Does international recognition of statehood affect popular support for violence among groups engaged in struggles for self-determination? On the one hand, there is widespread skepticism about the ability of the United Nations General Assembly to affect mass attitudes. On the other hand, theories in international relations imply that international recognition may also weaken support for the use of violence through the diffusion of international norms against the use of violence by non-state actors or because recognition increases the perceived effectiveness of non-violence as a strategy for achieving group goals. We build on these perspectives in order to develop a theory through which international recognition could affect mass attitudes as well. The paper then presents the first empirical test of the influence of international recognition on mass attitudes towards the use of violence. It does so using an innovative combination of a panel survey conducted around the 2012 recognition of Palestine as a state by the United Nations General Assembly and a survey experiment embedded in the second wave of the panel. Empirically testing the impact of international recognition on attitudes towards the use of violence allows us to adjudicate between the different perspectives on the impact of international recognition implied by the international relations literature. Doing so is also substantively important given the growing use of international rulings to adjudicate self-determination conflicts.

What is the impact of education on one’s attitudes about terrorism and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East? How should “terrorism” be defined? Do we overestimate the threat of terrorism, and do our governments pursue overly aggressive and counterproductive policies at home and abroad that restrict civil liberties and occupy foreign countries? Or do we underestimate the threat of terrorism, and do our governments fail to devote adequate resources and attention to preventing it? This project offers exciting empirical evidence to address these scholarly and policy debates by surveying students in numerous universities across the United States and the Middle East before and after completing relevant coursework in political science and related subfields. The findings offer a powerful picture of how an increase in knowledge about political violence and U.S. foreign policy can drive significant changes in individual attitudes.

Scholars and policy makers have debated whether coercive or conciliatory policies are more effective in combating insurgent violence and promoting conflict resolution. Some argue that coercive policies are an effective deterrent, whereas conciliatory policies signal weakness in the face of violence. Others claim that punishment is counterproductive, while conciliatory measures can promote trust and reduce grievances that lead to violence. However, empirical evidence that could shed light on this debate remains limited. The few studies that have examined this question have typically focused on how varying policies impact violence levels, but not how they affect public attitudes towards conflict and its resolution. This study addresses this gap by examining how coercive and conciliatory policies the Israeli government employs in its conflict with the Palestinians shape public opinion in Israel and Palestine. We utilize data from an original survey experiment designed to test how varying policies affect how ordinary Israelis and Palestinians assess the likelihood of peace, the likelihood of violence, and the perceptions of the other side to the conflict. By highlighting how the public evaluates and reacts to state policies, this study sheds light on the broader effects of counterinsurgency measures, with important policy implications for understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and obstacles to its resolution.

Scholarship on contemporary revolutions suggests that a revolutionary coalition of socially, ideologically, and ethnically diverse citizens is necessary for toppling durable autocracies. Yet what are the ramifications of such "negative" revolutionary coalitions for politics once the revolution ends, and the transition to democracy begins? In Tunisia, the principal contestation of the “transitional” period has occurred not between revolutionaries and old regime supporters, but between dueling factions of the revolutionary coalition that unseated Ben Ali in 2011. Emergent theoretical literature on the “urban civic revolution” suggests that rapidly assembled, diverse revolutionary coalitions are prone to post-revolutionary fractionalization – and that this fractionalization may in turn drive patterns of political and social contestation during the onset years of a new political order. During the Tunisian political crisis in August 2013, co-participants in the 2011 revolution found themselves in opposing protest groups, each side claiming to defend and uphold the revolution. What can the demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics of these groups tell us about how – or more specifically, along which political lines – the revolutionary coalition has broken down? Using an original dataset of pro- and anti-government protest surveys collected from Tunis in August 2013, this paper tests a series of empirical hypotheses regarding the dynamics of revolutionary coalition fragmentation in Tunisia. I argue that a research design comprising protest surveys of competing demonstrations lends empirical insight into the nature of emergent societal coalitions in transitional states. I provide the first evidence that both of these competing coalitions are indeed characterized by strong participation in the 2011 revolution, and show that fragmentation of this erstwhile revolutionary coalition has occurred along ideological lines concerning the role of Islam in governance, rather along the lines of social class, as predominant theories of revolution and democratization would suggest. I furthermore show that personalized evaluations of post-revolutionary progress, particularly in the economic arena, perform an important sorting function between pro- and anti-government groups. Finally, I develop and test a mechanism of protest mobilization specific to post-revolutionary contestation, namely the articulation of divergent revolutionary narratives corresponding with the predominant characteristics of each group.