For decades analysts of contentious politics have been utilizing a variety of theoretical models to explain the origin, development, and outcomes of popular mobilizations in different parts of the world. Many of these studies employ structural, critical mass, cultural approaches, and to an increasing degree the political process model to study the emergence of popular contention. The latter approach offers a more general tool for analyzing contentious collective actions by focusing on three fundamental factors: the political opportunity/threat structure (regime openness/closeness), available organizational and mobilizing resources, and framing processes. Yet this approach has been used predominantly to explore popular protest in democratic societies. My comparative research contributes to the scholarly conversation on social movements by emphasizing the importance of political process approaches and resource mobilization for explaining the eruption or absence of collective mobilization in four non-democratic contexts. Recently protesters marched en masse on the streets of Iran, Tunisia, and Egypt demanding radical reforms and the removal of the ruling regimes. Yet protesters were absent for a long time from the streets of these countries and in some cases, such as Syria, are still missing. What could explain the noisy circumstances in some contexts and the period of relative silence in others? By examining the structure of the ruling elite, existing opportunities and threats, and resources available to the dissident activists, I illustrate how the relationships between these elements help explain the emergence and dynamics of social protest. I focus on the following questions: what were the available opportunities/threats that facilitated popular revolt against the state in Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran, yet impeded mass uprising in other authoritarian environments, namely those of Syria, Morocco, and elsewhere? Why do authoritarian regimes with a history of brutal repression against their opponents tolerate certain degrees of dissident activism and restrain from harsh repressive measures at other historical moments? Why do the outcomes of popular contention differ across contexts? How does the examination of contentious politics in these countries help explain contentious politics elsewhere? Drawing on the works of social movement scholars, such as Asef Bayat, Quintan Wiktorowicz, Charles Tilly, and Doug McAdam, alongside national and international news sources and interviews, I demonstrate how anti-systemic activism is promoted or demoted by elite fragmentation, limited competitive elections, and the degree of access to information and social networks.

According to most measures of political freedom, the Middle East is the least free region in the world. Within the Middle East, the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council stand out as enduring dynastic monarchies with very limited opportunities for political expression. Yet even within these monarchical authoritarian regimes, there is considerable variation in the degree of institutionalized political feedback provided to country rulers. Political feedback is provided not just through elected assemblies, but also through structured consultative councils. What accounts for the variation in levels of institutionalized public feedback, ranging from high (Kuwait), medium (Bahrain, Qatar), to low (UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia)? In these non-democracies, why do some rulers consistently get reliable information about public preferences, while others do not? In this paper I argue that some Gulf monarchs demonstrate higher levels of vertical accountability to their citizens through robust consultative processes as a result of three factors: 1) historical patterns of regime consolidation and the social contract around citizen rights that emerged at the time of independence, 2) levels of domestic tribal and religious pluralism, and 3) size of the native population. In general, the more citizen rights were negotiated with the ruling family at the time of independence, the higher the level of domestic pluralism, and the smaller the size of the native population, the more likely rulers are to respect the political rights of their citizens through processes of public consultation. Evidence for the argument is provided from historical and ethnographic sources, as well as media content analysis.

How do changes of leadership impact the exercise of political authority and activism surrounding these transition periods? Through a model of sequential responses among governments and activists, I assess their respective strategies and tactics of cooperation and conflict during these critical periods. Existing research on leadership succession focuses heavily on elite politicking, paying little attention to societal dynamics during periods of succession. In contrast, my project focuses on the interactive relationship between governments and activists throughout the process of succession. This paper is part of a larger dissertation project in which I analyze the political effects of two types of succession: stable transfers of power upon death of the incumbent (“regular”) and successions caused by bottom-up pressure (“irregular”). This paper focuses on the former through a comparative study of successions in Jordan (1999), Syria (2000). These neighboring states underwent regular successions within a year of one another. However, they are significantly different in governing structures and practices, as well as social compositions, making them ripe for comparative study. I hypothesize that one leader’s exit and another’s advent, even in “regular successions,” is more than an immediate change of faces. Succession is a dynamic process that carries great potential for changes in politics and governance, as well as changes in public perceptions of governing authority and leadership. I answer the research question through event analysis. Using automated and manual coding of news reports to produce political event data, I statistically assess levels of interaction between government and activists, as well as the continuities and changes in their respective strategies and tactics, during the succession periods. This first-cut quantitative analysis is supplemented by case studies of each episode of succession to provide a detailed reconstruction of the patterns of interaction between the governments and challengers.

