Until recently, Kurdish nationalism, compared to its Arab, Turkish, and Iranian neighbors, has been stunted and divided. During the past decade, the creation of the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and Turkey's European Union accession process have created dramatic new "opportunity spaces" for the Kurds whose future prospects now present a fast-changing, much-needed analysis. How will the new al-Maliki government in Iraq affect Baghdad's delicate balance with the Kurdsh Even though the Kurdish position remains strong with Jalal Talabani's reelection as president of Iraq, once a new central government emerges in Iraq, the inherently more powerful Arab majority will again begin pressuring the Kurds for concessions on the decentralized Iraqi constitution so favorable to the Kurds and the definition of Iraqi federalism, the details of a hydrocarbon law, and the future of Kirkuk, among other issues. In Turkey, national elections scheduled for June 2011 present possibilities for a new Kurdish/Democratic Opening (based in part on the experiences of the failed Kurdish Opening in 2009) crowned by the drafting of a new truly democratic constitution to replace the one created by the military in 1982. Helping to drive all this, of course, is the reform process initiated by Turkey's EU accession process and Turkey's new foreign policy of "zero-problems with its neighbors" and emphasis on its soft power. More recently, moreover, Turkey has followed its economic support of the KRG with political support as the AKP government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sought membership in the European Union, which, as already mentioned, was contingent upon domestic reforms concerning Turkey's Kurds and zero problems with regional neighbors, among others. Less dramatic, but still dynamic is the Kurdish position in Iran in part driven by the new-found Kurdish models of assertion in Iraq and Turkey. What are the future prospects for the Kurds in Irano Finally, over laying these important "internal" Kurdish matters, lies the international community's position. How will the draw down of US forces in Iraq affect the KRG' future prospects Will the US guarantee of the KRG continue or inevitably weakeno How will the EU deal with the Kurdish problem which is now also Europe's given Turkey's EU accession process that is bringing the Kurds right up to Europe's borders and even into Europee The purpose of this panel is to analyze the future prospects for the Kurds within the continuing minefields of Middle East and international politics.
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Dr. Michael M. Gunter
The Iraqi Kurds, now not only possess their most powerful regional government since the creation of Iraq following World War I (the Kurdistan Regional Government or KRG), but also play a very prominent role in the Iraqi government in Baghdad including the posts of president (Jalal Talabani), foreign minister (Hoshyar Zebari), and several other cabinet positions. After a great deal of wrangling, the Kurds managed to maintain their strong position in al-Maliki’s new Baghdad government finally cobbled together in December 2010. This dual governmental role stood in mark contrast to the situation that existed before the events of 1991 and 2003, when the Kurds were treated as second class citizens and worse. The ultimate question, of course, is for how long this unique Kurdish position of strength will last. Many Arabs still resent the Kurdish claims to autonomy as a challenge to the Arab patrimony and a federal state for the Iraqi Kurds within Iraq as simply a prelude to secession that was forced upon the Arabs at a moment of temporary weakness following the war in 2003. When will the Iraqi Arabs get their act together and start trying to reduce the Kurds again? This paper will analyze this developing situation and tentatively conclude that the two sides are most likely to continue to coexist in a troublesome but peaceful relationship.
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of reformism, especially the Green Movement that came to the fore in the aftermath of Iran’s 2009 presidential election, on future prospects for the Kurds in Iran. The victory of the reformist cleric Mohammad Khatami in Iran’s presidential election of 1997 was welcomed by the Kurds. However, the reform movement (the Second of Khordad Movement) that brought Khatami to power and provided him with political backing proved to be weak. In addition to limits imposed on the authority of the president by the Iranian constitution, Khatami and his supporters were challenged in all arenas by their conservative opponents. When challenged, Khatami always conceded. The closing down of the reformist newspapers and organizations as well as jailing of supporters of political reform have gone unchallenged by Khatami, save occasional speeches he delivers denouncing violations of the rule of law. In Kurdistan, the arrest of officials, some of whom had identified with Khatami’s programs, continued to tarnish the reformists’ image among the Kurds. Furthermore, the presence of many individuals in the reform movement who had earlier participated in the suppression of Kurdish uprisings created obstacles for Iran’s reform movement to accommodate Kurdish demands. This partly explains why the voter turnout was among the lowest in the country in the first post-Khatami presidential election in 2005. Although Mostafa Moin, the presidential candidate of the reformist camp, made a special effort to woo voters from non-Persian nationalities and turn Iran’s multinational character into an important part of his platform, the Kurds did not support his candidacy in 2005. Similarly, Iran’s 2009 presidential election which led to the emergence of the Green Movement and the most extensive manifestation of popular outpouring for change in Iran since 1978, did not create grassroots support for the reformists in the Kurdish-majority provinces in the country. This paper seeks to explain the structural causes of discontent with reformism among the Iranian Kurds and analyze prospects for accommodation between the Kurds and the reformists in the future. Primary Kurdish sources as well as Iranian and Western sources will be used in this study.
