The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 is referred to as the Nakba, or Catastrophe, in contemporary Palestinian popular memory discourses. In these discourses, the Nakba, for those who were expelled beyond the borders of historic Palestine in 1948, is a signifier not only of the catastrophe of the people in 1948, but also of the ongoing catastrophes of the people as a result of their homeland, historic Palestine, remaining occupied. In Syria, the emergence of these discourses can be traced at least as far back as the Oslo Accords (1993). In response to the threat posed to their right of return by the Palestinian leadership, community activists began creating new memory discourses through activities that emphasised the Nakba, historic Palestine, and the Nakba generation’s memories. The meaning of the Nakba in these memory discourses presupposes that the significations of 1948 have been constant and universal since 1948. In contrast, this paper contends that the notion of 1948-as-catastrophe has always encapsulated competing significations, and has drastically changed since its conceptualisation as such in 1948. Against this backdrop of the Nakba’s shifting and contested significations over time, and the emergence of new popular memory discourses, this paper draws on interviews with first-, second- and third generation refugees in Syria, and explores how they “remember” an event which turned them, their families, and now a fourth generation into refugees. While the Nakba’s dominant signification as the ongoing past/present Palestinian catastrophe remains important and has been accentuated as a result of the war in Syria, the paper argues that the narration and transmission of memories of the Nakba in Palestinian refugee families does not necessarily simply confirm or reproduce popular memory discourses on and understandings of the Nakba. Community members’ own memories and narratives of memory invariably dialogue with, subvert and even contest these discourses, and make the case for the Nakba’s multiple and at times contradictory meanings.

While more than six decades have passed since the traumatic events of the Nakba, Palestinian refugees have maintained a political discourse that insists on the right of return and advocates liberation from Zionist colonization. However, the Palestinian political discourse on return and liberation is not articulated homogeneously across Palestinian constituencies. By focusing on overlapping ideologies as well as lines of fracture in this discourse, I hope to produce a more complex picture of current Palestinian attitudes toward the notions of return and liberation. This paper is based primarily on fieldwork conducted in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria from 2004 to 2006 but also incorporates more recent fieldwork (summer 2012) conducted among Palestinians in France as a means of comparing attitudes about return among camp-based Palestinian refugees and Palestinians in the diaspora more broadly. I will show that among Palestinian refugees in Syria, return is primarily understood in terms of returning to one's actual home or hometown irrespective of national boundaries; I will also show that return was expressed in moral terms as a question of respect and dignity. Drawing on fieldwork conducted this past summer in France, I will show that while UNRWA is seen as a potential political ally in achieving return for Palestinian refugees living in camps in Syria, it was generally looked down on as a depoliticizing force by the Palestinians I interviewed in France. I will also show that while Palestinian refugees in camps in Syria drew on a very localized imaginary of what return would entail, their Palestinian counterparts in France offered a much broader and more flexible notion of what return would entail. These differences aside, both groups offered visions of return that question the notion of the nation-state as the ideal space through which return, and linked to it liberation, can occur.

This paper explores future possibilities for Palestinian refugees in Syria who are caught in the midst of the brutal conflict between the Syrian political opposition and the Syrian regime that has now turned into a vicious civil war. This exploration begins with an analysis of the historical background of the political presence of Palestinians in Syria - as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestinian resistance groups and Islamic groups (mainly Hamas) - and these groups’ relationship to the Syrian regime, as well as with leftist Syrian opposition parties and groups. Based on primary material, the paper assesses how the Palestinians in Syria and their political factions tried to avoid becoming involved in the current national internal conflict and how they were nevertheless finally dragged into the conflict at the end of 2012. This analysis will be carried out within the context of the Palestinians’ historical presence in Syria, the degree of their integration into Syrian society, and the civic rights (and obligations) granted to them by successive Syrian regimes since the early 1950s. In addition, the demographic characteristics of Palestinian refugees in Syria will be assessed, as well as their geographic distribution within Syrian territory. I argue that the Palestinian involvement in the Syrian conflict has not been on the scale of their role in the Lebanese civil war, and that the two cases are different and incomparable in many respects. The paper concludes by assessing possible outcomes of the conflict and its impact on the future of Palestinian refugees in Syria based on the visions of prominent politically active Palestinian actors from Syria. These include the possibility that the opposition succeeds in overthrowing the regime and in coming to power; the regime defeating the opposition and remaining in power; a compromise is reached between the two sides and power is shared; and possible positions that might be taken by neighboring Arab states, Gulf Cooperation Council states and some Western states with regards to resettling Palestinian refugees from Syria who are unable, unwilling to or barred from return to Syria.

This paper explores the ways in which Palestinian refugees in the Old City of Damascus are impacted by gentrification. Gentrification is the rehabilitation of housing in economically depressed urban neighborhoods through the infusion of capital to create new venues for the consumption of culture. It inevitably results in the displacement of long-term residents who tend to be poor or marginalized populations without the political, economic, or social power to resist or take part in the economic and cultural transformations of their neighborhoods. The gentrification of the historic center that began two decades ago does bring attention to the vulnerability of Palestinian refugees who already have only a precarious presence in the Old City. The existence of refugees in the historic site is incompatible with cultural gentrification since Palestinians are considered “out of place” and a source of “pollution” due to their refugee status in the country. Hence, they have no claim to the neighborhoods in which they have been living for decades and no voice in the current gentrification that emphasizes the Damascene heritage of the city. Based on research conducted before the current civil war, I begin with a brief overview of the presence of Palestinians in the Old City of Damascus and their living conditions in the Old City. In addition I discuss how the presence of refugees in the Old City that is not indexed as a refugee camp is a contentious issue with Syrians active in the gentrification of the Old City. Through interviews, participation-observation, and archival research I look at the ways in which these refugees were able to forge a community in the Old City similar to a refugee camp, but without the official designation as such. UNRWA, which is more visible in the camps outside of Damascus, is required to keep a muted presence in the Old City. I demonstrate the ways in which Palestinian refugees maintain their distinct national identity in the Old City and in a built environment that is not a refugee camp. I conclude with how gentrification and heritage preservation is rendering the Palestinians an undesirable community in the Old City not unlike other poor and marginalized Syrians living in the Old City. I will also discuss the implications of the civil war on the gentrification of the Old City and the disadvantaged populations living there.