While the Islamic Republic of Iran is commonly perceived by political actors to be a threatening force in world politics, the theoretical discussions which have influenced the formation and the evolution of the institutions of the Iranian government since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 have received little attention by political theorists. This paper is an exploration of the political theory of a scholar whose work set off a debate which continues today in Iran—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Specifically, it argues that although Khomeini’s theory has been characterized in much of the secondary literature as a theory of guardianship, this characterization obscures the sources of legitimacy and nature of Khomeini’s ideal government. To be sure, one aspect of political legitimacy, in Khomeini’s view, is the religious doctrine that prescribes the political leadership of a qualified guardian, but just as important to Khomeini’s political vision is an act of popular will which he says grants to the guardian the right to assume and continue to hold his position in government. And though a guardian must be featured in any legitimate government, prerogative is exercised by popularly-elected bodies within a sphere of political action made possible by the flexible nature and limited scope of Islamic law. Khomeini’s theory may thus be described as limited guardianship based on consent. This paper positions itself against two kinds of portrayals of Khomeini’s theory. On the one hand, it argues against scholars who hold that Khomeini’s theory left no room for popular sovereignty and prescribed absolute rule by a religious hierocracy to implement a monolithic and indisputable form of divine law. On the other hand, it argues against scholars who hold that Khomeini’s view was fundamentally incoherent, embracing notions of guardianship and popular rule that cannot accommodate one another. This paper works to overcome these two kinds of arguments by utilizing evidence from two sources—one, Khomeini’s most systematic formulation of his theory in a series of lectures to seminary students in Najaf in 1970, and secondly, Khomeini’s public speeches during the drafting of Iran’s first constitution. It argues that the latter set of writings communicates a view of government that is often more precise than, but yet fully consonant with, his 1970 lectures.

Since the 1990s, the emergence of “post-Islamist” intellectual and social movements has challenged the culturalist discourse which is based on the incompatibility of Islam and democracy. (Bayat, 2007). The culturalist discourse is criticized for constructing Islam and Muslim societies as ahistorical and fixed while underestimating the democratic potential of Islam as a religion. This paper aims to analyze the post-Islamist intellectual discourses on democracy in two different contexts, Turkey and Iran. Unfolding the differences and similarities is a significant task in the sense that post-Islamist movements are likely to shape the future of political regimes not only in those countries but in the broader Middle East. We will analyze two preliminary figures of ‘religious intellectuals’ in Iran,- Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar who represent the reformist religious discourse in Iran.(Kamrava, 2008). From Turkey, the focus will be on Yalcin Akdogan and Ali Bulac. Akdogan came to be identified as the ideologist of the Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party(AKP).(Yavuz, 2009, 2). Although the AKP now represents a hegemonic manifestation of post-Islamism in Turkey, several other movements and parties might also be identified with post-Islamism. Bulac is chosen to reflect part of this diversity. In Turkey, the intellectuals’ claims to the coexistence of Islam and democracy are a call for the transformation of Turkey’s authoritarian secularism to a more religiously tolerant democratic regime. Whereas in Iran, Soroush and Kadivar develop the idea of Islamic/religious democratic government which has a concern for the inclusion of the already-excluded groups by the authoritarian religious regime. These different articulations of democracy have one common point: Despite appropriating the language of liberalism with reference to human rights, freedoms and individual liberties, each offers an authentic version of democracy, not necessarily in contradiction to Western liberal democracy, but as an alternative to it. We will conclude that although post-Islamist intellectuals challenge the essentialist construction of Islam and democracy as incompatible, the alternative form of democracy they put forth is limited. The paradox stems from their imagination of a religious society, the aspirations and demands of which, would be furthered under an authentic form of democracy. However, their imagination of such a religious society tend to result in blurring the distinction between the religious community and the political community. This in turn restricts the political representation of those outside this “particular religious community” to the narrow scope of human rights protection or the discourse of tolerance.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi on International Relations: The Counter-Hegemonic Discourse of a Leading Islamist Scholar The Egyptian-born and Qatari-based Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi is arguably the most recognized Sunni cleric in the Arab World today. While Qaradawi’s fame stems mainly from his regular appearances on al-Sharia wa al-Hayat (the Law and Life) Program on Al-Jazeera television – and is reinforced by his effective utilization of the internet to disseminate his views (including fatwas) via such portals as Islamonline and www.Qaradawi.net –, Qaradawi is nevertheless a serious scholar who has penned dozens of influential works on religious, political and socio-economic issues; many of which have been translated to Western languages. A critical component of Qaradawi’s voluminous body of work that has received limited academic attention is his discourse on international relations. The prevalence of Qaradawi’s views among Islamist and Arab nationalist authors, as well as their influence on broad segments of the public in the Arab world and beyond, warrants detailed treatment of this discourse. This paper presents and critiques Qaradawi’s views on a range of theoretical and concrete issues related to international relations in the Post-Cold war era, drawing on the cleric’s massive oeuvre (books, editorials, fatwas and transcripts of television appearances.) Thus, in addition to highlighting what Qaradawi posits as the underpinning principles of international relations, the paper sheds light on his views of the Post-Cold War international system, Western relations with the Arab and Islamic worlds (and more generally with the Global South), the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab and Islamic unty, globalization and the prospects for overhauling the prevailing “unjust” international order. In order to situate Qaradawi’s discourse in its proper geopolitical context, I consider selected works by other Islamists (primarily the Lebanese Shiite cleric and scholar-activist Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah) and secular Arab nationalists, such as the Egyptian authors Mohamed Hassanein Heikal and Galal Amin. The paper argues that what distinguishes Qaradawi and Islamists in general from secular Arab nationalists, and other leftist critics of the prevailing international order, is not the substance of their discourse (which can be best characterized as counter-hegemonic) but its framing within the sacred text (the Quran). In sum, the discourse of Islamists ought to be seen as part and parcel of the Third World political and intellectual response to the alleged Western hegemony over international relations.