The thirst for oil and gas inside the six Gulf Arab states, driven by deep subsidies, has given rise to unsustainable consumption, reduced export potential and domestic shortage. Most theories of the politics of these states, devised in the era of seemingly endless supply, are also under pressure. Thus, the energy crunch in the Gulf not only creates the impetus for autocratic regimes to modify relations with their citizens, but it also threatens the academic models that frame that relationship. This paper, stemming from the second year of a Cambridge University PhD dissertation, analyzes the direction of both of these streams. It examines trends in energy consumption and pricing. It surveys expert opinions to examine shifts in government policy, including historical changes as well as expectations of future change. And it examines how altered policies compare with the expectations of the Rentier State Theory literature, a genre that, more than any other, has shaped understanding of state-society relations in the energy-rich Middle East. Where evidence of reform is unavailable, the methodology of Expert Elicitation has been used to survey experts and policymakers regarding their expectations for energy subsidies and reforms. Many of these surveys have been finished at the time of writing, and I plan to present aggregate findings at the conference. Complementing the expert surveys is a public survey completed for the author by the polling firm YouGov. That survey, which polled nearly a thousand GCC nationals, was completed in December 2011, with responses revealing attitudes towards energy and government reform framed within respondents’ expectations as citizens. The day is approaching when Gulf oil and natural gas production will be unable to meet global as well as regional demand, and when the state-society relationship will have to be redrawn. Here, the hypothesis tested holds that states will be forced to curtail domestic consumption of energy in the interest of protecting the long-term basis for their economies and the longevity of their regimes. It is the flow of rents, after all, that allows Gulf autocrats to block the advance of democracy and maintain their families in power.

Thesis. The rentier framework vastly overstated economic determinism in analysis of the states of the GCC. In reality, money does not spend itself. Choices are made by ruling families about who gets how much when. Distributive choices are important as they often reflect sectarian politics and affect state building projects. Method. This analysis is comparative across the states of the GCC and is based on field work between September 2011 and March 2012 (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia). I begin with a brief look at the demographic balance and historical context of distribution, sect and state building. Specific issues include provision of jobs, education, subsidies, housing, salaries as well as the larger discourse on sect that is shaped by religious authorities, government officials and state-controlled media. Argument. The politics of distribution and sect are evident in state policy. I focus on three themes. First, distributive politics have been resurrected across much of the Peninsula with the Arab uprisings. States implemented such policies in order to prevent further encroachment of the “Arab Spring” into the GCC. I determine if there are patterns in distribution and delineate the timing, amount, the population to whom it was directed and the form it took. For example, massive housing schemes in Saudi Arabia; a 60% salary increase overnight in Qatar; and in Oman, unemployment grants, student stipends and 50,000 jobs. Second, the politics of naturalization and citizenship in distributive states, especially as it relates to sect. Bahrain has naturalized many Baloochis, Syrians and Jordanians who are Sunni to counterbalance the Shi’a majority. Saudi Arabia naturalizes Sunni populations to balance the Ismaili population in the south. Kuwait has naturalized thousands of Sunni Saudis. The UAE is likely to naturalize Sunni bidoon. Third, the dynamics between sect, state and the large foreign worker population. The state plays migrant laborers and sect off each other. This is especially evident in Bahrain. Conclusions. While observers used to analyze sect vis a vis individual sovereign states on the Peninsula, it is important to comprehend that the regimes have re-framed this issue to be sect vis a vis the Gulf Cooperation Council. I demonstrate how the ruling families have coalesced around this issue. This is evident in the speeches of senior Princes, in the GCC response to the uprising in Bahrain and in a thinly veiled suggestion of an extra-territorial response to uprisings in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

This paper provides both a general model by which to understand ‘grand corruption’ and its application to the Saleh regime in Yemen. The general model uses the variables of elite cohesion and strength of state institutions to generate four basic types of grand corruption. The model is then applied to the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh. The paper argues that grand corruption is not just a marginal problem but, indeed, has been the glue that holds together fragmented elites (five types are identified) in the face of weak state institutions. The paper further argues that the political economy of corruption in Yemen is centrally funded by oil revenues, new to Yemen since the late 1980s. At their peak, oil revenues accounted for over 90% of all government revenues in Yemen. The sharp decline in oil revenues in recent years has put in jeopardy the basic political economy that held Yemen together. Regional fragmentation and other sources of political instability that marked 2011 can be attributed to the collapse of the ancien political economy. This paper is based on fieldwork conducted in 2006 and recently updated. The final paper is expected to be published as a Carnegie study later this year.

This paper will examine the function of law, writ large as a societal system for resolving disputes and maintaining order, in contemporary Yemen. Specifically, it will seek to answer the central question of whether the rule of law exists in Yemen and, if so, how it currently functions within Yemeni society. This issue has been treated to some extent previously through anthropological approaches to analyzing tribal law (‘urf). However, this paper will take a more jurisprudential approach and focus on the forms, perceptions, and positions of legal systems in modern Yemen. While this necessarily incorporates the prevalent and arguably resurgent area of tribal law, the paper will give preference to analyzing the influence of other extant but latent or embryonic forms of law, such as court systems, private agreements, mediation, and quasi-government structures. These forms of legal systems exist and some currently carry substantial weight in the country. The paper will also look at less tangible, less identifiable forms of restraint or coercion which may occasionally function as law. The paper will specifically treat law in the context of the political agreement governing the transition of power from Yemen’s previous president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to a new era of political power under the leadership of Abd Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi. What role(s) did Yemeni law play, formally or informally, in this agreement? The methodology for this paper relies on firsthand experience interacting with Yemen’s court systems through litigation, empirical witness of events normally governed by law in other countries, and personal interviews with judges, attorneys, government officials, and youth involved with the current revolution in the country. Analysis will gauge the impact of law on decision-making, and how the discipline of law influences perception of the country’s stability across generations and political lines. Reference will be made to the significant works of Paul Dresch, Sheila Carapico, and Shelagh Weir, among others. The paper will seek to provide a brief survey of the current state of Yemeni law, an examination of whether scholars can speak of “law” as a unified system in Yemen generally, a ranking of which legal systems are currently most most trusted and/or respected by Yemeni citizens and a specific answer to whether the rule of law was present in the nation’s recent political agreements.