This paper examines the US state-building project in Iraq, not as an external imposition, but as a manifestation of a modern phenomenon of political engineering. State-building, a set of practices and forms of knowledge that are constantly produced and re-produced in academic and policy centers, is involved in perpetual forms of interpreting and intervening on the empirical reality in order to shape a particular order (the “state”). Interventions in the name of state-building act on all aspects of the state’s life: national narratives, legal, institutional and political arrangements and the “things” that make the state viable—buildings to house state functions, pipelines to feed the economy, methods of border-control to protect “sovereignty,” sewage systems to maintain public health, and, among many other things, an electrical grid to illuminate spaces and power economic activities. This paper examines how state-building assembles its object (the state). Instead of started from the desired end result, a reified state, and then judging the results in a backwards fashion, I begin from a site in which things, institutions, technologies, narratives, violence and expert knowledge are assembled together and maintained to help produce a new stately order: the electrical grid. Under the US occupation, the electrical sector was the recipient of the largest amount of reconstruction aid. Electricity was important not just for illumination and powering of machinery, but also for oil production—the country’s main source of income. The grid, which connected the country together in a network of wires, transmitters, transformers and generators, is a knot in a web of things, experts, narratives and technologies that are assembled together to (re-)build the state. Before examining the case study, the paper begins by placing state-building in an historical context as a political technology articulated in response to perceived global pressing political and security issues, and at the same time has deep affinities with academic knowledge production about the state. This article uses US government investigation reports as primary source material in constructing the case study. Methodologically, it draws on approaches borrowed from the studies of science and technology used in recent studies of political and economic engineering (e.g. Timothy Mitchell, Stephen Collier, Patrick Carroll; Andrew Barry). Theoretically, I follow a tradition that challenges the view that sees the state as a bounded and cohesive entity, and rather examines the sources of its agency and constant formation on the ground (e.g. Philip Abrams; Timothy Mitchell; Pierre Bourdieu).

In early 1970, with the major oil companies waging a rear-guard battle against an increasingly phalanx-like OPEC, the shah of Iran held a press conference in Tehran at which he expatiated on the machinations of the so-called Seven Sisters (the core group of multinational oil companies, five of them American), denouncing their attempts both to short-change oil-producing countries such as his own and to enlist their governments in the effort. The latter behavior, he stated firmly, was "a precise example of what is called economic imperialism." The charge was hardly novel then and remains pervasive today. Indeed, the debate over US imperialism in the Middle East ignites anew each time the United States elects to pursue its strategic goals in the region via military intervention, as it has done most recently in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. In its broader historical contours, the imperialism debate has been marked by a perennial set of controversies, one of which will be my focus. This is the dispute between those who contend that imperialism results from capital drawing the state into foreign military ventures and those who argue the reverse. In exploring this dispute with reference to US foreign policy in the Middle East, I contend that it posits a false dichotomy. Neither of the opposing positions is historically tenable, since capital and the state in fact have propelled one another into the region, with neither pulling the other in its train for any significant length of time without a reversal of roles. Further, I argue that one of the more ambitious alternatives to this account––the theory that the distinction between the state and capital is itself illusory––fails the test of history, and specifically history as it unfolded from the beginning of significant US engagement in the Middle East in the post-WWI era through the consolidation of OPEC in the 1970s.

The King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre (KASOTC) in Jordan, owned by the Jordanian army, financed and established by the US DoD and operated by the US private business ViaGlobal not only offers a base for the professional training of US, Jordanian and other international special forces units, but also for stunt training of actors and for adventure holidays targeted at investment bankers and other affluent professionals who are interested in ‘the special forces experience’. The diverse use of KASOTC indicates that US security assistance to Jordan is much more than mere support to the stability and security of a close regional ally. A deeper analysis of US security support to Jordan therefore needs to also include a discussion of how it contributes to the discursive construction of security threats and how it interacts with discourses of democracy promotion and economic development that frame US-Jordanian relations. Using KASOTC as a lens into US-Jordanian bilateral relations, this presentation discusses the following questions: How do the discourses of former US military staff based at KASOTC reinforce or contradict those of US democracy promoters in Jordan? What is KASOTC’s own business model and can one draw conclusions from it regarding the interaction of security support and promoted models of economic development in the country? And how does the layout and day-to-day running of KASOTC contribute to shaping conceptualizations of ‘the enemy’? This presentation argues that the example of KASOTC illustrates well not only the contradictory nature of US policies pursued in Jordan, but also the increased blurring of boundaries between security and political and economic development. At the example of KASOTC it is shown how US-Jordanian relations reproduce power structures that seemingly confirm the need to securitize the global economy’s periphery, such as Jordanian politics, before it is deemed ready for increased private foreign investment, as well as power structures that uphold claims of US moral superiority. The presentation speaks to the growing body of literature on the securitization of political and economic development and seeks to contribute to filling the gap of empirically grounded research on security sector reform and security support. It is based on extensive qualitative interviews with Jordanian government officials, employees of KASOTC and the US Embassy in Jordan, observations made during the attendance of a KASOTC hosted event in 2013, as well as on interviews with current and former employees of the US DoS in Washington D.C.

Since US-Egyptian relations deteriorated following the summer 2013 military coup in Cairo, which resulted in both pro-Mohamed Morsi and pro-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi camps distrusting the United States, the Sisi military-led regime has labeled the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist organization,” and simultaneously terrorist attacks in northern Sinai and even in parts of Cairo have escalated. Obscure Al Qaeda-affiliated groups proliferating in northern Sinai have emerged, and the need for security cooperation with the U.S. for counter-terrorism (CT) in Egypt has never been greater. Egyptians now harbor unprecedented anger and distrust towards the United States. Yet, Foreign Military Funds (FMF) and security assistance have not been cut off completely, despite the frayed bilateral relations. From the Egyptian military regime’s perspective, the U.S. is very likely seen as their “frenemy,” while nonetheless essential for high-technology reconnaissance, surveillance, and CT measures and operations. While bilateral relations have suffered significantly, they have not been rendered completely obsolete, as the integrity of the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords and US military sales to Egypt remain as crucial national interests on both sides. This paper applies Putnam’s 2-Level Game Theory to US-Egyptian relations involving domestic CT strategies in Egypt. Putnam involves simultaneous negotiations at the domestic (Egypt) level and internationally between governments (the US and Egypt). The study posits that Egypt’s current domestic terrorism problem compels the military-led regime to maintain security cooperation with the United States, despite deteriorating bilateral relations since the 2013 coup. Overshadowing this dynamic is a new trend of Egypt building relations with Russia, which will also be part of this analysis within the Putnam theoretical framework. The author has lived in Egypt for four years, and also utilizes primary-source interviews and government documents for this analysis. In addition, this paper will constitute a chapter in a book manuscript about the Arab Awakening.