Why do some individuals choose to participate in national movements against colonial, foreign or ethnic majority rule, while other members of the same national group remain uninvolved? Understanding the conditions under which ordinary individuals will choose to accept the risks of participating in national movements has direct implications for explaining differences in the growth and success of national movements and struggles. This paper explores the micro-dynamics of individual participation in national movements using original evidence from the case of the Palestinian national movement: a randomized survey conducted by the author of over 800 participants and non-participants in the Palestinian national movement in the West Bank. The survey contains data on a variety of forms of participation in the Palestinian national movement, including both participation in non-violent protest and participation in violent resistance, including membership in militant groups. These data allow me to compare not only participants and non-participants but also participants in violent and non-violent resistance, offering valuable insights into the sources of violence in particular as opposed to conflict in general. The data and analysis of the paper also contribute to an improved understanding of the Palestinian national movement, which has primarily been studied using elite-level sources and perspectives.

Unlike political parties in democratic states, armed groups in national movements lack easily measured vote shares and committee assignments. Nonetheless, the relative strength of armed groups in terms of membership size, funding, and support helps to create hierarchies of power in national movements. Although previous scholarship has often implicitly or explicitly recognized such hierarchies, systematic analysis of the hierarchy of national movements and its impact on group action is lacking. This paper will present a theory of national movement hierarchies that explains variation in the quality and quantity of groups’ use of violence, as well as how a group’s position in the movement hierarchy correlates with its likelihood of negotiating or attempting to spoil a deal with a state adversary. The theory and its competitors will be analyzed using longitudinal analysis of the Algerian and Palestinian national movements. Comparisons across movements and across groups within the same movement over time will allow for significant leverage to explain how variation in hierarchical position drives group preferences and behavior.

The rise of Islamic political parties (IPPs) in the aftermath of the Arab Spring raises various questions as to whether IPPs are seeking to establish an Islamic “tyranny of the majority,” or whether they are the equivalents of Christian Democrats committed to democratic principles. At the core of this debate is ambiguity over who IPPs are and what their “Islamic political identity” stands for. Hence, it is important to take a step back and to ask under what conditions and how IPPs define their identity. To begin with, IPPs, while defining their Islamic political identity, face a strategic dilemma between pragmatism and idealism. On the one hand, IPPs are trying to effectively govern a new political system that is subject to polarizations and to political instability. Moreover, they also are trying to establish themselves as trustable partners in international relations who will not repeat the self-imposed international alienation of the Iranian Revolution. In short, they face pragmatic problems within the context of real politics. On the other hand, IPPs, after years of repression, want to realize their ideologically driven goals while avoiding “watering down” their Islamic identity. As a result, Islamic movements today face a strategic dilemma between idealism and pragmatism where they have to find a way to stay true to their ideals as a governing party, while also pursuing popular support and international legitimacy. In order to discuss this strategic dilemma and its effects on Islamic political identity, in this paper, I focus on the Turkish AK Party, an IPP that has governed Turkey since 2002. I am focusing on the Turkish AK Party, because it is the only IPP that has been in government for over a decade and thus it can give us further insight into the future directions of IPPs. By analyzing the three electoral terms the AK Party was in power, I argue that the AK Party used foreign policy activism to solve this strategic dilemma between idealism and pragmatism. In particular, I analyze (1) how the AK Party used its pro-EU stance to cut its ties with its Islamist past and to signal the international community its pro-Western stance, and (2) how it started to get more involved in the Middle East to signal its difference from traditional center-right parties and thus its “hybrid” party identity. My evidence comes from party documents as well as from public opinion surveys.