The Arab Spring revolutions bring attention to the importance of legitimacy for the long-term stability and capability of political regimes. The concept of legitimacy is one of the most important concepts in political science. Yet it has been remarkably understudied, in general and in the Arab world in particular. As Schlumberger (2010) notes, “Despite its centrality to political life, legitimacy in the nondemocratic Arab world has not been studied in any encompassing manner for more than 30 years.” The 2011 revolutions prove Hudson’s (1977) point of three decades ago: “The central problem in the Arab world today is political legitimacy.” This paper unpacks the concept of political legitimacy to study not only how legitimization strategies affect government capacity and stability, but also to address a key question through an in-depth case study —- how Qatar has been able to create and maintain its legitimacy, in the eyes of citizens and expats, regional neighbors and global partners, throughout the Arab Spring. I follow Beetham’s (1991) tripartite definition of legitimacy: power is legitimate when it conforms to established rules, the rules can be justified by reference to shared beliefs, and there is evidence of subordinate consent to the power relationship. I classify sources of political legitimacy into four main categories: developmental (economic and distributional), governmental (bureaucratic and democratic), sociological (national pride and happiness, social trust and capital, and positive attitudes through areas such as human development, use of cultural symbols, and local media/advertising), and international (diplomacy and media outreach). The research puzzle: How can we explain the success of Qatar in creating and maintaining its legitimacy in the face of rapid socioeconomic modernization (Huntington 1968) and the Arab Spring (Huntington 1991, Brinks and Coppedge 2006)? How can the case study of Qatar help unpack the concept of political legitimacy in rentier regimes to address more than the state access to natural resource wealth? Using qualitative (media analysis of the four major local Arabic newspapers, Qatari blogs, and political cartoons, as well as personal interviews) and quantitative analysis (survey data of selected populations within Qatar), I will explain how Qatar succeeded where others failed. Why Qatar? Qatar is a good example case of a regime creating and maintaining legitimacy during rapid socioeconomic change and a regional zeitgeist of revolution. My work provides new information on an understudied yet crucial country and explains how some regimes successfully avoided the Arab Spring.

In the early 1980s, there was an academic tendency to explain the structure of the oil market by focusing on the role of Saudi Arabia as a swing producer, explained by the dominant firm model. In comparison with the situation of the world oil market in the 1970s, the soft market situation in the 1980s encouraged OPEC to introduce output sharing among members in 1982. Although the possibility of the breakdown of OPEC was very high with the wide spread cheating among OPEC members in this period, no such result happened. The dominant firm model, which focuses on the role of Saudi Arabia as a swing producer, was a useful tool to explain why OPEC did not collapse on the contrary to the anticipation of the classical cartel model. However, this economic model does not explain why Saudi Arabia tried to achieve relatively high oil prices at the huge expense of their own market share and oil revenues, which did not coincide with their economic interests. As James Griffin and David Teece mentioned, “the dominant producer must adopt a lower discount rate, reducing its current price to a level at which new entry and the expansion of fringe members are discouraged.” Under the situation of the increasing market share of non-OPEC in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia paradoxically tried to achieve the target price of around $28 per barrel, although this target price was relatively high in this period in comparison with the period between1974-78. Although the stability of oil price in this period was largely attributed to Saudi Arabian role of a swing producer, the main reasons of its activity were little discussed. Robert Mabro tried to understand this unique situation by phrasing “OPEC is Saudi Arabia.” However, this phrase has limitations to explain why Saudi Arabia suddenly gave up its role of a swing producer in 1985, although the Kingdom knew that this decision would severely threaten the existence of OPEC. On the contrary to the arguments of economists, my research will work under the assumption that the political circumstance in the early 1980s, which severely threatened the security of Saudi regime in the regional level, was a major motivation for the Saudis to play a swing producer role during this period. I will demonstrate how Saudi Arabia capitalized on this unique oil policy to get rid of the internal and external political risks in cautious and defensive ways.

