This paper will assess the immediate, medium, and long-term impact of the Israeli elections on right-wing politics in the country, particularly in the context of the leading role of the Right over the last ten years under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu (2009-2019) and, more generally, in the context of Israeli politics since the rise of the Right to power in 1977 under the leadership of Menachem Begin. The paper will note that since the 1970s the Israeli Right has dominated Israeli politics by emphasizing the perceived threats to Israel by the establishment of a Palestinian state, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that has grown in popularity since the Six-Day War (1967). The Israeli Left succeeded in challenging this Right leaning paradigm rather infrequently and for relatively brief periods (e.g. under Rabin in 1992-5 or Barak in 1996-9). Under Netanyahu, in what the paper calls “Neo-Revisionism of the 21st century”, the Rightwing Likud was successful in leading the country into a “status-quo position”, preventing it from adopting active diplomatic initiatives designed to reach a negotiated agreement with the Palestinians (along the lines of the 1993 Oslo Accords or the Camp David negotiations of 2000). Netanyahu has been highly successful in resisting any and all attempts (domestic and international) to move beyond the status quo, thereby establishing in effect an Israeli de facto annexation of the West Bank while preventing a formal annexation. The paper will assess the likelihood that this status quo position will be sustainable, able to resist annexationist pressure from the Far Right (represented by several parties in the 2019 elections) and countervailing pressures from the left and the international community toward a negotiated solution.

The approaching April 2019 elections in Israel will raise questions about the direction of Israeli policy concerning emerging relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf. Researchers often debate whether changes or continuation of policy are a result of a change in leadership or greater changes relating the position of a country in the world. For example, the Obama Administration's attempts to disengage from the Middle East prompted just such questions. But President Trump has in essence continued this policy, particularly where Syria is concerned. But relations are in fact determined by enduring interests. Israel and the Persian Gulf states have an enduring interest in confronting Iran, a policy shared with the US, and this interest will engender a continuation of policy regardless of who wins the elections. We can expect to see a tightening of relations, as Iran asserts its power in Syria and challenges both Israel and Saudi Arabia in the region at large.

Israel and Syria: Revolution, Civil War and Peace Process – between Moscow and Tehran The process of the Syrian state’s disintegration and decline into bloody civil war was also followed by Israel with great interest. Official Israel did not hide its view, even if it refrained from giving it expression authoritatively or in any outright manner, that Bashar al-Assad was “the devil you know,” to whom Israel had become accustomed over the years. Therefore, Israel had no interest in his downfall. Some senior Israeli officials even took the trouble to explain that Israel preferred a weakened and bloodied Bashar in power in Damascus, focused on what was happening inside his country, over a victory by radical Islamic, such as ISIS. Indeed, many Israelis perceived the continuation of Bashar’s regime as the only guarantee that quiet and calm along the Syria-Israel border would be preserved and the only effective barrier to Islamic radical groups becoming established on the Golan Heights, such as had happened in the Sinai Peninsula. Russian's involvement in the Syrian civil war starting in September 2015 brought, with the support of Iran and Hizballah, a dramatic change in the course of events and secure Bashar's position in power in Damascus. However, while fighting in Syria subsided, Iran continued to expand the circuit of its influence in the region while taking advantage of the United States' lack of interest to play a leading role in the Middle East. Israeli military activity aimed at preventing Iran from entrenching itself in Syria raised concerns for possible escalation that might lead to a major conflict in the northern front of Israel

In October 2018 King Abdullah II declared that he would not renew a clause in the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement of 1994 which allows Israeli farmers in two localities to cultivate land returned to Jordanian sovereignty. The King’s declaration was enthusiastically hailed by Jordanian public opinion and was accepted with dismay and indignation in Israel. It came after two years characterized by strained relations between the two countries including a severe crisis during which the Israeli embassy in Amman was closed for six months. This paper will show that in spite of the dramatic Jordanian move peace between the countries is strong. Both attach great value to their ties with one another; indeed one can speak of a Jordanian-Israeli strategic alliance. Recent years have seen close cooperation on issues such as ISIS, the war in Syria and the Iranian and Russian presence in that country, and the Palestinian question. Moreover, Israel plays a crucial role in Jordan’s stability by supplying it with water and gas. Nonetheless, the King’s decision not to renew the special arrangement stipulated by the treaty has an important symbolic meaning. It was this clause that testified most clearly to the good will that guided the two parties when they made peace in 1994. If Jordan does not reverse its decision before the King’s declaration comes into effect, 25-year-old hopes of building a warm peace and building closer relations between the two peoples will finally give way to sheer strategic interests, indispensable as they are. In this respect, the relations between the two countries are far cry from the ones envisioned by their late architects, King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin. It is doubtful therefore that when Israel and Jordan mark the 25th anniversary of the peace treaty in October 2019 the event will be a joyous one; it is unlikely to be accompanied with much celebration.

In my talk I will discuss the unique social and political characteristics of the young Palestinian “generation Z”, youth who were born between the mid-1990s and the end of the first decade of the 21st century. I will point out the changes in individual-collective identities, political perceptions and social practices among members of this generation and discuss the political challenge they present in both the Palestinian and Israeli spheres. My key argument is that many members of the young Palestinian generation maintain complex relations between individualism and collectivism, which is often not well-understood by outsiders, including Palestinians from older generations. On the one hand, these young Palestinians are experiencing a unique and nonlinear process of growing individualism, which reflect both domestic and global influences. On the other hand, their commitment to collective values and goals, whether social, national or religious, continues. However, unlike previous Palestinian generations these youth wish to determine by themselves to which communities and collective goals they will mobilize. This reflects their desire for alternatives to the traditional agents of collectivity, primarily the political organizations, but also to the traditional powerful standing of the family. I call this combination of growing individualism and collectivism of a new kind “collectivindualism”, which contribute to the understanding of various social and political behaviors of the young generation. Within the Palestinian sphere collectivindualistic approach directly impact, among other things, on the political alienation of the youth vis-a-vis the institutionalized organizations of Fatah\ Palestinian Authority and Hamas. The youth’s collectivindualism is also impacting the conflict with Israel in two key arenas. One is on the political/ security level where many “Lone-wolf” attackers of Israelis in recent years are characterized by collectivindualistic approach. The second arena is the Palestinian cyberspace in which diversified alternative collectives, in the form of online communities, play a key role in mediating Israel and Israelis image for the young Palestinian generation. Unlike previous generations, few young Palestinians have any acquaintance with Israelis other than soldiers and settlers. The study draws on a wealth of primary sources obtained from daily monitoring of discourse and dynamics in Palestinian cyberspace in 2015-2018, including approximately 100 social media pages from a wide range of online communities. The qualitative approach of the study is anchored in modern Middle Eastern history, combined with ideas and digital tools from Network Analysis.