Palestinian education curricula have long been of interest to scholars of Palestinian identity and nationalist consciousness. They rightly note that during the British Mandate period (1917-1947) Palestinians perceived these curricula as undermining their history and identity. Few scholars, however, have looked at the transition from British to Israeli educational policy for Palestinians. My paper examines this transition, and argues that the ideologies, motivations, and in many cases, the outcomes, of Israeli educational policy closely resembled those of the British during the Mandate. I also examine how the political and ideological motives of the British and Israeli education administrators affected Palestinian curricula. The development of events in the political area during both the British and Israeli administrations significantly influenced their treatment of identity and history in public schools for Palestinians. Using primary and secondary records, and including history textbooks, I argue that both British and Israeli educational policies were first and foremost motivated by a similar concern: that the inclusion of histories which highlighted a uniquely Palestinian identity might lead to a rise in Palestinian consciousness and, in turn, opposition to British and Israeli rule in Palestine. In response to administrational efforts to marginalize, replace, and deny any historical traditions that reinforced the collective identity of Palestinians that was produced by their shared historical traditions, Palestinians persistently demanded the inclusion of these histories in both periods. Repression of the development of Palestinian nationalist consciousness in the classroom did not prevent its expression elsewhere. As such, I argue that the marginalization of Palestinian historical narratives in the educational curricula of both periods only encouraged their articulation in other venues. Understanding Palestinian curricula as the object of a manipulative policy that was carried from the British Mandate period to the Israeli administration further adds weight to the debate on Palestinian identity and its development in the modern period.

Institutional Roots of Muslims’ Limited Provision of Modern Education in 19th Century Beirut At the turn of the 20th century in Beirut, the Muslim population was roughly 40 per cent. Yet, Christians’ share of new schools outnumbered those of the Muslims’ by a 17 to 1 ratio. This study focuses on the institutional roots of Muslims’ limited provision of modern education. It raises two questions: why Muslims failed to reform their religious schools to incorporate modern education, and why their supply of new schools continued to be limited. In addressing the first question, the dynamics of change within the waqf institution, upon which Islamic traditional schools depended financially, is analyzed. It is found that despite elements of static perpetuity, waqfs enjoyed relative flexibility, illustrating that change and reform of Islamic schools were theoretically possible. Yet, throughout Islamic history, attempts at reform remained sporadic and uncoordinated. The study shows that the process of change within Islamic education hinged on the discretion of individuals, qadis, muftis and teachers, who lacked coordination and whose legitimacy was measured by the degree of their compliance to established rules. Both factors limited the potential for change and confined innovations to specific place and time. The study then moves to analyze Muslims’ limited engagement in founding new schools. Comparison of the resources and institutional flexibilities available to Muslims and Christians is carried out through thorough analysis of the waqf deeds of two 19th century schools: the Islamic Benevolent School or al- Maqa>s}id for the Muslims, and the Zahrat al-Ih}sa>n for the Christians. It is found that the structure and scale of both sets of waqfs were pivotal to each group’s ability to found new schools. Contrary to the Christians, Muslims faced at least three factors within their institutions that adversely affected their ability to establish new schools. The absence of collective legal entities in Islamic law and the lack of central management hindered Muslims’ ability to pool resources. The state’s centralization policies of the waqf affairs further limited resources by altering potential endowers’ motives for founding large-scale charitable waqfs. This study shows that incremental change within Islamic education was pursued. Yet, it was not carried out to its full potential due to the individualistic character of Islamic institutions, the structure of legitimacy that hindered institutional change, and the lack of structural reorganization.

