This paper, in the historical context of the administrative and bureaucratic reforms of the nineteenth century, examines criminalization of laziness focusing between 1870s and 1914. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state took punitive steps against bureaucrats who failed to meet the new standards of efficiency. Bureaucrats who neglected their duties were fined, demoted, transferred, suspended, and even dismissed. The objectives of this paper are two fold: first, it aims to explore the changing perceptions of productivity and efficiency in the Ottoman bureaucracy. This paper is a part of a larger project that examines the development of the culture of productivity in late Ottoman society. By focusing on the bureaucratic offices of the period, I hope to shed light on the role of social practice in this emergent culture. I argue that the Ottoman state’s involvement in bureaucratic productivity and efficiency was pivotal in shaping of the attitudes about work and laziness, hence in making and spreading of the culture of productivity. The second aim of this paper is to demonstrate the contested nature of this new culture, particularly in the bureaucratic office: Bureaucrats challenged allegations of laziness using the state mechanisms, and they constantly contested and negotiated them. Bureaucrats disputed decisions of fines, demotions, and dismissals, which were made based on the accusation of absenteeism (adem-i devam), laziness and slacking (betaet and rehavet). They took pains to prove that they were diligent and/or they had a legitimate reasons for their actions and, and of course, inactions. The legal aspects of these processes reveal a contested realm when it comes to the expectations of duty and performance of the fulfillment of work, from the perspective of both the state and its employees. By examining hundreds of documents, bureaucratic bills, state documents, particularly the Ottoman Personnel Records (Sicill-i Ahval) and the records of state investigation of individual bureaucrats, along with petitions from bureaucrats and citizens, and the accounts/memoirs by and on office holders, I show that in these empire-wide offices Ottoman citizens, bureaucrats and, to a certain extent, the public became directly aware of the concern for efficiency and modern work practices. Through new social practices, and a process of punishment, reward, and negotiation, new concepts of work and productivity were disseminated throughout the bureaus of the empire.

Prominent philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin considered widespread boredom to be one of the distinctive features of modern life, and yet, systematic research of the experience within the humanities has been thus far rather limited. The history of emotions was mostly concerned with more "dramatic" feelings such as love and fear and thus, while the number of psychological studies dedicated to boredom has been growing steadily, historians have rarely considered its implications. The proposed study, then, is an attempt to historicize boredom by analyzing its relations with social hierarchies in the late Ottoman Empire. Relying on contemporary codes, school textbooks, journals, diaries, novels and memoirs, I argue that the late Ottoman discourse of "self-help" was not only about imperial "progress," but also a remedy proscribed by elite members to the boredom of their subalterns, which was considered a threat to established order. Yet, imposed activity could not alleviate the sense of powerlessness and meaninglessness that generated boredom to begin with. Psychological study of boredom identifies different types of and reasons for boredom. One of main reasons for what is known as "state boredom" is the imposition of monotonous tasks that are experienced as meaningless and/or restrictions on movement that constrain one within an under-stimulating environment. Boredom in these contexts is the result of imposed powerlessness and is therefore closely associated with class, gender and age. Hegemonic writing in the late 19th century Ottoman Empire began targeting the experience of boredom rather than the state of "idleness," which was often the concern of officials and moralists in earlier periods. Didactic periodicals warned children that "time passes slowly" when being inactive and encouraged them to study and work harder. Textbooks for female students repeatedly emphasized that a busy routine is the solution for the dull of domestic life. Yet, memoirs of former students in Hamidian schools and contemporary novels (e.g. Mehmed Rauf's Eylül) implicitly or explicitly associated boredom with the stifling atmosphere of the Hamidian period. Many of the addressees of the discourse of self-help simply could not help themselves as Samuel Smiles, Ahmed Midhat or Ebüziyya Tevfik preached them. For them life was not about possibilities and advancement but about the lack thereof. Behind the closed doors of hegemonic discourse, then, there lies a whole other history of inactivity and frustration, of longing for alternatives.

During the late-19th and early-20th century, Ottoman Empire went through a period of intense transformation and modernization and the Ottoman rulers used various strategies of legitimization and display to confirm their power and sovereignty. The politics of legitimization were targeting not only the subjects of the empire but aimed at presenting the prosperity and modernity of the empire to foreign gaze as well. The past was also utilized as a tool for promoting the regime and confirmed the dynastic continuity of the Ottoman sultans. Within this context, the Topkap? Palace was positioned as a showcase of history and Ottoman possession of the past with the establishment of the Imperial Museum and opening of Imperial Treasury for touristic visits. During the Hamidian era, the Archeological Museum (Müze-i Hümayun)was institutionalized and reached Western standards. Together with the School of Fine Arts, a new and modern Archeology Museum building were erected in neoclassical style in the outer gardens of the Topkap? Palace. Modern cataloging and displaying strategies were adopted, which reflected the modernizing face of the empire. Thus, the archeology museum, with its collections composed mainly of Greco-Roman antiquities, reflected the Westernized and modernized face of the empire, manifesting itself as a part of the European league. However, within the walls of the same imperial complex, a couple hundred meters away from the Imperial Museum, a different strategy for display and self-representation was followed. After the abandonment of the Topkap? Palace by Ottoman rulers during the 19th century, inner courts of the palace and the Imperial Treasury (Hazine-i Hümayun) were opened for touristic visits and became one of the major tourist attractions of Istanbul. A certain choreographed tour was performed, creating a mystic, yet exotic experience for foreign gaze. This self-orientalist spectacle, aimed at utilizing Ottoman past as an authentic scene to represent Ottoman glory. Using a great deal of primary sources from various archives, local and foreign newspapers, periodicals, memoirs, travel accounts, photographs, videos, engravings, paintings, and postcards, I hope to present the politics of self representation and the foundation of first museums in the Ottoman Empire: one emulating a Western model of museology and the other adopting a self-orientalist strategy for representing the lost glory of the empire. This research hopes to shed light on different strategies of self-display performed within the same imperial complex.

