Ideology, Political Culture and Authoritarianism in Ba`thist Iraq and Syria
Panel 025, 2012 Annual Meeting
On Sunday, November 18 at 8:30 am
Panel Description
The Ba'th ideology was (and is as of the writing of those lines) part and parcel of life in Iraq and Syria. While its fundamentals were not as deep and intellectual as Communism, its adherents in both countries ruled (and still rule) for numerous decades. Every institution, be it the military, the intelligence services, or the government bureaucracy was affected by this dogma. Decisions, whether in the spheres of internal politics, foreign affairs, economy or culture were impacted by this ideology. The panel will look at different aspects of this ideology: in Iraq, the panel will evaluate how this ideology shaped the political indoctrination not only of the party affiliates but a whole generation of Iraqis through an orchestrated effort by the regime to win supporters. By focusing on the Party Preparatory School, we learn how this ideology seeped through every sphere of governance. In Syria, the panel assesses how Hafiz al-Assad dealt with the Ba'th ideology when he came to power in 1970; and examines how the ideology not only impacted internal politics and economy, but also how the country handled its regional conflicts. In both countries, the regimes were flexible when it came to economic patronage and crony networks, and were willing to change or adapt to the circumstances that ensured their longevity. From socialism to privatization, both countries did not have much trouble changing policies to their benefits. But, at the same time, both regimes used this ideology to build strong security services and ensured that intellectuals opposing the regime would find themselves in the wilderness, a phenomenon very similar to what occurred in Communist Europe and the Soviet Union. Both regimes used this ideology to build a cult of personality for their leaders, particularly Saddam Hussein and the first Assad. The machinery of the Iraqi and Syrian factions of the party, which never saw eye to eye on almost any issue, succeeded in creating images of their leaders who could do no wrong, and which impacted to a large degree the effectiveness of decision-making in both countries. In all three papers, the research is based on archival sources (for Iraq) and on government sources, first-hand accounts and print media (for Syria).
In its attempt to control state and society, from ideological and cultural points of view, the Iraqi Ba‘th used madrasat al-i‘dad al-hizbi (the party preparatory school) as the vehicle for training its cadre and for expanding the ideological education of existing members. The talk will explore, by using the original documents of the Ba‘th Party, how the school operated, how members were chosen to attend, the courses given and the role it played in developing the ideology of the party. The Ba‘th party’s dominance in Iraq was more than simply holding on to power. While it did not directly govern; it led, directed and controlled all institutions of governance: army, security services, government bureaucracy, and mass organizations such as labor unions. Thus, preparing the elite that controlled these different organizations of the state was a vital task. The talk will underline the linkage to the political indoctrination of the masses, and will analyze the impact of this ideology on policies such as creating the cult of personality for Saddam Hussein and launching the faith campaign.
This paper will trace the process of the radicalization and ruralization of the Ba`th party in the 1960s. the main sources will be primary sources based on various memoirs of ex-Ba`thists as well as the research of Raymond Hinnebusch, `Aref Dalila, Nasir Nasir, Hanna Batatu, and Steven Heydemann, The Ba`th party is best understood as a coalition of social and ideological currents, united by their opposition to the status quo during the pre-union (UAR) period between Syria and Egypt: the union (1958-1961) created a split between the old guard (who favored the union) and the rest of the party, and the conservative “Separatist Movement” (1961-1963) created another split between the hard-line regionalists (i.e., the rural base) and everyone else. By the time the regionalists (themselves an amalgam of rural minorities) wrested power in 1966, the `Alawi element dominated that fringe, but it still included some non-minoritarian elements. At the end of the 1960s, the Ba`th leadership was less urban and more rural, less Sunni and more minoritarian, less diversely minoritarian and more `Alawi. Initially, the radical leadership’s drive in the 1960s had been the need for establishing a mechanism of loyalty in the absence of strong institutions and in the presence of a strong urban opposition. Sectarian identity was used to mobilize support for political goals, i.e., as a means not an end, although the coincidence of class, regional, and sectarian divisions made it difficult to isolate the causes. Such communal mechanism would have to be buttressed by structural and strategic rationality. `Alawis, though divided among themselves on political as well as personal grounds, and though they did not rule in the name of or for the benefit of that community, were seen by excluded groups as `Alawis nonetheless, and thus found sectarian-based alliances rational. However, most analysts assert that the conflict was primarily over issues, including the different views of how radical the Ba`thi revolution should be and how it should deal with the urban opposition. Nonetheless, to rely solely on the rural/minoritarian factor would have spelled political suicide for the regime.
Whilst it is impossible to deny that Ba’ath ideology left an imprint on Iraqi state and society that lasts to the present day, it can be asked whether it was more ideology or political practice as shaped by the social backgrounds and political careers of the Ba’ath elite that accounts for this legacy. It can be argued that the ideological framework that the previous regime ostensibly rested on has been far less relevant in shaping the new Iraq than the forms in which the Ba’ath exercised power. To take but one example, whether centralization is a legacy of Ba’ath ideology or Ba’ath practice independent of ideology is open to debate. Less ambiguous is the legacy of nepotism, corruption, zero-sum politics and the politics of personalities that predates the Ba’ath and continues to the present.
Nevertheless, the Ba’ath’s ideological imprint has undeniably left Iraqi society with a vocabulary and charged symbolism that is specifically related to ideology (even if that ideology was seldom mirrored in practice). The most obvious example would be the associations relating to ‘Arabism’ and the assumed implications of Arab identity. Furthermore, the relevance and legacy of Ba’ath ideology in such cases is equally apparent in both attachment and rejection: in some instances, the relevance of Ba’ath ideology is evident by the popular backlash amongst some against the assumed Ba’ath position on a given issue. Similarly, there are many documented instances of unlikely imitators of Ba’athi rhetoric who do so as a form of opposition to the current ruling elite. Few examples are more striking in that regard than an Iraqi Salafi preacher employing Ba’athi idioms intermeshed with standard Salafi anti-Shi’a discourse. This presentation will discuss the difficulties in identifying the Ba’ath’s legacy (in terms of both ideology and practice) in current Iraqi political discourse, practice and outlook.