The story of expanded women’s education is one of the foundational stories of the modern Tunisian state. The revision of the Personal Status Code at independence in 1956 that granted Tunisian women legal rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance has ever since placed Tunisia at the forefront of women’s rights debates in the Middle East and North Africa. Scholars like Mounira Charrad have emphasized the demographic particularities of Tunisia as a small state and the political vision of its nationalist leaders as crucial factors in its post-colonial focus on women’s causes. But this narrative, which closely ties national independence to women’s emancipation, has a tendency to blur inequalities in women’s development across social classes in Tunisia. A more thorough study of the modern history of Tunisian girls’ education must take into account the records of the first schools for Tunisian Muslim girls between 1900 and 1958, which provided a primary education combining a limited French language education with professional training in crafts such as carpet weaving. This study examines the carnets historiques and enrollment registers at the national Museum of Education in Tunis for several girls’ schools, and places their stories within the larger narrative of women’s expanded political participation in the Tunisian nationalist and early post-colonial periods. The incorporation of girls’ primary schools into this narrative reveals a more explicit economic role of girls’ education in Tunisian society. At independence for example, 46% of female students were enrolled in a professional track of studies and received training in topics such as clothes making and nursing. The new professional focus of many schools also promised to open economically lucrative careers to girls, who began as early as the 1930s to enter fields of medicine, law, and business. By the 1950s, the rhetoric of girls’ schools also emphasized themes of choice and discovery in a young girl’s entry into school, mimicking themes of the nationalist movement. According to one contributor to a Tunisian women’s journal, through school “the young girl searches the knowledge to build her life,” an acknowledgement of a new valued female agency in society. This sense of choice also tended to blur class distinctions, as women across social classes reported significant, life-altering participation in schools.

This paper focuses primarily on Islamist activism at public universities in Morocco. It addresses individual conceptions of Islam, personal faith and how these relate to social action among female university students. Islamist activists currently dominate student organizations at public universities in this North African country. Much of the activism revolves around expressions of solidarity with and support for Hamas in Gaza, organizing strikes and holding rallies, leading to recruitment for Islamist organizations. The paper, in the process of being researched at the time of this wiring, is based on interviews with students and members of the larger community, and female Islamist leaders of various organizations and political parties. In the contemporary situation where the nature of Islam and relationships with the West are of great urgency, a more nuanced understanding of non-violent Islamist activism among young people, especially women, is needed. There are three main aspects to this paper: Firstly, examining the reasons why women decide to become active in Islamist organizations. Secondly, investigating the extent to which young women’s decisions are shaped by domestic and/or international events. Thirdly, addressing new forms of personal faith, a notion commonly associated with the West, but which is increasingly recognized to be a vital element among women of the Muslim world. While “Islamist Feminism” is a much debated academic concept, this paper seeks to shed light on the goals, beliefs and challenges of women who describe themselves as such but are not unified by a common understanding of the term. They hold widely varying views which are occasionally mutually exclusive. Moroccan scholar and activist Asma Lamrabet describes Islamist Feminism as “a timid movement, still somewhat confused and expressing its first stammers.” It is certainly a phenomenon that will shape and influence the role and status of women in this North African country. As Morocco is situated at a crossroads between Europe, Africa south of the Sahara and the Middle East, the extent to which non-violent Islamist Feminism impacts on public life will resonate in the Mediterranean region and beyond.

Fakhri al-Barudi came of age in a time of radical change in the Ottoman Empire. In response to European encroachments and domestic nationalist movements, the empire evinced an expansion of governmental authority in the daily lives of its subjects, particularly in the arena of education. As part of its modernization reforms, the Ottoman state founded Maktab ´Anbar as a government-run boarding school for the wealthy sons of Damascus and the surrounding countryside. In his memoirs, Barudi presented one student’s perspective on the state enterprise to train its students in modern subjects and inculcate them with a sense of civic pride and shared identity. Maktab ´Anbar’s curriculum reflected a spirit of hybridity and the Ottoman reformers’ need for synthesis to effect change in the Syrian province. The state-approved coursework in science classes displayed a state endeavoring to arm students with up-to-date technical and scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the religious curriculum demonstrated the Ottoman Empire’s self-identification as an Islamic state and attempt to make this new state school acceptable to traditional families. The religious-tinged coursework reflected the state’s adaptation of their modernization project to the local Arab, Ottoman, and Islamic contexts. Linguistic training in Ottoman Turkish and classical Arabic illustrated the state’s continued need for able administrators to further the centralization projects of the modernizing Ottoman Empire. Barudi’s memoirs also offered a glimpse into the daily lives of young Arab students during a time of great change and continuity. Barudi goes on to recount his numerous run-ins with the school administrators, providing insights into traditional and Western-influenced disciplinary measures: public humiliation, the role of the school monitor, and the use of the trumpet for roll call. The student-perspective puts into question what one historian describes as the policing of a normative moral code with a clear Islamic foundation in the late Ottoman school system. Furthermore, a critical re-reading of Barudi’s memoirs rejects the notion of proto-nationalism on the part of the Arab and Turkish students at Maktab ´Anbar.. The education of Barudi thus offers a number of lessons about the end of empire and Syria’s transition into a modern nation-state.