Recent studies on the politics of religion-state arrangements have emphasized the great variety of ways in which states formally institutionalize their relationships with the religions of their nations (Fox 2008, Madeley 2004, Grim and Finke 2006, Driessen 2010). This paper engages that literature by asking how political regime types affect the way in which this variety of religion and state arrangements interact with national religious markets. Specifically, the paper claims that regime types condition the manner in which religion-state arrangements affect the economies of national religious markets as hypothesized by, among others, Gill (1998, 2008), Stark and Iannacone (1994), Barro and McCleary (2006). Variation in regime types, the paper argues, can help account for the failure of recent religious market scholarship to explain the exceptionally high levels of religiosity found in predominantly Muslim and Catholic settings (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Rather than inevitably distorting and weakening the vitality of national levels of religiosity (as religious market theorists would suspect), government favoritism of religion in an authoritarian setting can actually spur national levels of religious growth. After presenting these theoretical claims, I explore their expectations through an analysis of Fox’s (2006) cross-national data on religion-state arrangements and their relationship to national religious attitudes in the predominantly Muslim world. Preliminary results support the hypothesis that state subsidies on public religious education can help regenerate a loose national religious identity in an authoritarian setting. The paper concludes by reflecting on the risks and advantages incurred to states, authoritarian or not, when they treat religion as a public good.

The last ten years have been marked by political economy transformations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Financialisation has increased, public-private partnerships proliferated, sovereign wealth funds gained prominence, and each Gulf state has acceded to the World Trade Organization. These changes have been instrumental in bringing the region to the forefront of global political economy discourse in capacities beyond the oil market. (Legrenzi and Momani 2011; Hertog 2010; Hvidt 2007) Not only are Gulf states confronted with a shifting economic architecture, but they are also faced with intensifying policy challenges like rising unemployment among a burgeoning demographic of young labour market entrants. (Winckler 2009; Economist Intelligence Unit, Gulf 2020, 2009) Combined, these factors are challenging the social contract status quo. Whereas many Gulf populations have grown accustomed to the abundantly generous provision of public goods, the economic strain of maintaining these is intensifying. As the economy grows increasingly diversified, the provision of goods, particularly employment, is increasingly disseminated to other actors. Indeed, Gulf states seem to have reached a threshold of possible change, between clear and delineated structures of their rentier past and the yet uncertain structures of the approaching future. While Gulf economies have decidedly evolved, it remains uncertain whether governance in the region is following suit. (Schlumberger 2008;Glasser 2001; Davidson 2009) This paper suggests that novel forms of governance may be emerging in the region. It is particularly concerned with changes in the policy space on issues of youth inclusion. Pointing toward new phenomena like regional economic policy initiatives and networks, this paper challenges some traditional assumptions of the rentier state literature and posits novel trends in the opening of the policy making space around particular issue areas. On one level, this paper is concerned with development choices, political economy transformations and evolving development model and policy-making processes. On another level, it is concerned with the transformation of youth agency within a subregion that has historically had little need to respond to the population but finds itself in a broader region where governments are toppling in the face of growing youth demands. Questioning the source and the direction of this change, it posits the broader meaning for future evolutions in development policy making and delineates a research agenda for examining the nexus of youth inclusion and policy making in Gulf rentier context.