From the 'Abbasid Revolution of 750 until the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in 1258, the 'Abbasid caliphate claimed to dominate the medieval Islamic world. But, by the ninth century, their power was more often symbolic than real. Within Iraq and Iran, the 'Abbasids began to lose direct control over the lands of Islam as early as the ninth century. Further afield in Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain, the 'Abbasids often did not even have nominal power by the tenth century.
This panel draws together scholars who work on challengers to the 'Abbasids, such as the Fatimids, Buyids, Seljuks, Tahirids, and Mazyadids. Often, the stories of these challengers are marginalized within the larger field of medieval Islamic history. While there are extensive bibliographies for some of these 'challengers' (e.g., Fatimids, Buyids, Seljuks), much of it focuses more on the polities themselves than on their wider position with regard to the disintegration of the Abbasid "Empire." Further, some of these 'challengers', such as the Mazyadids and Tahirids, have been relatively neglected.
The papers in this panel focus on these polities and bring their contributions back into the broader narrative of the development of the medieval Islamic world. From questions of how the Seljuks and 'Abbasids worked together to counter intracommunal violence in Baghdad to explorations of how medieval bureaucrats who shifted between the courts of rival dynasties affected the court cultures of these competing empires, this panel reveals how these 'Abbasid challengers engaged with the caliphate and played pivotal roles in defining medieval Islamic society. Further, this panel also explores how these 'Abbasid challengers acted as intermediaries between caliphal authority and local elites and how these non-'Abbasid dynasties were portrayed and remembered in later Islamic historiography.
Further, this panel brings together a wide variety of sources on the ninth to eleventh centuries: historical chronicles sponsored by the Seljuks, Buyids, Fatimids, and 'Abbasids, by authors such as Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Rudhrawari, Abu al-Buqqa al-Hilli, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, and al-Maqrizi; political manuals by Nizam al-Mulk; travel narratives by al-Muqaddasi, and a variety of legal manuals. By bringing together papers that analyze the role of non-'Abbasid polities within the decentralizing 'Abbasid 'Empire', this panel explores the relationships between the 'Abbasids, their challengers, and political, social, and religious elites of the ninth through eleventh centuries, thereby illuminating the changing nature of the socio-cultural/socio-political milieu during this pivotal era.
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Dr. Christine Baker
The era of the Fatimids (909-1171) and the Buyids (945-1055) is often known in scholarship as the “Shi’i Century.” During this period, these two Shi’i states rose to power in North Africa, Iraq, and Iran, challenging the power of the Sunni ‘Abbasid caliphate. Thus, this period is often remembered in medieval primary sources and modern secondary sources as a time of extreme sectarian conflict, when new Shi’i movements were challenging the authority of the Sunni ‘Abbasid hegemony over Islam.
This paper, however, challenges the notion that the ‘Shi’i century’ gave birth to an era of sectarian conflict in Islam. Instead, it argues that there was no unified tenth-century Sunni response to the rise of these two Shiʿi dynasties. This paper accomplishes this task by examining contemporary – tenth century – Sunni responses to the rise of the Fatimids and the Buyids, and then contrasting them with portrayals of this period dating to the eleventh century and later. The post tenth-century Sunni sources depict the Fatimid and Buyid era as one of sectarian conflict. The tenth-century Sunni sources, however, written by Muslim travelers, Sunni religious scholars, and Sunni religious officials living under Fatimid and Buyid rule, are not predominately concerned with the Shiʿi identity of these two Shiʿi states. These tenth-century Sunni sources focus instead on conflict between the different Sunni schools of jurisprudence and on the disintegration of 'Abbasid power.
Tenth-century sources paint a much different picture of sectarian conflict than eleventh to fifteenth-century historical chronicles, which cast the tenth century as a sectarian narrative. These tenth-century sources, such as Al-Muqaddasi’s Ahsan al-Taqasim fi Ma'arifat Al-Aqalim, Al-Khushani’s Kitab tabaqat ʿulama’ Ifriqiya, Al-Tanukhi’s al-Mudawwanah al-Kubra, Al-Qayrawani’s Kitab al-Jamiʿ and ‘Arib b. Saʿd al-Qurtubi’s Silat ta’rikh al-Tabari, reveal the ways that local non-Shi’i Muslims reacted to the advent of Shi’i rule in North Africa and Iraq. Thus, this paper will demonstrate the diversity and fluidity of medieval Islamic identity and challenges the notion of rigid sectarian conflict in the medieval Islamic world.
