This paper has two aims: First, to offer an analysis of the way Arab states celebrate and commemorate their national holidays; and second, to compare between the Arab and Western-European models of celebrations. Most of the Arab states are modern creations, formed by the Western powers in the aftermath of World War I, following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Within the processes of nation-building and state-formation, the Arab state used various instruments in order to build the local territorial identity: education, archeology, history, literature – and state celebrations as well. In fact, each nation-state – like the European model – represented itself through a plethora of symbols – of which flag and hymn were the most important – as well as the national calendar, which tells the national historical narrative through the celebration and commemoration of national days. On the basis of the analysis of six Arab case studies (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia), this paper will show how state – secular and religious – holidays helped forging the nation and to what extent Western paradigms are relevant to the Arab world. The research shows that four reasons led to the invention of a national calendar. The first is the need to develop a national identity. The second is the regime’s need to establish legitimacy. The third is connected with the regimes’ desire to maintain hegemony and elicit obedience by creating fearful citizens. And finally, national celebrations have a psychological function, responding to the need of the individual to feel part of a larger community. The research found that state celebrations constitute a contesting ground – or negotiation space – between tradition and modernity, and between Islamic and non-Islamic elements. The end result was the formation of a hybrid political culture. The new symbolic market included modern Western and Eastern inventions, as well as Islamic and pre-Islamic traditions – sometimes adopted in a modern guise. This hybridization is not only a product of the colonial period, but of various Arab regimes, which have used this market freely in accordance with their interests and needs.

The mid-19th century witnessed reforms in Tunisia brought on by challenges emanating from increasing competition between France and Britain in the Mediterranean Sea. That sea had long facilitated the Ottomans' extension of its empire, even to its territories with considerable autonomy, such as the Beylik of Tunisia. Tunisia’s rulers embarked on a series of reforms in an effort to stave off succumbing to either increased Ottoman rule, or worse, European rule over the beylik. The reorganization of the military and the creation of a police force, the announcement of the “fundamental pact” (1857) and the promulgation of a new constitution (1861)—all initiated by Tunisian reformers during the middle years of the 19th century—were not enough to prevent the eventual arrival by France in the country in 1881 and its assumption of the reins of power in increasing degrees over the next several decades, including in the realms of urban spatial organization and urban heritage. This paper examines urban development and heritage under colonial conditions by analyzing the French Protectorate’s efforts to repair and restore monuments in the sacred Tunisian city of Qayrawan in the first half of the 20th century under varying circumstances of degradation and destruction. Prior to World War I, the French in Tunisia issued decrees on urbanism, historic monuments, and public space in the country. Such decrees allowed the French to classify historic sites and to engage in restoration projects, as documented in correspondence between French officials in Qayrawan and Tunis. The Second World War brought significant destruction to the holy city of Qayrawan and a post-war decree issued in France, with regard to destruction and repair of historic sites, came to serve French officials in Tunisia. The correspondence and decrees examined in this paper show French officials calling for the restoration of Qayrawan’s sites destroyed by the Germans during the war and turning to French legal means to rebuild Tunisia’s religious and historic heritage. By examining previously unseen documents from the French Protectorate period, found at the Association for the Safeguarding of the Medina of Qayrawan, this paper will examine French colonial policy toward urbanism and urban heritage through a case study on Qayrawan. These documents will expand our knowledge of the relationship between empire and colony; colony and city; city and sites, and elucidate our understanding of the colonial and national identification with sacred and historic urban heritage.

Shared memory, says Anthony Smith, is as essential to the survival of a collective cultural identity as is the sense of a common destiny. As is the case with all ethno-national projects, the elaboration and dissemination of modern Berber identity is being accompanied by the fashioning of a "memory community." This involves a search for a useable past and enshrining it in new narratives, rituals and collective commemorations. This paper will elucidate and evaluate the means by which the Amazigh culture movement in Morocco has sought to appropriate the legacy of Muhammad bin al-Khattabi, the leader of the five-year rebellion in Morocco's northern Rif region against European colonialism, from 1921-26. At first glance, appropriating Abdelkrim may not simple for secular Berberists, as he promoted Islamic reform at the expense of popular religious practice which Berber activists foreground as central to their specific heritage. Nor did Abdelkrim emphasize an explicitly Amazigh/Berber identity in his mobilizing efforts. But contemporary Amazigh activists have not been deterred. They portray Abdelkrim as a heroic leader of his people against the occupier, unlike the urban Arab class which sat on its hands. Theirs is an ongoing project, intimately connected to the themes of marginalization, discrimination at the country's Arab-Islamic elite and identity denial that characterize the contemporary Berberist discourse. Their methods range from writing children's cross-word puzzles with the theme of Abdelkrim, to campaigns to reinter Abdelkrim's remains (located in Cairo) and build a maseouleum-museum-cultural complex in his Ajdir redoubt, to demands for compensation for victims of chemical weapons used by Spain against Abdelkrim's followers and for the state's commemoration of the 1921 battle of Anoual as a national holiday. Some Rifian militants point to Abdelkrim as the inspiration for their promotion of autonomy for the region, and Facebook pages glorifying Abdelkrim and promoting Rifian identity abound. Still, many questions remain, both within the Amazigh sphere and beyond: is Abdelkrim a Riffian or all-Amazigh hero? Is there a contradiction between Abdelkrim the Amazigh freedom fighter and Abdelkrim the Moroccan resister to colonial rule? What about Abdelkrim's Islamic credentials, which may make him attractive to Islamist and pious opponents of the Amazigh movement? How enabling is the Moroccan state willing to be, in educational curricula and elsewhere? The paper will address these and other questions, employing a variety of printed and cyber-materials in French, Arabic and Tamazight, supplemented by interviews with movement activists.

“Our heroes had recorded history, therefore, it is a must to record their struggle. The great October victory will remain a light to be followed by our future generations. It will always shine as far as martyrs dedicated and devoted their life with a strong will.” The reverse side of the entry ticket to the Panorama of the 1973 October War in Cairo declares in simple language that a victorious history must be preserve and passed down to successive generations. Constructed in cooperation with the North Korean government of Kim Il Sung in 1983, the 1973 October War Panorama was originally designed to be a major tourist destination in the heart of Cairo. However, the Panorama spectators are almost exclusively Egyptian school children and local weekenders. As such, the Panorama has become a powerful tool in defining Egyptian identity to a mass, native audience. This paper seeks to investigate the war memorial, in combination with the reinforcing depictions of the National Army Museum, which serves as a true tourist destination for illustrating Egyptian identity, as a microcosm of the quest of Egyptian elites after 1973 to give a tolerable meaning to the war. Specifically, I will demonstrate how these memorials show conflicts and perplexities through a lens that embraces both ancient and modern myths to articulate a national identity rooted in duty to the country’s leader through sacrifice linked directly to a well-defined territorial demarcation. With the demise of Nasserism, Sadat and the new “re-emerging” Egyptian middle class shifted custodianship of core national identity from Egypt’s Arab heritage and Third World leadership to stress upon Egyptian identity stretching back to Pharaonic times and its uniqueness, which rested on a civic duty of military participation seeking the goal of liberation and justice. The Mubarak presidency had sought to continue this emphasis through “governmentality” by instilling images that produced disciplinary aspects of modern politics through microtechnologies of power in the context of everyday social life. The 1973 October War Panorama fills such role as a targeted tool to demonstrate the double-edged relationship of nationalism that looks inward to emphasis a shared public culture and specific linkage to territory, while also allowing for an outward view of a differentiated group that threatens social justice and individual liberties.