Although the Egyptian revolution of 2011 was characterized by years of demonstrations, including some that numbered in the hundreds of thousands or millions of participants scholars have paid little attention to them as independent and important moral or political phenomena. They are generally understood as epiphenomena expressive of structural conflicts in Egyptian society or of already existing social movements. In contrast, I argue that between 2011 and 2013 mass demonstrations marked a discontinuity with earlier forms of protest and played an independent role in toppling the old regime and in structuring political conflict. We must therefore understand the connection between mass demonstrations that verged on popular insurrection and our conceptions of democracy and revolution. Why, as a matter of political practice and political discourse, were demonstrations so important for change and how, during the three years in which they formed a dominant form of political practice, did Egyptians understand them? Mass demonstrations, as a form of political action, differ greatly from other forms of direct action such as strikes and sit-ins and also from other forms of mass political participation such as elections. We must think again and more clearly about the nature of contingent and spontaneous mass urban protest and less about leaders and structure if we are to understand the Egyptian events of the last half decade.

Studies of political participation in authoritarian systems have generally taken two forms: on the one hand vis-à-vis formal, liberal democratic institutions or by contrast in favour of informal networks, coalition politics, and mediation mechanisms which largely escape the purview of the state (cf. Lust and Zerhouni 2008). The visible varieties of political participation leading up to, during, and after the Egyptian uprising(s) of 2011 complicate this distinction. This study offers an ascending analysis which addresses wider debates about the varied impact of governmental actions (latent and manifest) arising from global and local exchanges between state and society— and the exercises of power that entwine them. With extensive post-2011 ethnographic fieldwork across three popular quarters in Greater Cairo, the paper highlights how everyday experiences with uneven development impact subject formation and lead to capillary efforts to improve livelihood and reach community objectives. An exploration of the varieties of youth engagement in political and economic activities, the aim is to problematise contemporary conceptualisations of collective action and participation amongst the urban poor. I posit that a Foucauldian reading of neoliberal governmentality provides a coherent framework for understanding how power relations within these popular quarters play out in everyday practice and how such relations are constructed by, and constitutive of, different forms of political engagement.

In 2010, the young Tunisian street vendor who set himself in fire inspired what has come to be known as the Arab Spring. Although it first seemed an isolated incident protesting the abuses of local authorities, it rapidly gained broader support and recognition, since it was followed by a massive wave of demonstrations that eventually shook the grip of authoritarian regimes across the Middle East (Compante & Chor, 2012). Ever since it was erupted, the Arab uprisings seemed to be brought and sustained by educated youngsters. In Egypt, the educated young generations of Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, along with other liberal and secular youths of organizations such as the April 6th Movement, have managed to occupy the public arena since Mubarak deposition and for few more months leading to a new historical era of high mobilization and public participation in Egypt. Even with the clashes between youth movements from opposite poles of the political spectrum that accompanied by a rising rate of political and social tensions and polarizations, mobilization and public participation could be still seen high in the Egyptian landscape. However, with June 30 uprisings and amid the intervention of the military to depose former president Morsi, Egypt has entered a new episode of history where mobilization has been put down intentionally but still gradually by the new political regime. Henceforth, political participation has declined again to approach the lower rates that existed in the pre January 2011 era. Student activism is the ideal platform to see the effect of education on political participation. European students rioted against authority at Oxford, Bologna, and Paris during the Middle Ages. As Rander-Pehrson (1999) stated, “If the revolution had a core, it was the young educated elite” (p. 145). It is therefore, the aim of this project to analyze the ups and downs of mobilization and political participation in Egypt by studying the relationship between higher education and democracy with a focus on Egyptian university student unions and movements both before and after the January revolution in an attempt to explore why the hoped-for democratic transition did not take place in this densely populated country, and what tools and tactics have been used by the post-June 30 regime to put down all aspects of youth mobilization and participation, drawing the future scenarios of democratic transition in Egypt.

The Arab Uprisings of 2010/11, were the epitome of youth political participation and demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa. Many studies have analyzed the structural barriers of youth participation in the region, or the socio-political and economic factors that led to the mass mobilization and demonstrations of 2010/11 in the region. Six years after these uprisings, few attempts have been made to link the relationship between the structure of authoritarianism in these regimes and the extent to which citizens in general and young people in particular trust their state institutions. Based on random sampling surveys of youth in 6 MENA countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia, OPT and Morocco) and on qualitative fieldwork with more than 150 civically and politically engaged youth in these same countries, during the period from March 2015 – April 2016, the preliminary results show interesting trends and relations between youth civic and political participation and their levels of trust in formal institutions. The survey studies show that youths’ trust levels in formal institutions is very low, while at the same time, qualitative fieldwork shows that civically and politically engaged youth have very low trust levels not only in formal state institutions, but also in civil society organizations, political parties and the political elite in general. This paper analyzes the seemingly positive relationship between the structure of authoritarianism and citizens’ attitudes in the region. It argues that youth, who have lower trust levels in their state institutions, are more likely to be politically active and to contest the power of their respective regimes. However, this participation is in the form of independent activism, not through participation in conventional organizations like political parties or NGOs. This type of activism lowers the activists’ social capital and bargaining power vis a vis their regimes, which leads to a weakening of civil society and strengthening of the regimes.