This paper examines the use of Jordanian foreign policy by the Hashemite regime as a means to navigate between severe domestic and regional pressures unleashed by the “Arab Spring.” Bordering Syria, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Jordan is insecure in its foreign relations at the best of times; yet 2011 to 2013 has been especially tumultuous. More than 300,000 Syrian refugees have crossed to Jordan to escape the Syrian civil war (joining previous waves of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees). The regime fears that Syrian unrest will spill over into Jordan in still worse ways. Yet Jordan has also seen domestic protests every week for more than two years, calling for greater domestic reform. These internal and external political challenges come as Jordan is suffering a severe economic crisis. In this paper, I explain how the Hashemite regime is attempting to steer between Asad’s Syria to the north, and anti-Asad pressures from the south from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Jordan hopes to join the GCC, yet has no desire to antagonize Syria. The Arab spring has left the Hashemite regime less secure domestically and regionally. Yet many in Jordan’s pro-democracy opposition have heard this story too often before, and fear that domestic reform is once again being sacrificed on the altar of real or imagined regime security concerns. This paper examines not only how and why Jordanian foreign policy is attempting to navigate the pressures of the Arab spring, but also if this is sustainable. I argue that opening the domestic system further is actually essential to the security of both the country and the regime, and that relying on foreign policy alone can no longer help Jordan navigate the many pressures on state and society in the kingdom. Sources: The paper is based on extensive field research that includes interviews with both the regime and its critics. I have conducted field research in Jordan frequently for more than 20 years, most recently in June 2011, December 2011, May 2012, December 2012, and January 2013. My interviews include regime critics (Islamists, leftists, political parties, grassroots activists, journalists) as well as key elements of the regime itself (including interviews with government officials and Jordanian policy makers, such as foreign ministry officials, senators, cabinet ministers, prime ministers, and twice with King Abdullah II himself).

This paper examines why Qatar has adopted a bold foreign policy and emerged as a major player in the international relations of the Middle East, particularly in the context of the Arab uprisings beginning in 2010. From a small state in a volatile region, we might expect a passive foreign policy characterized by attempts to avoid perturbing stronger neighbors and great powers. In this regard, Qatar’s foreign policy presents a puzzle. Since Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa assumed power in 1995, Qatar has adopted a bold foreign policy, underlining its freedom of maneuver and taking controversial stances that have sparked the ire of allies. During the Arab uprisings, the trail-blazing support of this tiny oil-rich autocracy for democratic movements in the region has been especially striking. Qatar was the first Arab state to withdraw its ambassador from Syria and led the push within the Arab League to sanction the regime of Bashar Al-Asad; meanwhile, Qatar led the Arab world in recognizing Libya’s National Transitional Council, backed NATO intervention, and supplied weapons to the Libyan rebels. Throughout the Arab uprisings, Doha-based Al-Jazeera has played eyewitness to and cheerleader for events unfolding from Tunisia to Yemen. While Qatar’s foreign policy has drawn substantial attention, with assessments of it ranging from “perplexing” to “deliriously ambitious” to “successful,” we lack a satisfactory understanding of the factors driving Doha’s ambition. By focusing on the pursuit of prestige domestically and abroad, this paper will enhance our understanding of Qatari foreign policy and contribute to the field of foreign policy analysis. The politics of prestige enhances our understanding of state behavior where traditional theories of foreign policy falter. Drawing on field research from a year in Qatar (2010-11), this paper theorizes and contextualizes Qatari foreign policy in a way that sharpens our understanding of international relations in the Middle East and beyond.

Throughout Husni Mubarak's presidency, Egyptian policy toward sub-Saharan Africa in general, and toward Ethiopia in particular, remained stagnant. Occasional warnings to the leadership in Addis Ababa to refrain from interfering with the northward flow of the Nile River accompanied pervasive disengagement with the states that controlled the river's headwaters. This pattern changed almost immediately following Mubarak's ouster. The burst of activism vis-a-vis the governments of northeastern Africa that took shape in the spring of 2011 signalled a transformation not only of the content of Egyptian foreign policy but also of its basic form. Popular delegations took the lead in reconstructing ties to Ethiopia, and set the tone for the marked improvement in bilateral relations that followed. Egypt's new posture toward Ethiopia is hard to explain in terms of conventional notions of threat and security. The shift in policy accompanied no change in strategic circumstances that might have elicited a recalculation of underlying interests by policy-makers in Cairo. A more promising explanation can be found in various strands of "securitization theory," which highlight the political dynamics that transform otherwise unremarkable features of a country's environment into matters of pressing national concern. Current scholarship on securitization focuses disproportionately on political elites, but as the case of post-Mubarak Egypt shows, it is crucial to explore the actions of public actors in order to untangle the processes whereby basic conceptions of threat and security get constructed and reconstructed, particularly in post-revolutionary circumstances.