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Dr. Robert Haug
Under the year 224/838-39, al-Tabari relates the story of a conflict between the Bavandid ruler of Tabaristan, Mazyar b. Qaren, and the Tahirid governor of Khurasan `Abdallah b. Tahir. Mazyar did not want to send the kharaj from his domains to the Tahirids, instead preferring to send the money directly to the caliph al-Mu`tasim. The impression we receive is that Mazyar did not see himself as the Tahirid’s inferior and did not want an intermediary between himself and the caliph. He was encouraged in this attitude by the Afshin Haydar who had his own rivalries with `Abdallah b. Tahir over control of Transoxania. In the end, al-Mu`tasim supported the Tahirids. `Abdullah’s forces entered Tabaristan and captured Mayzar, who was then executed by the caliph.
Most scholarly interest in the Tahirid dynasty, both as governors of Khurasan and the holders of high political office in Baghdad, focuses on questions of autonomy and their relationship to the `Abbasids. While the approach to the Tahirids has moved away from the image of the dynasty as proto-Persian nationalists, we have only begun to explore the role the Tahirids played as intermediaries between caliphal authority and local elites. This paper focuses on the exchange between the Tahirids as regional autonomous representatives of the `Abbasid caliphate and local elites throughout Khurasan and its neighbors. The interactions between the Tahirids and more localized authorities, especially in moments when Tahirid authority is contested locally or when Tahirid authority is explicitly reconfirmed through appointments or alliances, may be a window where we can see more clearly not only how the Tahirids saw their position as an intermediary between imperial and local authority but also how others conceived of Tahirid authority as well.
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Dr. Eric J. Hanne
This presentation provides some of the results from my ongoing mongraph project on the Mazyadids (~350-558/961-1163), an Arab Shīʿite amirate that had an influential role in the devlopment of the post-334/945 political arena. Modern scholars have largely ignored the Mazyadid presence in this arena and the ways in which the medieval chroniclers portrayed it. Barring the works of Karabecek (Leipzig, 1874), Makdisi (JAOS, 1954), and Najī (Baghdad, 1970), which provide the basic foundation for the history of this dynasty, no real work has been done to place the Mazyadids into the larger narrative of ʿAbbāsid “successor states.” Building off of Makdisi’s article, which highlighted the difficulties in establishing the origin dates of both the Mazyadid amirate and its establishment of Ḥilla as its “capital,” my research focuses on the ways in which the medieval Arab chroniclers (e.g., al-Rūdhrāwarī, Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Ḥillī, al-Bundārī, Ibn al-Athīr, and Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī) depicted ʿAlī b. Mayzyad (r. ~350-408/961-1017) and Dubays b. ʿAlī’s (r. 408-474/1017-1082) creation of a presence in central Iraq and what this tells us about the nature of the “post-ʿAbbāsid” socio-political arena. As I will show, once we work through the chroniclers’ omissions, internal inconsistencies, and editorializing, a clearer picture of the Mazyadid military and political relationships with their allies/adversaries (e.g., Buyids, ʿUqaylids, ʿAbbāsids, etc.) emerges. Whereas one can argue that the Mazyadids were more of a disruptive than stabilizing element in the poltical arena, causing numerous problems for the “established powers,” the chroniclers’ found that portraying this history was just as problematic for their larger narratives. It is only when we fully integrate the Mazyadids into the mix that we can have a more accurate, informed understanding of the decentralized nature of political culture following the disintegration of ʿAbbāsid power and how the medieval historians related it.