In 1882, Cemil Pasha, the Ottoman Vali of Aleppo, ordered Nafi Efendi Cabirizade into exile in Elbistan. The incident created a great deal of controversy, especially as Nafi Efendi sought recourse under Ottoman law and appealed via petitions to Ottoman and Western officials resident in Aleppo. Nafi Effendi argued that the root cause of his exile was personal; he wasn’t guilty of an actual crime, but had simply run afoul of the Vali. British officials expressed similar sentiments, and described Cemil Pasha as a man driven almost entirely by a desire for power and authority. These British officials commented often on the corruption associated with Cemil Pasha’s time in Aleppo (1878-1886), and many of these characterizations are supported by Ottoman archival materials. In fact, according to Ottoman records, the ‘poor administration’ of Cemil Pasha was being discussed long before the end of his term in Aleppo. Based on Ottoman and British archival materials, this paper attempts to reconstruct conceptions of justice and proper rule in late Ottoman Aleppo through a case study of the rule of Cemil Pasha. As has been argued elsewhere, petitions were a primary means through which individuals were able to interact directly with the Ottoman state and the time period for this paper is no exception. Countless petitions were submitted as Ottoman subjects presented their opinions concerning the governance of Aleppo. This project relies not only on individuals’ petitions, but the internal documents that illustrate just how effective petitions were in instigating change in the Ottoman context. The case of Cemil Pasha is particularly interesting, as it gives us a great deal of information of how Ottomans, often of various social and political classes, believed their local governments should function. In addition to petitions like those written by Nafi Efendi Cabirizade and other disgruntled individuals, the Ottoman archives contain numerous petitions submitted in favor of Cemil Pasha, thanking him for his service to the state and local institutions. Within this historical framework, this paper analyzes the importance of petitions in the construction of concepts like authority and justice, and pays particular attention to how these constructions related to the implementation of mid-nineteenth century reforms in Ottoman Aleppo. It is often noted that Ottoman governors rarely remained in place for substantial amounts of time, but relatively little is said of the day-to-day events that may have played an important role in the rapid rate of governmental turnover.

This paper analyses dynastic heroism as an expression of Ottoman imperial culture in the period 1900-1918 with particular emphasis on the years immediately preceding and following the Ottoman revolution of 1908. While previous studies have peripherally examined Ottoman dynastic heroism with attention to the emergence of popular Turkish nationalisms after 1922, no study has historicized this phenomenon as part of the social history of Ottoman monarchy. Therefore, in concert with this directive, this paper examines the widespread perception of Ottoman sultans as historical “shapers” of an Ottoman universe of meaning in which the empire’s subjects lived. Insofar as sultans were seen as influential “movers and shakers” within the confines of late Ottoman historical thinking, how did the social and cultural presence of the House of Osman shape the Ottoman world as it appeared to contemporary Ottomans? Drawing on works of Ottoman Turkish historical literature, the Istanbul-based Ottoman Turkish illustrated press, as well as on the dynastic tradition of courtly patronage, I argue that a select canon of Ottoman sultans were venerated as heroic empire-builders and empire-reformers whose legacies had shaped and continued to inform the realities of the late Ottoman Empire, and whose heroic examples provided attractive models for the future of the empire and its peoples. Selected from amongst the members of the House of Osman, this canon, which tended to include Mehmed II (r. 1444-46, 1451-81), Selim I (r. 1512-20), Süleyman I (r. 1520-66), Osman II (r. 1618-22), Murad IV (r. 1623-40), Selim III (r. 1789-1807), and Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) entered Ottoman literary consciousness in the Hamidian period (c. 1876-1908). However, quite paradoxically, their heroic personae did not cease to play an important role in Ottoman historical discourse in the wake of the Committee of Union and Progress’ ascension to political power after 1908. To the contrary, it was at this point that an explosion of novel news media cultures and temporarily relaxed censorship policies provided new space for their veneration as “Ottoman,” and not simply as “Muslim” or “Turkish” heroes. In this connection, I demonstrate that in spite of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s (r. 1876-1909) relegation to the role of “constitutional monarch” in 1908, his later dethronement in 1909, and the ascension of Sultan Mehmed V Re?ad (r. 1909-18) as a ruler with ostensibly few institutionalized responsibilities, the House of Osman continued to hold weight as a symbolic site of imperial allegiance in the last Ottoman decade.