The “Arab Spring” in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving – in a variety of ways – global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity, time and place. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental “policy of dissociation”, two non-state actors have been selected: Hezbollah that supports the Syrian regime, and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our exploratory fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across the borders. Accordingly, the paper will answer notably questions about how some places have been given special meanings, prompting Lebanese youngsters to fight and die in Syria; how identities have been reframed to mobilize across borders; and beyond, how and why such identity mobilizations have been that successful. Based on more than 35 interviews already conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, our research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization: whereas Hezbollah’s operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by both geo-strategic calculations and identity politics, the involvement of Sunnis is rather made on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities. While “assabiya” proved to be paramount in the first group, social anomy has been found essential in the second one. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these phenomena that make identity so prone to activation that people opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death, are bred by two key factors: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a meaningful political project for the youth, and the failure of both regional and international actors to sooth rather than instrumentalize differences in the region. Both these failures have led to polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization and hence sustained the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.

In June 2014, forces of the “Islamic State” (a.k.a. ISIS, ISIL, or Da’esh) began probing the Jordanian border, leading to skirmished with Jordanian border forces and intense anxiety within Jordan. Until that point, Jordan had essentially lain low – maintaining as low a profile as possible even as violence erupted across most of its borders (including in Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Palestine). Yet Jordan was not a true neutral in the Syrian civil war either. Reports suggested that Jordan was connected to both arming and training of ‘moderate’ rebel forces against the Asad regime. Jordan then took the unprecedented step of engaging in air strikes on ISIS targets in Syria. When Da’esh staged a horrific execution of a captured Jordanian pilot, the regime declared that “the gloves had come off.” Jordan increased its air strikes on ISIS and refused to rule out ground troops in either Syria or Iraq. But as pressure built amongst its allies (the U.S., Saudi Arabia, GCC states in general) to increase its military role in Syria, Jordan seemed to grow more cautious regarding its level of intervention against either Asad or ISIS – and Jordan’s role in both conflicts remained deeply controversial within Jordanian domestic politics. These sometimes conflicting policies were complicated still further by the massive influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan, as the country attempted to deal with yet another challenge. Analysis and Conclusions This paper shows how Jordan’s multiple challenges and sometimes conflicting policies together amounted to an enormous and even dangerous gamble regarding ISIS, the outcome of the Syrian civil war, and its own domestic support and internal security. This paper examines Jordanian policy regarding each of these three key areas, as the Jordanian regime attempted to survive the threats of ISIS, the Syrian Civil War, and even the domestic challenges of the Arab Spring era. Regime focus on the former (external) threats, I argue, threatened to completely derail hopes on the domestic front for meaningful reform and change. Methods This paper draws on extensive field research, including with Jordanian government and opposition figures. Interviews include Islamist and leftist opposition activists, parliamentarians, government ministers, and several meetings with King Abdullah II. Panels? If accepted, this paper could fit with a diverse range of panels, including those on Jordan, the Syria civil war, ISIS, regional security, foreign policy-making, regional relations, or re-assesssments of the outcomes of the ‘Arab Spring’.

The “Arab Spring” in Syria has swiftly turned into a multilayered and total war involving – in a variety of ways – global, regional and local actors, some in an official (inter-)governmental capacity but many in other capacities obeying to logics that challenge common understandings of border and identity, time and place. This paper aims at studying one such instance: the involvement of Lebanese non-state actors in Syria. Considering the extent of their respective involvement in the Syrian conflict in spite of the Lebanese governmental “policy of dissociation”, two non-state actors have been selected: Hezbollah that supports the Syrian regime, and informal Sunni movements that have embraced the fight of jihadi groups. Beyond the assessment of who these actors are and how they involve in the conflict, the research devotes special attention to what our exploratory fieldwork shows to be a key mobilizing factor: the reconstruction of identities across the borders. Accordingly, the paper will answer notably questions about how some places have been given special meanings, prompting Lebanese youngsters to fight and die in Syria; how identities have been reframed to mobilize across borders; and beyond, how and why such identity mobilizations have been that successful. Based on more than 35 interviews already conducted in Lebanon with a variety of actors and observers, our research shows differentiated patterns of identity mobilization: whereas Hezbollah’s operatives are bound to a powerful top-down organization with an agenda underpinned by both geo-strategic calculations and identity politics, the involvement of Sunnis is rather made on an individual basis within networks of jihadists built almost exclusively on the activation of religious identities and enmities. While “assabiya” proved to be paramount in the first group, social anomy has been found essential in the second one. Interestingly, the research has shown that both these phenomena that make identity so prone to activation that people opt for a path leading to a likely if not a certain death, are bred by two key factors: the failure of the Lebanese state and society to build a meaningful political project for the youth, and the failure of both regional and international actors to sooth rather than instrumentalize differences in the region. Both these failures have led to polarization and ensuing narratives of victimization and hence sustained the cultivation of transnational primary identities at the expenses of national belonging.