The weak/fragile state thesis claims that states like Yemen are a manifestation of spaces of chaos and lawlessness that provide a safe haven for terrorists. Central to this thesis is the state’s lack of sovereignty over its territory, which leads to deteriorating security situation detrimental to Western interests. Although the validity of weak or failed state thesis has come under scrutiny due to its orientalist trait, it continues to dominate the writings of security experts who assume its sufficiency to gauge the strength and weakness of state power within non-western contexts. In this paper, I argue that the theory of governmentality can help us better understand what is described as failed/weak state. I further argue that the state power should be viewed in terms of its ability to produce self-governed subjects over which it enacts its sovereignty. Based on ethnographic-historical materials, including fieldwork conducted in the wake of recent popular uprising in Yemen, this paper concludes that the thesis of failed/weak/fragile state is itself fragile failing as it does to explain the historicity and complexity of state power in non-western contexts.

This paper is addressing the issue of state weakness in Yemen from two perspectives. On the one hand, it will look at the origins of state weakness at the top through investigating how an incumbent regime prepared the ground for forces of political disorder. On the other hand, it looks at bottom-up approaches of how to implement the functions of a state. In order to address the origins of state weakness, it is crucial to clarify what the functions of the state in Yemen constitute, and what ‘the state’ in Yemen actually is. Following this, the paper will have a closer look at the regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and how he used the state to achieve legitimacy for his rule. His instrumental use of the terrorist threat and his exploitation of the few resources of the country contributed to the precarious political, economic and security situation the country finds itself in today. However, Yemen has never been a strong state, and its history indicates that it has never been a centralized state either (patchwork of sultanates in the south, the division between north and south, de facto semi-autonomous regions in the very east). A centralized government has only existed from 1990 onwards as a result of Yemen’s unification. This however did not lead to a greater cooperation between the regions but rather to competition over state patronage. Instead of focussing on the imminent threat of state weakness, it is of greater importance to address the imminent threat of authoritarian resilience after the 2011 uprising and ouster of Saleh. The existing structures of regionalism could be used in order to initiate a de-centralization process in the country. The economy needs to be developed in a way that it does not rely exclusively on foreign money. One of the most important tasks is however an effective institution building in the country and a clear time frame for the tasks, which need to be accomplished during the transitional period. These three aspects might ultimately lead to a stronger state in Yemen.

Since the uprising in 2012, it is now possible to openly discuss and express support for the Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. Predictably, Houthism’s long suppression in the capital has led to its current popularity; Houthi signs of “Death to Israel, Death to America” now dot Sanaa’s Zaydi neighborhoods. Meanwhile, anti-Houthism is now a larger part of an Islah party rhetoric. Based on first-hand interviews with scholars in the Houthi controlled territories in Saa'da and in Sanaa and Islah publications which propagate anti-Houthism, this paper discusses Houthi and anti-Houthi discourse in post-Saleh Yemen. I speculate on Houthism and Houthaphobia's significance for the state's capacity to govern and form policy for its northern problem in the coming years.

In the post-Soviet world, the idea of state weakness and fragility has become a major concern for policy makers and academics alike, particularly in Europe and the United States. Weak states threaten security because they allow non-state actors to organize and threaten the region and the world. Weak states threaten neighboring states because their inability to provide for their citizens creates domestic economic and political chaos that spills into neighboring states. However, the concept of state weakness is built upon even weaker conceptual foundations that render the idea unable to grasp the political dynamics of states. The concept of state weakness is based upon a functionalist paradigm of the state in which the state performs services “contracted” by society. The state provides security, economic development, and good governance that reflect the local interests of citizens. But power builds states. States are sites of political deals and compromises that often have little to do with broad citizen interests and more to do with particular interests. Power shapes citizen interests more often than citizens shape the state. The Yemeni transitional government shows that not only do particular domestic interests construct states, but states are also built upon the interests of international actors with their own particular interests. As one proponent of the state weakness concept proposed, states provide the international good of stability and predictability. In the Yemeni case, powerful foreign actors seeking their own security rather than Yemeni security construct the state, in the sense that the particular political agendas foreign actors strongly shape the transitional Yemeni state.