The trope of “the way of the pious forefathers” epitomizes Islam’s most viable response to the challenge of modernity. The Salafi discourse fills the theological space that opened up in the nineteenth century between the puritan Wahhabiyya, the pre-modern expression of the Hanbali tradition of return to original Islam, and new Muslim elites advocating a wholesale adoption of Western values and institutions. The early Salafi protagonists were reformist middle status Arab ‘ulama/intellectuals who defined themselves in contradistinction to Wahhabis and Westernizers, while their main adversaries were conservative ‘ulama and Sufis who, entrenched in the same theological space, accused the Salafis of both Wahhabism and unbelief. Salafism may accordingly be seen as an anti-traditional discourse that calls to return to the way of the pious forefathers in order to secure Islam’s place in the modern world. My presentation seeks to follow the modern debate over the legacy of the salaf in the crucial period of its consolidation, from the demise of the Ottoman Empire and abolition of the Caliphate following World War I to the creation of independent Arab states in the aftermath of World War II (roughly 1920-1945). I use an interdisciplinary approach, analyzing writings of the major participants in the debate over the Salafiyya in the historical context of the time and in light of the theoretical contributions of Althusser, Barth, and especially Foucault concerning the dialogical nature and power determination of discourse. My primary sources are texts by the main protagonists of the Salafiyya at that period in the Arab east such as Rashid Rida, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, and Bahjat al-Bitar, as well as major anti-Salafi ‘ulama/Sufis like ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Iskandarani and Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari. My principal conclusions are that this debate resulted in 1) the formation of the Salafiyya as the hegemonic ideology of modern Islam, so that today it is used not only by Salafis but also by their ‘ulama and Sufi adversaries, and 2) the current diversification of the Salafi discourse itself between a Wahhabi-type creed and a politicized (post-)modern global Jihad.

This paper examines contestation within the Wahhabi stream of Salafi discourse over the notion of al-wala' wa-l-bara' (loyalty to God, Islam and Muslims and disavowal of everything else) in two historical contexts. The first episode of contestation arose during a conflict between two Saudi princes, ‘Abdallah and Sa‘ud, during the 1860s and 1870s. This conflict caused a heated debate among Wahhabi scholars because ‘Abdallah tried to fend off Sa‘ud’s challenge to his power by asking the Ottoman Empire for help. Since the Ottomans were considered to be infidels by Wahhabi scholars, ‘Abdallah’s call amounted to isti‘ana bi-l-kuffar, asking the “unbelievers” for help in fighting other Muslims. Although the majority of scholars sided with ‘Abdallah, a small but vocal minority claimed that al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ dictated that the rulers keep their distance from infidels. The collapse of the second Saudi state, partly caused by the lack of unity among the ‘ulama’ , was an important reason for future generations of scholars to adopt an attitude of subservience to the state. Because of this submission to the rulers, the notion of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as developed by most 20th-century Saudi scholars dealt only with social issues and aspects of personal conduct, incorporating the concept in their broader discourse of a strictly quietist Wahhabism. A recent episode of contestation emerged in response to the Saudi decision to allow US “infidel” troops on its soil as a precautionary measure against a possible attack by Iraq in 1990. From that time onward, several Wahhabi scholars have used the scholarly debate surrounding the 19th-century conflict to criticise the Saudi state in its own, Wahhabi terms. The Palestinian-Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959) has been particularly instrumental in reviving an uncompromising interpretation of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’. By invoking the 19th-century scholars who had sided with prince Sa‘ud, al-Maqdisi not only turned one aspect of Wahhabi discourse against Saudi Arabia but also showed that al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ may not simply be the quietist doctrine that many Saudi scholars claim it is. In fact, Al-Maqdisi’s writings on this issue later became an important part of the anti-Saudi discourse used by Al-Qa‘ida on the Arabian Peninsula. This shows that the Wahhabi tradition is, at least in some of its aspects, a highly contested one and not a doctrinal core that is interpreted unambiguously among Wahhabis.

The idea that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida led a movement of reform called Salafiyya (or Salafism) is one of the basic postulates on which the study of modern Islamic thought is built. It is true that Salafism has become a label whereby many scholars in the West, and some in the Middle East, refer to the broad program of Islamic modernism that took shape in the late nineteenth century. Yet this definition is the source of much confusion, for Salafism has also become a puristic label that stands for a rigorist religious orientation and methodology associated with Wahhabism and the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia. How can there be such a gap? This paper will attempt to relieve some of the confusion that beclouds the term Salafism by looking, on the one hand, at the history of its meaning up to the early twentieth century and, on the other hand, at the process through which it gradually became a truly widespread label and slogan. Hence, the argument will be twofold. First, the paper will contend that the substantive “Salafism”, which refers to a broad program of modernist reform, is in fact a creation of the twentieth century. While some Salafi labels existed as early as the Middle Ages, their meaning was rather narrow and theological in nature. Second, the paper will argue that the famous Salafiyya Press and Bookstore of Cairo played an important role in the emergence of “Salafism” as a label, gave it unprecedented visibility, and accounted for much of its diffusion. Through its publications and editing choices, the Bookstore also contributed to setting the parameters of what constituted Salafism. In other words, it influenced the perceived meaning of this label and evidently led some observers to believe that Salafism referred to a broad movement of renaissance (nahda), reform (islah), and Islamic modernism in general. This is indeed how French scholars understood the term as early as the 1920s. Sources for this paper include medieval biographical dictionaries and Hanbali theological treatises, but the bulk of the research is based on various materials written, printed or distributed by the managers the Salafiyya Press and Bookstore from the 1910s to the 1920s. Western reviews of this material will also be used.

The term Salafism is misunderstood by academic scholars, in part because it is contested among Muslim scholars and groups, who often use the term loosely and even misleadingly. This paper will provide a definition for Salafism, arguing that understood theologically it has a long pedigree in Islamic sectarian history, one that dates back to the medieval period. Salafis adhere to a well-defined creed and have formed a distinctive interpretive community. They reject the beliefs of other Muslim groups such as the Ash`aris and the various Shii sects, among others, and they do so in order to draw a boundary around the community of believers which they defend vigilantly. This process of constantly attacking others is necessary for reinforcing the bonds and identity of the Salafi community, and is a distinctive feature of Salafism. The modern descendants of the Salafis are the Wahhabis but also members of the Ahl al-Hadith movements in South Asia, Yemen, Egypt and elsewhere in the world. Some of these movements predate the Wahhabi movement. Moving away from theology, the consensus among Salafis begins to fray on matters of law and the question of the authority of the established schools (madhhabs). And when it comes to political affiliation and action, the Salafis are profoundly divided and cannot be considered members of a single group. The proof that I will adduce for the importance of theology will come from the long-history of Salafi attacks against the Shiis—from Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise entitled K. Minhaj ahl al-sunna al-nabawiyya to Nasir al-Fahd’s Risala fi mashru`iyyat al-ighlaz `ala al-Rawafid. This is a little studied yet important polemic and this paper will provide a roadmap for the anti-Shii discourse among the Salafis. It will become clear that under the vehement criticism by the Salafis of various Shii practices (e.g., cursing certain companions, visiting the graves of the Imams, etc.) lies a profound difference over theological tenets, one so great as to lead to mutual anathemization and to the potential for violence, as seen in Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere. Finally, I hope to show that those Muslims who have claimed the mantle of Salafism have invariably had to adopt its theology, part of which involves adopting anti-Shii views. This is the case for certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood who wish to be Salafis as it is for members of al-Qaeda (e.g., Ayman al-Zawahiri) who have not been raised with these beliefs.