “dark side” (Cf. D. H. Smith, 2016) policies of uncivil society (Gross and Kotkin, 2009). These frameworks guide the analysis of how civil society in Afghanistan operates within and beyond traditional organizational boundaries. Data Sources: • Reports from international organizations, NGOs, and human rights groups in Afghanistan. • Online publications and social media of Afghan civil society organizations. • Interviews with key actors countering extremism in Afghanistan. • Academic research on civil society in conflict zones. Research and Results: Preliminary findings suggest that civil society in Afghanistan has undergone significant transformations in response to the Taliban regime. While some organizations have been forced to operate clandestinely or suspend their activities, others have adapted by leveraging digital technologies and forming strategic alliances with international partners. The research will delve into specific case studies and examples to illustrate these dynamics and provide a nuanced understanding of civil society's resilience in the face of extremism. Conclusions and Recommendations: The findings of this research are expected to contribute to the body of knowledge on civil society dynamics in conflict-affected environments and offer insights for policymakers, practitioners, and civil society actors working in similar contexts. By highlighting the innovative strategies and challenges faced by civil society in Afghanistan, this study aims to inform strategies for supporting and strengthening civil society in the fight against extremism.

Most academic accounts written on the “global mufti” Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Arab Spring politics focused on his support of most Arab uprisings, explaining this support by his “revolutionary,” “modern,” “democratic,” or “republican” political thought (Al-Azami 2021; Al-Khatib 2014; Fadel 2016; Moosa 2015; Osman 2015). These accounts, however, do not pay enough attention to al-Qaradawi’s positions that do not align with the ideological positions attributed to him. Taking al-Qaradawi as a case study, this article answers the following question: How do “ideologically committed” intellectuals form their political opinions and actions during politically volatile times? I argue that in these situations, intellectuals adopt consequentialist ethical reasoning that is primarily concerned with the interest of their potentially threatened asabiyya (solidarity) groups. In the case of al-Qaradawi, he prioritizes consequentialist Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-maʾālāt) over revolutionary Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-thawra). Theoretically, this argument builds on Weber’s analysis of political moral dilemmas seen in the competition between “conviction ethics” and “responsibility ethics,” and Ibn Khaldun’s theorization of asabiyya (intense group feeling). Empirically, I chronologically order about a thousand primary sources about al-Qaradawi and his religious and political context, collected from news reports, books and memoirs, TV interviews, Friday sermons, and interviews with people in al-Qaradawi’s circles. Methodologically, my research design utilizes comparative and process tracing methods by leveraging al-Qaradawi’s political stances on different contemporaneous uprisings (the 2011 Egyptian, 2011 Bahraini, and 2013 Sudanese), tracing why his political stance varied over them.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution enabled religiously conservative women to partake in building a Shi’i revolutionary state by creating unparalleled access to the women’s seminaries. I lived in Iran for 15 months to explore what being loyal to this project looked like for them. Of the eight women, five were students of the Supreme Leader, and over twenty were involved with the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary organization. While my ethnography, “Paths Made by Walking” (forthcoming September 2024), tells stories about what I have learned from the women, it does not detail my challenges of doing fieldwork with them, who are at the forefront of supporting the Islamic Republic. In this paper, I describe the precarity of red-flag moments I set aside in order to accomplish my fieldwork; moments that include interrogation, documentation of my actions, encounters with state actors, and violence. I situate my experiences in Holland’s figured worlds as symbolic spaces made meaningful by narratives, actors and interactions with each other (Holland 2009). As I increasingly recreated my sense of self as part of the women’s figured worlds, the more I cared about my presentation of self, an attempt that was built on the common ground of our Muslimness. But, there were other greater figured worlds in the sociohistoric time and space being constituted and reconstituted at the same time; those that identified me as a possible threat because I, history-in-person, though a Muslim, came from a place, the United States, that has historically sought to destroy their project. I explore this critical tension for what we might learn about a particular kind of surveillance, and the exercise of colonial power on forms of Muslim womanhood.

This study interrogates the logic behind repression in authoritarian contexts, aiming to understand the manner in which repression is carried out and who it targets. Much of the literature on repression in authoritarian regimes assumes that repressive strategies are static or "sticky." Using arrest data from Egypt over the past decade, I challenge this assumption, and demonstrate that repression is a more dynamic process, with regimes updating their tactics in response to shifting contexts. The research employs a mixed-methods approach to uncover the nuanced evolution of repressive methods over time. Initial findings reveal a higher rate of targeted arrests immediately following the 2103 coup, which then evolves into more reactive strategies. These strategies aim to preempt specific dates of potential mobilization, becoming more indiscriminate and targeting a broader spectrum of perceived threats to the regime and potential opposition groups. This pronounced shift in patterns of arrest over time indicates that authoritarian strategies are far more adaptive and calculated than previously acknowledged. This insight reshapes our understanding of authoritarian repression, emphasizing its fluid nature and offering new perspectives on the complexities of maintaining control in authoritarian states. The findings have broad implications for both academic research and policy-making in addressing human rights abuses, highlighting the need for a dynamic understanding of repression in authoritarian regimes.

On the morning of April 15th, residents of Khartoum awoke to find themselves trapped between two military factions who had turned the city into a battleground, destroying whole neighborhoods with artillery, air strikes, and door to door combat. Nearly a year later, the battle still rages, having claimed the lives of thousands and displaced more than ten million in the “largest internal displacement crisis in the world.” With its capital leveled and the rest of the country divided between the two warring camps, Sudan’s attempted democratic transition has ended in tragedy. Democratic transitions are difficult and uncertain ventures (Ulfelder 2010), yet just two years earlier Sudan looked like a potential model for emulation rather than a cautionary tale. Sudan was a case, where “sustained mobilization but also organization, divided regimes, and international pressure [converted] a revolution into a transition.” Compared to Algeria whose own uprising struggled to achieve any goals beyond deposing the country’s longtime dictator, in Sudan “Three factors stand out: 1) the differing level of organization among protesters; 2) the unity/disunity of the regime’s security forces; and 3) international mediation, or lack thereof”. These three factors, the high level of organization that coordinated calendars of protest and forged a political coalition, disunity in the security forces that led to defections away from the countries longtime dictator and two competing military bodies, and international mediation that established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) turned bread protests into a robust movement for change. This paper asks: why did a well-organized, long running, mass protest movement that toppled a dictator and installed a transitional government fail to lead to a democratic transition in Sudan? What factors prevented the country’s “glorious revolution” from achieving its aims? To answer these questions I focus on a key set of actors: The revolutionary forces of the RCs and the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), the political parties, international actors, and the counter-revolutionary forces of the military and its regional supporters. Instead of adopting merely a revolutionary versus counter-revolutionary perspective, I highlight the complex and often unexpected web of incentives that set pro-democratic forces against each other resulting in a transition trap that turned the very prospect of democratic politics into a catalyst for war.