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The 2003 Iraq war accorded the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) further opportunity to consolidate its power by cooperating with occupation forces to fight against Saddam Hussein loyalists, who strived to return to power. Kurdish politicians exploited the political vacuum in Baghdad and Iraq’s occupation to improve their influence inside and outside Iraq. Being aware that the United States and the neighboring states, especially Turkey, were against declaring independence, however, the Iraqi Kurds carefully enshrined their vision in the Iraqi constitution for a federal democratic state that would grant them maximum autonomy. As a result, by 2010 the Kurds had their own de facto government, territorial borders, constitution, army, border guards, low-key diplomatic representation aboard and a flourishing economy. When Falah Mustafa, the KRG’s Foreign Relations officer, was asked on December 2, 2010 to explain why some Arabs were alleging that the KRG was establishing ties with foreign governments in preparation for declaring independence, Mustafa claimed his office was simply acting in line with the Iraqi Constitution. He added that KRG President Barzani’s roundtable initiative of November 11, 2010 to break eight months’ of political impasse following the Iraqi national elections of March 7, 2010 was proof that the Kurds supported Iraq’s unity. Nevertheless, while presiding over the 13th Congress of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Arbil in December 2010, Barzani shocked Arab groups as well as Turkish officials by asking the Congress to analyze the Kurdish people’s rights to self-determination. Some observers speculated that Barzani had directed his remarks at those wanting to rewrite the constitution by warning that the Kurds might declare independence if they tried to curtail the KRG’s authority. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the future prospects for the Iraqi Kurds in terms of how susceptible the KRG is to domestic Iraqi Arab and regional Arab forces seeking to reduce its autonomy within a recentralized Iraq. Will the KRG be able to maintain its autonomy, negotiate a favorable hydrocarbon law, and implement Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution regarding the future of Kirkuk, among a plethora of other concerns? This paper will employ objective content analysis of primary KRG documents as well as scholarly and media articles from various Western and neighboring regional states to analyze the future prospects for the KRG.
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Dr. Hakan Ozoglu
After surveying the history of the US position towards the Kurds in the Middle East, this paper will first discuss the future prospects and challenges of Kurdish Nationalism in relation to the US involvement in Iraq. It will then move on to examine the same issue in regards to Kurds in Turkey. The conclusion of the paper will be the comparison between the future prospects of Kurdish political movements in Iraq and Turkey as the US forces continue to disengage in Iraq and Turkey comes out of new general elections in the summer of 2011.
I will base my comments on the US archival sources including Wikileaks, and CIA documents that have become available to the general public due to Freedom of Information Act. These sources provide us with an understanding of US diplomats' views on the Kurds and their analysis/recommendations to Washington. As primary sources, these documents are of great value; however, they should be evaluated under a great scrutiny. My main conclusion will be to point out the many variables that could potentially affect the future of Kurdish movements in the Middle East.
The subject of this paper fits into the proposed panel since it attempts to discuss the future prospects of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. I believe that such predictions should be based upon available historical record. That is why, I will be referring to several historical documents to demonstrate the shifting positions of the Turkish and the US governments. After discussing the reliability of several US diplomatic cables on the Kurds, my paper will make cautious predictions for the future of the Kurdish political movements in Turkey and Iraq.
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Vera Eccarius-Kelly
The aim of my paper is to examine how European-based Kurdish satellite TV/Internet and social media outlets manage, respond to, and shape Diaspora Kurdish perceptions about rapidly changing events inside Turkey, Northern Iraq (KRG), and Iran. Among the central questions to be discussed in my paper are: How do specific Kurdish Diaspora satellite television stations attempt to portray the changing dynamic in all three countries? What are some of the constraints Kurdish media outlets experience in Europe? And, which stations and affiliated political groups exert the most influence on Kurdish media in Europe?
I will provide an analysis of satellite stations that operate in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and France, and evaluate their roles and impact on the Diaspora over the past several years. Within this context, it will be imperative to (a) gauge the Kurdish Diaspora political framing of the Green Movement in Iran, (b) examine the coverage of the scheduled Turkish national elections, (c) determine whether the Diaspora’s assessment of Turkey’s relationship with the Kurdish minority has shifted in comparison with the failed 2009 Kurdish Opening, and (d) analyze the Kurdish Diaspora’s reaction to an increasingly assertive central government in Baghdad.
My paper fits well within the proposed panel since I will discuss the Diasporic efforts to shape future prospects for Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. There have been few media studies regarding transformative events within the Diaspora, even though conditions for Kurds in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq have changed significantly since 2005. In my presentation I hope to call attention to ongoing efforts by various Kurdish Diaspora organizations to shape public perceptions and discourses about Kurdish communities through the use of satellite TV.
