Historiography of the British period in Persian Gulf history often covers economy and trade as well as political conflict between the Ottomans, Persians, and British as the era of independent nations began to replace imperial rule. A trope of the literature is that life in the gulf changed dramatically with the arrival of the British, and particularly when began using steam ships. What is often missing is the role of the Persian Gulf’s inhabitants. The Persian Gulf is important for the surrounding desert lands, both as a natural connection to major trade routes and for its unique resources. Locals engaged in fishing, pearl diving, and sailing, but little has been written about how local residents of the Gulf coped as their region passed from one imperial ruler and historical era to another. An environmental approach to this important region of the Middle East suggests that local Gulf residents used an ultra-localized understanding of their resources, terrain, and weather patterns to facilitate their transition from ruler to ruler throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. Arab pirates knew the best escape channels between islands and the nearest inlets in which to hide along the barren shore, methods that worked even after the advent of steam power. Fishermen maintained an array of methods in order to bring in various types of fish in different seasons, often outside of governmental control. Pearl divers had always been more closely controlled because of the lucrative nature of their trade, but the British were, perhaps, less adept at controlling that industry than provincial Ottoman leaders who had deeper connections and greater knowledge of local conditions. Finally, if life became too difficult as a result of poor governance, political battles, open warring, or extreme weather, local residents knew when to flee and which distant Gulf shores would provide for their families. Through an examination of travelers’ guides, memoirs, and government documents, I recreate a picture of Arab and Persian daily life in the Gulf as it existed outside of major political centers. Such a paper provides a new assessment of the impact of new technologies on the Gulf region and show how local, collective environmental knowledge allowed inhabitants to maintain cultural traditions and resource management long into the modern period.

Drawing upon interviews and primary and secondary source research in Turkey and Azerbaijan, and employing a comparative political science approach, this paper asks: Why have Black Sea countries already dealing with the effects of climate change (extreme weather events, sea level fluctuation, etc.) largely opted for mitigation strategies (reduction of GHG emissions) rather than adaptation strategies? While adaptation responds to immediate risks and in many cases has greater utility to local constituents, countries experiencing direct effects of extreme weather events often puzzlingly choose policies which prioritize mitigation. This is the case even though the effects of mitigation will be experienced globally and at a much later time, and mitigation strategies often require investment in new technologies and the creation of new market structures to make renewable energy and energy efficiency projects economically viable. Others who have tried to answer this question have focused on technological and market/regulatory framework explanations and the relative economic prosperity of a country. Yet none of these approaches are able to fully answer the question of why some countries still don't pursue adaptation even when they should from a human and energy security standpoint. Recent research has observed that the diffusion of environmental programs is simultaneously influenced by processes operating within nested organizational fields at local, national, and global levels. Similarly, I argue that explaining why countries pursue mitigation over adaptation requires examining how constellations of forces at different levels come together on the ground. Though my dissertation draws on case studies throughout the broader Black Sea region, this paper will discuss my case studies of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijan, despite its hydrocarbon resources and the fact that it is already bearing the economic and social costs of flooding, sea level fluctuation in the Caspian, and damage to agriculture from higher temperatures, has chosen to pursue aggressive GHG mitigation policies rather than adaptation. Turkey has recently embarked on limited adaptation in southeastern Turkey, largely galvanized by international donor organizations, yet its domestic policies also mostly focus on mitigation. I explain how domestic private sector interests in renewable energy, involvement in international climate negotiations, the international donor community’s local agendas, and the relative social and political capital of communities affected by climate change shape these countries’ respective approaches to domestic climate change mitigation and adaptation. I use these examples to draw broader conclusions for shaping regional approaches to climate change and energy security in the Middle East.

Following the discovery of large natural gas fields in the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean, energy has become yet another sensitive issue in Eastern Mediterranean politics. Cyprus and Israel appear to be the first two states to benefit, as they have already signed large contracts about drilling projects that would soon turn them into net energy exporters. The possibility of discovering further energy reserves has raised the question of delineating the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean. This has involved all littoral states and added one more potential regional dispute. Unilateral moves by littoral states could potentially lead to regional tension and conflict, while the prospect of referring the delineation to international adjudication appears dim at the moment. Turkey’s role has been important not only because it is one of the region’s littoral states, but also because it could serve as a transport hub for the delivery of hydrocarbons to-be-extracted to the world market. Nevertheless, the Cyprus question and Turkey’s frozen relations with Israel obstruct regional cooperation, as well as the promotion of European energy security. The European Union authorities would be very glad to acquire access to Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, as this would reduce their dependence on energy imports from Russia. This paper aims to examine the validity of realist and liberal theories of international relations through the study of the energy scramble in the Eastern Mediterranean region, in particular the theories that focus on absolute and relative gains regarding the formation of actors’ behaviour. It also aims to identify risks and opportunities for regional stability and European energy security that the discovery of energy resources has brought about.

Many Middle Eastern states have experienced protracted droughts, fluctuations in water variability, and internal and cross-border migration that have challenged states’ capacity to manage domestic water resources. This paper examines how Israel, Syria, and Jordan framed the connections between migration, water, and climate variability differently, despite sharing experiences of drought and considering water resources a national security imperative. In Israel, heightened securitization of the links between migration and water scarcity have clouded the underlying causes of migration, where immigration is largely due to conflict and economic reasons. In contrast, in Syria we find that governing elites downplayed connections between internal migration and drought in the late 2000s, building upon years of failure to adapt agricultural and water policies that constrained its ability to effectively respond to drought-induced migration. While Jordan has sought to improve water use efficiency over the last decade, a securitized water policy that prioritized augmentation of supply and large controversial infrastructure projects constrained its ability to build local adaptive capacities.