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Mr. Mohammed Allehbi
After the Seljuq conquest of Baghdad in 1055 CE, Tughril Beg and his successors replaced the Buyids as the designated military protectors of the Abbasids in Baghdad. A unique situation occurred in the early Seljuq era in which two regimes coexisted in Baghdad and maintained public order together. In this period, sectarian violence was epidemic in Baghdad. Ḥanbalis and Shafiʿis fought in street battles in the urban quarters of the city over disagreements in theology while the violent conflicts between Sunni and Shia continued from the Buyid era and became progressively worse.
The Seljuq governor, the shiḥna, had at his disposal the entire military garrison of Baghdad to confront the sectarian militias. The Abbasid Caliphs’ police force at times worked together with the shiḥna. Also, the Abbasid Caliphs’ ties with urban notables and religious scholars in Baghdad allowed them the ability to mediate these sectarian conflicts. On the other hand, at times, Abbasid and Seljuq’s administrations’ attempts to deal effectively with the sectarian violence either were unsuccessful or escalated the violence further.
A major factor that determined the success and failures of Abbasid and Seljuq’s efforts to reduce sectarian violence was the relationship between these two regimes. A working relationship between these two polities could lead to a decrease in these violent outbreaks. Inversely, an antagonistic relationship between these two regimes driven by their differing political interests could led to a escalation of public disorder and an infringement on the effectiveness of the law enforcement institutions and channels for mediation. As such, exploring the efforts of Abbasid and Seljuq’s administrations’ efforts to deal with sectarian violence in Baghdad within the background of their ever-changing relations provides a greater understanding of the maintenance of public order in Baghdad during this period. The paper utilizes Seljuq era chroniclers such as Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 1200 CE), Sibṭ ibn al- Jawzī (d. 1256 CE), and Ibn al-Bannā’ al-Ḥanbalī (d. 1079 CE). However, there is a lack of contemporary Seljuq era chroniclers, which poses an issue for the historiography of this period. The study's methodology is not based on verifying the accuracy of the incidents reported in these narratives, but rather on confirming the decisive factors in the constructed realities of these chroniclers, which resulted in the successes and failures of the Abbasids and Seljuqs’ approach to sectarian violence.
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In his treatment of the brief triumph of the Fatimid supported ex-Buyid, ex-Abbasid, Turkish general al-Basasiri over the Seljuk leader Tughril Bek in 1057-58, the Egyptian historian al-Maqrizi briefly mentions that the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustansir started to build a palace that later became known as the western palace to house the Abbasid Caliph al-Qa’im. As we know, al-Basasiri’s triumph was short-lived; Tughril Bek returned to Baghdad and reinstated the Abbasid Caliph under Seljuk control. Nonetheless, the fact that the Fatimids had put in place a plan, not to eliminate the Abbasid Caliph, but to give him a place in the Fatimid court suggests that the Fatimids had a vision of the relationship between the different parts of the family of the Prophet that envisioned the Abbasid Caliph working for them.
It was not just the Abbasid Caliph for which the Fatimids found a place. The Fatimid court was rife with people who had started their careers in the service of the Abbasids, Buyids, and Seljuks in places like Baghdad, Rayy, and Shiraz. Abbasid and Buyid immigrants came to Cairo either drawn by its power and wealth or as refugees. Things went the other way also. Members of the Cairo court end up in Baghdad, Shiraz, and Rayy serving the Abbasid Caliphs, and the Buyid and Seljuk Amirs. .
The question then becomes, does this exchange of personnel mean that the three courts had similar court cultures? Much is made of the rise of “peripheral” states in the Islamic Middle Period, but how much of a change did this represent? Were Cairo and Shiraz poor imitations of Baghdad? Or did they develop their own court culture?
Based on the patterns of the exchange examined above, the peripheral courts were a draw in and of themselves and many courtiers felt that they could make better careers in Shiraz and in Cairo than they could in Baghdad. Likewise the direct exchanges between Shiraz and Cairo suggest that some never felt the need to try their hand at Baghdad and instead went for the opportunities available to them in these peripheral courts. All of this suggests that in fact the peripheral courts were not in fact poor cousins to Baghdad but had powerful court cultures all their own.
