(Youth) unemployment has been one of the central factors sparking the Tunisian revolution in 2011, although (graduate) unemployment was already a structural challenge long before 2011. The Tunisian revolution had negative impacts on the macro economy, accentuated unemployment, and raised local and global awareness for the challenge of job creation. Due to the current regional context (e.g. negative impact of the Libyan civil war on the Tunisian economy) and the challenges of the Tunisian political and institutional transformation process (e.g. high number of succeeding governments), urgent economic reforms have been reported. Recent studies predict that unemployment will remain high for the next two decades, mainly due to the demographic situation, and report that unemployment is the second most important concern for the majority of the population, right after security threats. Today, the Tunisian labour market is marked by a strong increase of higher education graduates facing an economic system dominated by sectors mainly employing non-qualified labour force. The paper identifies major factors that hinder a more fluid matchmaking between jobseekers and employers, and explores the question how these factors could be coped with. It suggests that three factors are most relevant to the existing mismatch: low job creation, little public-private co-governance in education, and inefficient employment agency. The paper argues that a comprehensive approach of employment-, education-, and private sector development is needed, for coping with the mismatch in a mid- and long-term perspective and for fostering a sustainable employment policy in Tunisia. Using the example of the education system, it develops ideas how certain reforms could provide a response to the rapidly changing (skill) needs of the labour market. These reforms could include: re-training of higher education graduates, revalorising non-academic professions, and intensifying public-private co-governance of vocational education. By tackling the skill mismatch, structural unemployment can, at least partially, be reduced, and the employability of jobseekers can be increased. The paper uses a qualitative approach based on empirical results gathered during a field study in Tunisia in 2015, including semi-structured face-to-face interviews with entrepreneurs, education experts and political decision-makers. Keywords: Tunisia, Arab Spring, social uprisings, (youth) unemployment, labour market, employment policy, employability, education policy, skill development, private sector development.

It’s been five years since Tunisia’s 2011 “Jasmine Revolution” inspired region-wide revolutions and uprisings against authoritarianism. Many of the causal factors behind the Jasmine Revolution pertain to the country’s socioeconomic health and status. Under Zain-ul Abideen Ben Ali, Tunisia suffered terribly from high unemployment, a corresponding youth bulge, high rates of university graduates who faced joblessness and economic stagnation, gross corruption that penetrated all levels of society, and deficiencies in rule of law. In other words, if you were a young Tunisian and a university graduate, you were not likely to find a job, marry and start a family, and in practically every economic sector you faced no recourse from corruption. If you complained, you faced threats of imprisonment, torture, and no means of protection. Since the revolution, the Tunisian people have been determined to overhaul the political, judicial, and economic systems. This analysis focuses on the Tunisian economy and assesses its strengths and weaknesses five years following the revolution. The study examines the Tunisian economy’s indicators, development and progress, trade relations, employment rates, and other relevant indicators that measure economic health. Comparisons are made between the pre- and post-revolution economies. Threats that terrorism poses to Tunisia’s tourism industry are also explored. Amartya Sen’s “Social Choice Theory” is applied as the theoretical framework in this study. The theory posits that, without freedoms and rights for individuals to make personal choices, an economy will not develop and progress adequately. Conclusions about Tunisia’s economic outlook for the near and distant future are presented. Implications of the post-revolution Tunisian economy for the region, as well as for Tunisia’s European trade partners, are also presented. Particular focus on the post-revolution status of corruption in Tunisia is presented, since corruption has been one of the principal causal factors behind the revolution. Finally, linkages are identified between Tunisia’s political and economic health and development, which also encompass rule of law issues, such as human rights, freedoms, transparency, and due process. All of these variables are interconnected, and account for the causal factors of the revolution. Hence, it is crucial to approach a study of Tunisia’s economy from Political Economy levels of analysis. Clearly, if Tunisia’s post-revolution economic health and status have not improved, and have failed to eliminate corruption, reduce high rates of unemployment, and implement rule of law effectively and fairly, then Tunisia will only go back to square one.

What has the role of Egyptian communities across the Arab world been for post-2011 Egypt? In the Middle East, a region historically rich in a variety of migratory processes, the issue of how intra-Arab migratory movements affect bilateral state relations has been unanswered. The importance of regional labour migration tends to be approached in economistic, “push” versus “pull” terms, largely obscuring the frequent exploitation of these communities for political purposes. In contrast, this article demonstrates how Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya employed the potential displacement, or mistreatment, of Egyptian expatriate communities in order to affect Egyptian policy-making under President Mohamed Morsi in the 2012-13 period. By intentionally creating legal problems for the Egyptians residing in these three countries, elites aimed to gain specific concessions by the Egyptian state with regard to natural gas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and the extradition of Libyan members of the Qaddafi regime. Methodologically, the article draws on content analysis of these crises’ coverage within Egyptian and Arabic media (print and online), as well as on semi-structured, elite interviews conducted in Cairo (n=31). It aims to highlight how Arab states attempted to coerce Egypt into specific policy decisions by targeting the Egyptian migrant communities within their borders. Overall, the article examines an under-discussed aspect of post-2011 Arab world politics, and makes the case for a more critical examination of regional migration management as firmly embedded in states’ decision-making processes.