Regime durability in the wake of a mass popular challenge is the result of multiple factors, including structural factors like regime type and economic resources, as well as the political strategies played by regime leaders. This paper focuses primarily on the effects of leadership strategies on regime durability in the Arab world by examining patterns of both repression and concession by Arab governments in the wake of the popular uprisings of 2011. The effects of both repression and concession on regime durability are tested using an original chronological data set of all major public concessions and repressive acts by Arab governments since the beginning of the Arab uprisings at the end of 2010 through early 2012. These data illustrate wide variation in the mix of repression and concession used by Arab governments, which are then correlated with variation in regime durability over time. I argue that there is evidence to suggest that dominantly repressive and dominantly concession-oriented strategies are more likely to lead to regime durability than playing a mixed strategy of both (simultaneous or alternating) repression and concession. This is illustrated by contrasting the effects of mixed vs. dominant strategies of repression or concession on temporal patterns of protest and regime change events. Mixed strategies that alternate repression and concession are directly associated with the collapse of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and to a lesser extent in Yemen (which did alternate strategies, but with heavier repression). If mixed strategies that alternate concession and repression lead to lower regime durability, then why are they used? I argue that there are two different reasons that regime leaders play mixed strategies, but that these strategies are unstable over time, leading to shifts away from mixed strategies towards either dominantly concession, or dominant repression strategies as time goes on. The first reason that leaders use both repression and concession is due to political uncertainty and poor information about the effects of these strategies on their opposition. A second reason that regimes use both strategies is because of divisions among decision makers, who may have different beliefs or preferences about whether to repress or concede. Hard-liners may make decisions favoring repression while soft-liners simultaneously send signals for dialogue or offer other concessions.

There is renewed interest in the institutional economics and the politics of development literature in the impact of colonialism on contemporary political and economic institutions. A common thread in this literature is the argument that political, legal and economic institutions founded by the colonizing state reflect the preferences of the colonizer, whether it is the extraction of resources or the building of representative institutions. This paper investigates the formation of legal institutions in Mandate Palestine as a process of colonial institution building. I demonstrate that legal institutions adopted under colonial regimes do not necessarily reflect the preferences of the colonizer. Although British administrators favored the implementation of a British common law system in the Palestine Mandate, the outcome was a combination of civil law institutions with religious courts, which later laid the foundations of Israeli legal pluralism. I argue that the British colonial administrators were limited in their ability to build legal institutions based on the British common law system in Palestine Mandate partially because they faced an acute shortage of qualified lawyers trained in the British tradition. Jewish immigration from East and Central Europe increased the number of lawyers trained in the civil law tradition, while Palestinian Muslims retained Ottoman Islamic law, particularly in personal and family affairs. By focusing on the human resources aspect of colonial institution building, this paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of colonialism on the legal and political institutions of post-colonial societies in the Middle East.

Egypt witnessed a growing socioeconomic crisis during the neoliberal restructuring in the 2000 years. Labor protests and food riots increased as the state withdrew from regulating prices and providing jobs, education and health services. Making use of an constructivist approach to historical institutionalism, I argue that parliamentary debates do not only offer a chance to reconstruct the social meaning of these developments but they also give insights into underlying norms and beliefs that still influence Egypt’s politics today. In an interpretive analysis of parliamentary minutes dealing with the transition to a free market economy between 2005 and 2010, changes can be detracted in regard to norms and their implementation by the government. Pivotal here was the role of the state and the question of trust in state authorities and political institutions. Following norm dynamics, conflict lines appear that show a growing divide within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and cross-party alliances. In particular, norm conflicts heated up against the increasingly visible wing of businessmen within the NDP whose laisser-faire approach to economic policies as well as their identity as a political actor were highly contested. Norm diversity can be found with the Muslim Brotherhood who showed a broad range of positions towards the social question ranging from a more interventionist state, for example in the wage system, to sole criticism of the extent of social inequality, without causal explanation or reform demands. The overall picture reveals a growing legitimacy crisis concerning the government’s implementation of the belief in an active state that should create a new social balance in a free market economy. During the first two years after the fall of Mubarak, all eyes had been on the installment of a new political system even though the Egyptian economy has been in a free fall. Questions on the right economic order and the search for social justice are more important than ever and need intense political debates. The analysis of the years before the revolution can serve as a background to contemporary developments and raise the awareness for their complex normative foundations.