“Upheaval in the Arab World: Back to the Drawing Board for Political Scientists” The surprising demise of authoritarian rulers in Tunisia and Egypt requires political scientists to reexamine some of the conventional wisdom about Arab and Middle East politics. (1) The “durability of authoritarianism”. How valid now is the argument that mukhabarat states can keep several steps ahead of societal opposition through better access to and use of new technologies of information and repression? (2) Democratization is an inappropriate goal and impossible to achieve in the Arab world. Were the so-called “demo-crazy” analysts really so blinded by their presumed liberal preferences? (3); Populations are passive—anaesthetized by the opium of the rentier state or bowed down by the burdens of daily life or cowed by fear of the mukhabarat. How then to explain the extraordinary massive popular protests? (4) Arab nationalism is dead; people are reverting to their primordial affiliations. But how then to explain the so-called “contagion effect” of the Tunisian and Egyptian upheavals? Facebook alone did not cause them. And (5) the Middle East regional system is essentially stable; states still are the prime units; the regional balance of power is stable; and the system is still encased in American hegemony. But how then to explain the stunning strategic setback suffered by the United States and Washington’s apparent inability to manipulate the new situation. The paper will critically review some of the academic and policy-oriented analyses supporting these propositions and propose that a combination of factors--group-think, theoretical tunnel vision, ideological agendas, insufficient attention to the work of Arab intellectuals, and a lack of multidisciplinary approaches —help account for the difficulties. It will call for a rethinking of categories such as state (failed or otherwise), regime (rogue or otherwise), nation, society (civil or otherwise) and leadership. And it will emphasize the importance of new media and information technologies in clarifying (and energizing) the Arab “imagined community.”

Political socialization agents, especially the school and religious institutions have been adept at influencing Egyptian citizens’ religiosity, throughout the past three decades. Nevertheless, during the January 2011 uprising, new social movements, which were essential for this uprising, were secular in nature. Why was the discourse of these movements essentially secular, while the political socialization agents they were accustomed to, were very religious? The Mubarak regime has extensively relied on religious institutions to gain legitimacy within the Egyptian society. The public sphere became marred with sectarian strife and a mutual dependency of the regime upon religious intuitions for the persistence of the status quo and authoritarianism in Egypt. Thus the public sphere, of which the religious institutions were an important part, became increasingly encroached by the regime. In 2005 the regime enacted reforms, to silence the increasing national and international criticism against the regime. However, rather than expanding the public sphere for more political participation and accountability, these reform measures have effectively institutionalized authoritarianism (Kienle, 2001; Schlumberger 2007; Lust-Okar, 2005; Brownlee 2009). The public sphere has been opened up, nevertheless, political stagnation and economic inequality have been on the rise. Thus the public sphere has been encroached upon by the regime, leading to the development of a new secular social movement, which led the road to political reform in the country. New social movements on the other hand, increased in the Egyptian public sphere, mainly in the early 2000s. Why were these social movements, secular in nature, rather than religious? This paper hypothesizes that when the public sphere becomes entrenched by the regime, social movements develop a different political identity, and reinforce new values, which the political system fails to introduce (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). This paper argues that new social movements are able to by-pass a stagnant religious discourse, and gain legitimacy for their newly developed political identity, even if the society in general is religious. In an attempt to understand and expand on post democratization studies, this research will analyze the dynamics of interaction between the State, the Azhar Institution, and the Coptic Orthodox Church, and their religious discourse during the Mubarak regime. This will shed light on how they helped in the resilience of authoritarianism in Egypt; and the extent to which social movements were drawn away from their stagnant discourse.