This paper examines why Qatar has adopted a bold foreign policy and emerged as a major player in the international relations of the Middle East. From a small state in a volatile region, we might expect a passive foreign policy characterized by attempts to avoid perturbing stronger neighbors and great powers. In this regard, Qatar’s foreign policy presents a puzzle. Since Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa assumed power in 1995, Qatar has adopted a bold foreign policy, underlining its freedom of maneuver and taking controversial stances that have sparked the ire of allies. During the Arab Spring, the trail-blazing support of this tiny oil-rich autocracy for democratic movements in the region has been especially striking. Qatar was the first Arab state to withdraw its ambassador from Syria and led the push within the Arab League to sanction the regime of Bashar Al-Asad; meanwhile, Qatar led the Arab world in recognizing Libya’s National Transitional Council, backed NATO intervention, and supplied weapons to the Libyan rebels. Throughout the Arab Spring, Al-Jazeera (based in Doha and funded by the Qatari government) has played eyewitness to and cheerleader for events unfolding from Tunisia to Yemen. While Qatar’s foreign policy has drawn substantial attention, with assessments of it ranging from “perplexing” to “deliriously ambitious” to “successful,” we lack a satisfactory understanding of the factors driving Doha’s ambition. By focusing on the pursuit of prestige domestically and abroad, this paper will enhance our understanding of Qatari foreign policy and contribute to the field of foreign policy analysis. The politics of prestige enhances our understanding of state behavior where traditional theories of foreign policy falter. Drawing on field research from a year in Qatar (2010-11), this paper theorizes and contextualizes Qatari foreign policy in a way that sharpens our understanding of international relations in the Middle East and beyond.

Empolying an empirical and comparative approach, this research paper analyses the past record and the future trends of economic diversification efforts in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the post 1973/74 period. The proposed paper is an outcome of a broader reserach project dealing with developmental issues in the GCC countries. In addition to published academic sources such as books and journal articles, this reseach rely on recent field work in each of the six GCC countries and not least as a novelty, it bases its analysis of future diversification trends on a review of the currrent development plans or national visions publiched by the GCC governments. Applying the methodology of 'content analysis' to the reading of the plans, four questions guides this enquiry: (i) What barriers to growth are foreseen and how is diversification envisioned to solve them?; (ii) What economic sectors are targets for the diversification effort?; (iii) Who will be the driver of the future economy, the state or the market, the public or the private sector?; (vi) What type of (economic) state is envisioned in the future; an allocation or an production state? Among the findings are that the GCC countries do not pursue a 'Western' neo-liberal and market based economy, but rather express desires to continue along the path of a state-led, but market based economy resembling 'Asian state-capitalism.' Another finding is that the current economic model - the allocation state model - has run out of steam. It neither creates enough jobs nor income to accomodate the current and future needs in these societies. This development leverages the future drive toward diversification. The impact of the 'Arab spring' and the current high level of oil and gas prices is found to produce both factors that reinforce this drive toward diversification and the opposite.

State-building in Qatar took place under circumstances that are largely unique in relation to most other parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Bahrain, in Qatar the ruling family, the Al-Thanis, did not have to contend with other groups in their vicinity who had collective identities or corporate interests. In Qatar, lack of easily accessible ports and an underdeveloped pearling industry resulted in the comparative weakness of the merchant classes, and an absence of vibrant urban centers impeded the growth of a robust religious establishment. This left the large Al-Thani clan as the only organized group to vie for power and freed it from the need to offer concessions to other, potentially competing groups. Political competition was thus limited to occurring within the ruling family. The flow of oil revenues further consolidated Al-Thani rule, though it did little to foster cohesion and unity within the family. If anything, internal family competition over political power and influence intensified. Only beginning in the 1990s, with the ascension to power of Hamad bin Khalifa following yet another palace coup, was the internal politics of the Al-Thani family streamlined and were the rules of succession codified. Preoccupation with political consolidation took place at the expense of state-building processes, thus resulting in the absence of many of the institutional accouterments of a modern state. Institutional underdevelopment has been reinforced by the pervasiveness of rent revenues, which have freed the state from the need to give concessions to any potential opposition groups. Over the last decade, the state has undertaken a frantic effort to proliferate much needed institutions for modern governance. But the underlying personalism of the sultanistic system remains intact. While the emerging system of benign despotism has so far not encountered any serious difficulties, its continued viability in the post-oil era, at least in its present form, is open to question.