This study applies the Hirschman model of “Exit, voice and loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970) to the case of emigration in Algeria since the end of 1990’s civil war. It looks at specifically one form of emigration; el-harga. Literally translated harga is a burn. In the Maghreb, the term is associated with illegal migration. Harragas are the Maghrebians, mainly young men, who try to leave their home country illegally on small boats, facing high risks. Looking at the causes of el-harga, one has to go beyond the platitudes about the attractiveness of a Western el-dorado. Indeed I revealed that Algerian emigration is a real flight, with very little concern for the country of arrival. It is an “exit” for people who feel despised and abused by their own government. What are the political implications of el-harga ? What mechanisms link “exit” and “voice”? Does the “exit” option (emigration) undermine “voice” (public protest and riots) as originally argued by Hirschman? This paper combines theoretical consideration with empirical insight from Algerian migration. Indeed it is based on a 6-month fieldwork in Algeria monitoring illegal departures and public protests. I mainly conducted semi-directive interviews with migrants and protesters. This study also involved collection, compilation and analysis of newspaper articles, political speeches as well as legislative and other regulatory documents dealing with harga and public protests. I argue that examining el-harga and its political implication requires a reconfiguration of the “exit, voice and loyalty” model. “Exit” and “voice” are not mutually exclusive alternatives. Even if the availability of an exit option, through harga, drains forces form public protests in Algeria, this form of exit because it is highly risky and receives a lot of media and political attention can be analyzed as a form of “Voice through Exit”.

Free Movement of People within the Gulf Cooperation Council Freedom of movement stipulations in the formal protocols of the Gulf Cooperation Council have had limited impact on the participation of GCC citizens in the regional labour market. Under the GCC instruments, free movement of nationals among the six member states was established as an essential component of the region’s movement towards full economic integration. Nationals of member states were to be given full and complete rights in terms of the right to entry, residence, and employment at developmentally suitable stages in the process. This paper analyses these protocols within the broader construct that stresses human emancipation and freedom of mobility as fundamental human rights. Throughout the GCC, however, states face the peculiar dilemma of supporting full freedom of mobility for citizens, while also severally limiting and curtailing the mobility of the dominant, non-national population. This paper questions how normative debates on the freedom of movement apply to the Gulf region. It examines the fundamental contradiction between strictly managing movement of international migrants while at the same time freeing up movement for citizenry. It will also assess the socio-cultural and political factors within the GCC that hinder the development of free movement of people as a designated human right.

Recent uprisings of the Tunisian and Egyptian populations radically question former analyses on the resistance of the Arab World to reform processes, ascribed to the implied non-compatibility of democracy and the Islamic civilization. In addition to the importance attributed to the new media within these opposition movements, other factors have also contributed to the outbreak that maybe leads to a “fourth democratisation vague”. One of these factors is mobility. I argue that in political science the role of migrants as carriers of change thanks to their mobility and their hybridity (in a postcolonial sense) has been neglected so far. We actually know little about the influence of mobility on identity. Since two decades, mobility is accelerating, structures and forms of migration flows are changing, collective identities are redefined and questioned. In the Euro-Mediterranean space transnational migrant flows cross each other. This growing mobility between Europe and North Africa leads to a multiethnic constellation that can be experienced as a conflict, but also as a potential. The number of these individuals born out of mixed marriages or relations, having a “bi- or multi-cultural” background, is estimated up to 20 million in the Euro-Mediterranean area. So-called hybrid identities, meaning individuals who feel simultaneously belonging to different cultural spaces, moving between Europe and the countries of origin, illustrate the interwoven character of transnational identities. I argue that these individuals can be considered as “agents of change” for their countries of origin. By travelling in the Mediterranean, they do not only carry values, ideas, cultural oeuvres and social practices, but also professional knowledge, competences and financial transfers. An extended, dense and complex relational tissue (family, friendship, professional) is emerging “in between” Europe and North Africa, and thus contributing from below to the construction of a Mediterranean region. Therefore this contribution seeks to analyse the different forms of post-colonial identities in the Mediterranean Area and how these individuals with a specific hybrid migration background contribute to reform processes in the North African countries. The paper will mainly be based on qualitative interviews conducted with Euro-Tunisian and Euro-Moroccan migrants.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the substantial Lebanese Diaspora on Lebanon’s economy during the years 2008-2010, a period of substantial international economic uncertainty. Despite the vast literature revolving around diasporas and the financial benefits they tend to provide their homeland, little is known about how an active diaspora affects a state’s ability to withstand an exogenous economic shock. Certainly, the literature is silent on the role of Lebanon’s diaspora. The paper begins with an overview of the theoretical literature that addresses the role of a diaspora in the economy of their homeland, and then proceeds to examine the case of the Lebanese diaspora. Perhaps surprisingly, despite the global economic recession, Lebanon’s economy actually grew during the 2008-2010 period. In 2009, for example, growth was pegged at a staggering 9%. Following an analysis of the economic data, the paper will argue that, indeed, the Lebanese diaspora was instrumental in ensuring Lebanon’s continuing economic growth. They continued to invest strongly in key sectors of the economy - real estate, banking and tourism - the very sectors that have long dominated economic activity in Lebanon. A number of conclusions can be reached. 1) The Lebanese economy is somewhat immune to global economic downturns because its large diaspora remains attracted to the country and sees it as an important place to invest. 2) Conversely, however, the economy is worryingly dependent on the diaspora for its economic prosperity. Should diasporic interest in Lebanon weaken, due to, for example, political instability and/or a security breakdown of some sort, the economy would be in substantial trouble. 3) And, finally, with respect to comparative lessons, the Lebanese situation may be unique, as the particular nature of its economy – the heavy reliance on banking, tourism, and real estate – played to diasporic investment priorities.

Since the infitah period under Sadat, Egypt’s citizens have been a major source of labor in the Gulf countries, and more recently have started migrating in greater number to Europe. Migration remains one of that country’s most significant sources of income and an estimated four percent of Egyptians live abroad. Because most migration is temporary, much of population either have been, or have close relations with return migrants. While each story of travel and subsequent return is personal, the idea of migration is common throughout Egypt. This paper complicates notions of locality and homeland, particularly in light of views about the Mubarak government expressed in interviews from the summer of 2010. These interviews were collected in the weeks following the brutal murder of Khaled Said by police officers in Alexandria, an event that mobilized protests both in the seaside city as well as in the capital. This paper builds from international reports, political science literature and ethnographic accounts to add a new geographic specificity to the study of return migration. Transnational crossing has become a normal part of Egyptian life, and as such, is an integral part of understanding the relationships of citizen to government and of membership to homeland. While the experience of migration might shape an individual in unique ways, the ideas about the Mubarak government were not radically different than those held by many who have not migrated. Thus this project is not just a way to understand returnees or complicate notions of what is local, but also another way to examine the relationship between citizen and state in Egypt. Returnees tended to love their country and its people, but often expressed ambivalent emotions toward “the government.” In the cases where the government was feared, individuals often expressed nostalgia for a “better place” from their past, be it Kuwait, Qatar or Cyprus, where life was perceived as easier. These notions, in turn created more tension about the seemingly unlimited powers of the state. Coupled with this fear or distrust is also the feeling that Egypt is nonetheless home.