The end of Mubarak’s rule has spawned hope as much as it has created apprehension about Egypt’s future. With Mubarak gone, the question arises whether Egypt can develop democratic institutions despite its authoritarian legacy. One particular institutional practice that may raise concerns is the corporatist system of worker representation that was central to Egypt’s authoritarian formula. This corporatism was supported through a legal framework that granted a monopoly of representation to a single trade union federation, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), and gave the regime considerable leverage over trade union activities. Overall, this framework has arguably proved successful at preventing worker organizations from developing into an oppositional force. Yet, this corporatism has been challenged in recent years, notably by the emergence of a grass-root movement calling for trade unions’ independence from the regime. This movement is lead by a group of real estate tax officials who, in December 2008, created their own “independent union:” the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers (IGURETAW). Though the Mubarak government tolerated the new union to an extent, the IGURETAW’s official status remained ambiguous because of enduring legal obstacles to its recognition. In fact, despite their relative success, the tax collectors did not succeed in altering the main institutional and legal tools whereby the regime limited associational freedom. The establishment of a military caretaker government, however, may open new opportunities for institutional change. It is probable that the union will take advantage of this new political environment to push for reform. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it attempts to elucidate the conditions for effective popular mobilization in authoritarian settings by explaining how the IGURETAW could come into being despite the institutional and legal obstacles that the organization faced. Second, the paper assesses the extent to which popular mobilization may bring about institutional change in authoritarian settings (both during periods of authoritarian stability and transition), by assessing the impact of the movement for the independence of trade unions on Egypt’s institutional structure. The research of this paper is based on interviews in Arabic conducted in 2010 with key figures of the Egyptian trade union movement, direct observation of trade union activities and protests, and an exhaustive review of the Egyptian press for the 2007-2009 period.

This paper explores the role of the Egyptian public sector within protest movements and how this relationship has changed overtime. The recent protests in Egypt have renewed interest in the role of workers in demonstration and opposition movements. While many observers have focused on private sector unions, syndicates and trade associations, less attention has been given to public sector employees and their response to and participation in protests. These actors are especially important given the regime's historical dependence on the public sector and vast bureaucracy, which have traditionally constituted vital constituencies for the regime. By focusing largely on private actors and groups, existing accounts leave several important questions unresolved. Does the public sector participate in protests, and if so, on whose behalf? Do they support the opposition or, as some recent media accounts have suggested, buttress the regime in times of turmoil? Alternatively, is the public sector too varied and diverse to characterize in such generalities? To answer these questions, this paper takes a broadly comparative approach, exploring variation across both time and economic sectors. I begin by investigating the changing role of the public sector in protest movements since 1952. I embed and contextualize this group (to the extent we can characterize public sector workers as such) within the broader opposition movement and explore their relative coordination and competition with private sector workers and groups. In answering these questions, I draw on various sources, both traditional (e.g. personal narratives and news reports) and sources only made available through new social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter). Ultimately, I show how protest movements have changed overtime with the proliferation these new media, and how these changes have had manifold effects on the composition and dynamics within opposition groups. Although once critical to their success or failure, the public sector and bureaucracy have become increasingly less focal within protest movements, which have grown more broadly inclusive and egalitarian with these new media.

The eyes of the world were on Tahrir Square in Cairo in late January and early February 2011, as millions of Egyptians called for a new government and the departure of Hosni Mubarak. But this political drama was particularly enthralling for Egyptians and other Arabs living in the US, for whom it was an opportunity to have new conversations, in Arab communities and with others, about Arab politics and the meanings of their identities. This paper will examine the experience of Egyptians and other Arabs in New York City as they watch both the fall of the Mubarak regime and the post-Mubarak transition. First, it will examine how Egyptian-Americans were constructed in mainstream news media and transmissions during these moments, as suddenly Steinway Street's "Little Egypt" became the focus of news reports in New York's local media, including television (especially New York One) and print media (especially the New York Times, and its online City Room blog). Then, reflectively, it will examine how young Egyptian-Americans and other Arab-Americans, contemporaries of those who turned out in Tahrir Square, constructed their own narratives of the Egyptian revolution and of their own Arab selves. Research for this paper is ongoing, and derives from my existing fieldwork in the Arab communities of New York City.