De-centering the study of Shiism
Panel 169, 2017 Annual Meeting
On Monday, November 20 at 3:30 pm
Panel Description
Much of the study of modern Shi’ism has (legitimately) focused on towering figures and the institution of the marja'iyyat as the center of religious authority. Thus, studies of individual leaders, such as Sadr, Khomeini, Sistani, Khoei, Fadlallah abound, as do representations of Shi‘i belief and practice as necessarily organized around the marja’, the source of emulation. This panel aims at de-centering the gaze on Shi’i religious authority by shifting perspective in two ways: For one, it proposes that bottom-up studies of Shii authority ought to complement the dominant approach of a top-down perspective. Most studies take the marja and his beyt (office) as the starting point in order to ask questions such as: what is his fiqh, what services does he provide to the community, which hawza does he run. Seldom have scholars taken the viewpoint of the muqallid, the believer, who needs to choose between different marja’s, to navigate the copious jurisprudential literature, and the various vukala (representatives of the marja’) who present themselves to him to collect khoms and offer religious advice. Second, the panel aims to shed light on contexts where the importance of the marjaiyyat as the beacon of religious authority recedes into the background. Many Shiites of Pakistan, for example, either do not follow a marja at all, do not follow one faithfully, or accept authorities as maraji who in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon would not be considered as such. The Pakistani context is hardly unique in this regard, as comparable observations can be made in Morocco or Indonesia, where hierarchies of religious authority are more diffuse, and the leader-follower relationship less stable. Third, the panel turns attention to the vast part of the Shiite population to whom religious authority, in particular the marja’iyyat, was long closed off and for the most part still remains so: women. Following the pressure of women who sought training in the Islamic sciences, the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1980s has invested enormous resources into the build up of a system of women’s seminaries where women can begin the stony path that may lead to the attainment of religious authority. Yet, most of the extant programs teach women to reproduce regimist interpretations rather than to develop the skills needed for autonomous exegesis. The panel then proposes to de-center the study of Shi‘ism by treating on new geographic, gender, and methodological grounds.
Disciplines
Religious Studies/Theology
Participants
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Prof. Said Arjomand
-- Discussant
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Prof. Meir Litvak
-- Chair
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Dr. Mirjam Kuenkler
-- Organizer, Presenter
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Hafsa Oubou
-- Presenter
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Thomas Fibiger
-- Presenter
Presentations
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Dr. Mirjam Kuenkler
As the 1979 revolution in Iran created unprecedented opportunities for women’s learning in the secular universities, so, too, did it dramatically improve women’s access to a hawza education: an education in the Shiite seminaries. In nearly every Iranian town today girls and women can seek instruction in one of the state-supported institutions of women’s religious learning and seek accredited degrees of higher education. As I argue in this article, the scope of the religious education on offer is, however, limited. While most men’s hawza allow their students to study up to the highest level, which leads to the acquisition of an ej?zeh-ye ejteh?d (the certification to engage in independent interpretation of the sources of law), only very few maktabs and hawza provide similar opportunities for women. Accordingly, hardly any female mojtaheds have emerged from the post-revolutionary seminaries. This, I suggest, is chiefly because women are trained in the hawza not to become mojtaheds or religious scholars, but moballeghs (propagators). The lens through which women’s religious education is studied here is J?me?at al-Zahr??, the country’s largest institution of theological training for women today. It is distinguished from most other women’s seminaries in Iran by the large size of its student body, the scope of its financial means, and also its independence from the national bureau that oversees most of the country’s women’s seminaries. Instead, J?me?at al-Zahr?? is managed by a board directly appointed by the Office of Supreme Leader Khamenei. As such, it is argued, J?me?at al-Zahr?? fulfils not only a function within the broader field of Shiite education in Iran, but a political function within the regimist Shiite establishment that works towards the expansion of Khamenei’s marja‘iyyat.
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Thomas Fibiger
Based on recent ethnographic fieldwork in Kuwait this presentation seeks to challenge two tendencies in the study of religious authority among Shia Muslims. The first tendency is to focus these studies on the religious authorities themselves, on their teachings, profiles and positions within the clergy. In line with the overall theme of this panel, this presentation will contribute to an understanding of the meaning, place and role of religious authorities ‘from below’, among the muqallidun who emulate a marja’ (source of emulation). The second tendency is to regard the marja’iyya as a question of political identity, ideology and difference. In this regard the presentation will argue that following a religious authority is first and foremost a moral and a spiritual question, and in Kuwait most Shia hold that marja’iyya has little to do with politics. According to this widespread view, politics is not the place of religious authorities. Kuwait is, I suggest, a particularly interesting place for the study of the place and role of marja’iyya religious authority among lay Shia: First of all because not much research has examined notions of religious authority among the Kuwaiti Shia so far and how these may differ from such notions among the Shia of Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Bahrain, secondly because the place and role of marja’iyya is an issue of great concern for many Kuwaiti Shia, thirdly because the competition for believers among the marja’s is seemingly less politically charged in Kuwait than it is in Iran and Iraq, and finally because Kuwaiti Shia choose from a number of different marja’s, all very present in the Kuwaiti Shia imaginary, some thought of as local to Kuwait (such as the Shaykhi and the Shirazi marjas) and some internationally reputed marja’s (such as Sistani and Khamenei). As I will argue, differences within the Shia sect are therefore often just as important as are differences between sects, even if the latter is a greater concern to both scholarship and politics today. However, and not least when studied ‘from below’, the question of following a particular marja’ is – at least in Kuwait – not so much a question of political ideologies and differences as it is a question of moral and existential concerns for the individual Shia to lead a proper life.
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Hafsa Oubou
In this paper I explore Moroccan-Belgian Shi‘a in Brussels and their religious practices as a Muslim minority in Belgium. Taking an ethnographic approach, I examine how Moroccan-Belgian Shi‘a navigate issues of belonging to both Belgium and Morocco and how discourses around their status shape the broader Shi‘a community and Moroccan diaspora in Belgium. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, a number of Moroccans in Belgium began to self-identify with Shi‘a Islam. Based on fieldwork in Belgium, I examine how the community navigates two powerful and contradictory state ideologies: the centrality of Sunni Islam to the Moroccan state of origin even among the diaspora, and the dominant discourse of secularism which is promoted in Europe. Unlike former colonial powers of France and Britain, Belgium began its relationship with Moroccan diaspora for economic reasons in the 1960s with bilateral accords with the Moroccan and Turkish governments. The community of Moroccan-Belgian Shi‘a therefore provides an important site for further understanding the contours of the broader Muslim population in Europe. Their current position is contested by their ethnic and religious affiliation that challenge the widespread presumption that Moroccans are Sunni by birth. Social science research on Muslims in Europe to date has focused on Sunni Muslims in France. Based on previous fieldwork in both Belgium and Morocco, this paper examines the Moroccan-Belgian Shi‘a in Brussels who offer a significant lens through which to study the ways in which the making of subject-citizens intersects with transnational migration, citizenship, and religion.