This paper explores the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the social contract in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Most countries in the MENA region had quite similar social contracts after independence: authoritarian governments have claimed legitimacy on the basis of their efforts to protect citizens against internal and external threats and provide for their living through social and economic services, while political, participation, was undermined by authoritarianism. These social contracts began to change in the 1970s when MENA governments faced increasing problems to fund the “provision” part of the social contract. After the 2010/11 uprising, the social contracts developed into different directions: some governments transformed them into pure protection contracts (only security, no more provision, e.g. Egypt). Some governments made attempts to return to the old more inclusive populist contracts (e.g. Iran). And one government (Tunisia) has included “participation” into the deliverables of the state but still struggles what exactly the “provision” component should include. The Covid-19 pandemic has now emerged as the latest factor influencing the social contracts in the region. Citizens have realized that their security depends just as much on provision as it depends on protection by the government. And they know now that health services and proper government information can be as important as jobs and economic opportunities. Therefore, we raise two sets of questions: (i) How have citizens’ perceptions about the main responsibilities of the government changed? Has the focus shifted from participation and protection to provision? And has the focus within “provision” shifted towards health services and access to information? (ii) How do citizens rate the performance of their respective governments with regards to these different deliverables. To answer these questions, we use three representative telephone surveys conducted in Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon (3500 households altogether) during the fourth quarter of 2020. The surveys include questions about citizens preferences and values regarding government deliverables. Moreover, the surveys repeated the most important questions of the Arab Barometer surveys in those countries (2018, 2019), which allows us to unpack changes of citizen perceptions over time. The paper’s findings will provide insights into citizen perceptions of the social contract in the MENA regions and provide input for governments and foreign donors for prioritizing post-Covid-19 public emergency and reconstruction spending in the MENA.

What explains varying levels of compliance with public health measures? During the global COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world have implemented various forms of containment measures, including lockdowns, mask mandates, curfews, the closure of business, schools, or places of worship, and more. One factor in physicians’ and governments’ decision making about which measures to implement has been anticipated rates of compliance. Compliance, in turn, affects the extent to which these measures have an impact on rates of infection and deaths. We collected data by systematically observing public webcams in Turkish municipalities to directly measure behavioral compliance with COVID-19 restrictions. These data allow us to examine the impact of the tightening or loosening of restrictions, as well as temporal and geographical variation in compliance rates. We hypothesize that variation in compliance may be driven by levels of trust in the government. One possibility is that citizens affinity towards the ruling political party affects trust in government and, thereby, compliance. We test this hypothesis using our data.

The Corona Crisis is unprecedented in terms of the danger it poses to health globally. Most coun-tries have instituted full or partial lock-down measures to save lives. But protecting human life has an economic cost in terms of slowed growth and productivity, massive job losses and broken value chains. This paper descriptively assesses the effect of the crisis on some main indicators of firm level economic activity in Egypt. The paper will also identify important transmission mechanisms. These effects and mechanisms will differ from sector to sector and by other factors such as firm and management characteristics, ranging from size to nationality of ownership, to location (indus-trial zone or other), technology adopted in the firm before the crisis hit; and how far its production processes depend on automation, or the ability of its workers to perform substantial tasks from home. The effects will also differ based on the support received from government. On account of the expected change in demand, some sectors may relatively benefit, likely those in chemicals and pharmaceuticals but many others will lose. Information on shutting down, full or partial exit will also be presented as part of the assessment of the damage. This analysis will also specify effects of the crisis on Value Chain operations, Sales, Exports, Em-ployment and Productivity by Firm Size, Sector, Spatial Agglomeration and informality status. The survey covers about 3000 firms of which 2000 are still in operation. Two questionnaires were administered one for firms that are still in operation, and another, very similar one, for firms that have exited the market or have temporarily shut down operations during fieldwork time. The data were collected at the beginning of the second wave extending to the height of it, precisely be-tween November 19th 2020 and 31st of January 2021. The data are representative of the entire manufacturing sector in Egypt, that is firms belong to the formal as well as the informal sector, export or predominantly serve the domestic market, are located both in and out of special economic areas and zones, are both private and public and are of all firm sizes.

The Covid-19 pandemic has emerged as the most serious health crisis the Middle East and North Africa region has ever witnessed. This paper addresses the capacities of states and societies to cope with the crisis and asks the following question: who is expected to best mitigate the social and economic consequences from the health crisis? The paper draws on original survey data to explore the expectations of citizens in crisis management and mitigation. We explore two rivaling expectations. For one, we consider a network hypothesis: prior research on wars and environmental disasters has shown that such exogenous shocks can expand altruism and community-level cooperation. If these findings are applicable to the Covid-19 pandemic, one would expect citizens across the Middle East to primarily resort to their social networks when they seek help. For another, we consider an accountability hypothesis: there is evidence that government responses to disasters increase post-crisis support for those governments, for instance on the ballot box, hence producing incentives for governments to provide help in exchange for political support. In this perspective, citizens would expect state authorities to ameliorate health risks and economic hardship. Tunisia and Lebanon are excellent cases to test these expectations. Unlike other Arab states, both countries have developed meaningful electoral procedures, which substantiates expectations in governmental accountability. In turn, the societies of both countries remain characterized by ethnic and religious identities, which fuels expectations in community-based assistance. This paper draws on nationally representative surveys from Lebanon and Tunisia—administered in December 2020—to systematically test these expectations. These tests will be based on quantitative methods and leverage individual responses on a battery of questions, distinguishing between central governments and local authorities, on the one hand, and family members, religious leaders, and traditional leaders, on the other hand. The paper will provide a comparative account not only of the two countries under investigation, but also of different social strata and political communities across Lebanon and Tunisia.