Do disparities in early state-building efforts have an impact on support for authoritarian regimes? This paper attempts to find an answer to this question by tracing historical state-building efforts for economic and social development at the local level in Turkey. It then tests for a correlation between provincial disparities and the electoral support for the current incumbent party, AKP. The analysis is built on original historical data gathered from the early statistical yearbooks of the Turkish Republic. By geo-coding annual public investments for transportation, communication, and health at the provincial level during the period between 1923-1964, the paper maps the development of the Turkish state’s infrastructural capacity in its early decades. The data shows a strong correlation between the early efforts to increase state infrastructure and the current regional development levels, suggesting that early state-building efforts had a persistent impact on the existing regional disparities. Provinces who were historically neglected seem to have given enduring support to the AKP at the ballot box, with the exception of the Kurdish majority region. Yet, a regression analysis of local public investments in the 20 years of AKP rule shows that the incumbent party has not favored these under-invested provinces. This finding stands in stark contrast to the electorate’s common belief that voting for the AKP is rewarded with better local infrastructures. Instead, drawing on recent literature and secondary data, I show that the AKP favors its voters in different ways such as expanding public employment, social welfare, and subsidies for private firms in these provinces. Despite perpetuating underdevelopment, short-term benefits create a veneer of higher local growth levels at the expense of economic sustainability and build support for authoritarian rule through clientelism. Overall, this paper suggests that historical regional differences should not be overlooked in research on corruption and the support for authoritarian regimes. By exploring the possibility of applying a similar study for Egypt, this paper concludes with a discussion on the potential implications for other Middle Eastern countries that have historically been marked by high levels of centralization and regional disparities.

The Party of Justice and Development (PJD) played a decisive role in post-Arab uprisings in Morocco. Yet, a clear understanding of its structure is absent from the discourse on the party. After a decade in power, the PJD lost its electoral appeal. More than a year after the heavy defeat, the party with an Islamic background seeks to revive its components and structures to remedy its regression after losing much of its homogeneity and popularity. Focusing on the PJD, this paper asks how party organization affects political performance. Specifically, what internal organizational factors contributed to the decline of the Islamist party’s political appeal after gaining substantial power? Deriving its conclusions from primary sources, including its political thesis, general program, bylaws, and manifestos, election results, as well as interviews with party leaders and members, my assessment traces the trajectory of party decline from insights on the provisions related to internal processes and the organizational structure of the party. The findings suggest that many of the challenges faced by the PJD pertain to internal party politics, ranging from ideological compromises to polarization caused by leadership alterations.

While existing literature on party politics primarily centers on national states, the profound impacts of globalization and transnationalization in recent decades have prompted significant reforms related to the voting rights and representation of emigrants. Additionally, national political parties have increasingly engaged with diasporas (Van Haute and Kernalegenn 2020). In authoritarian and hybrid regimes, where opposition parties encounter formidable obstacles in achieving political power and promoting fair elections, activities related to voting abroad have become crucial. These activities not only serve to mobilize and, to some extent, polarize the diaspora but also empower citizens abroad to challenge authoritarian governments in their home countries. While the existing literature on parties abroad tries to undermine the activities and organization of these parties, it fails to systematically analyze the strategies of opposition parties abroad in the face of authoritarian regimes at home. The political landscape of Turkey has witnessed a growing presence of Turkish political parties operating abroad, reflecting broader efforts to connect with the Turkish diaspora and advance political agendas abroad. While historically, the Turkish diaspora in the United States (U.S.) was not a major focus, the Justice and Development Party’s ascendancy to power led to a global approach to diaspora engagement, with Turkish citizens abroad viewed as representatives of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy interests and Islamic identity (Tepe and Gumrukcu, forthcoming). This shift was reinforced by the extension of voting rights to Turkish citizens living overseas in 2012, creating a significant voter bloc for political parties. As a result, political parties, both ruling and in opposition, established bureaus and offices in the U.S. to mobilize the diaspora vote. This paper examines the diverse tactics employed by opposition parties abroad in response to authoritarian regimes at home and transnational repression, focusing on the case of parties from Turkey in the U.S. The study contributes to our understanding of the parties abroad and influence of authoritarian states on diaspora politics by (a) comparing the activities opposition parties abroad, especially under authoritarian regimes, to those of the ruling parties in the diaspora, and (b) presenting systematic data on diaspora parties' activities, derived from original sources on lobbying by parties in the United States and in-depth interviews with representatives of Turkish parties in the U.S.

The success of democratic change is often predicated on the moderation of anti-systemic and extremist parties. For this reason, the rise to power of Islamic political forces in some of the countries that experienced the Arab Spring raised major concern among observers on whether the prospects of democracy in those countries were to be dashed by an imminent ‘Islamist winter’. Among the Islamist actors that attracted attention was the Brotherhood-inspired Ennahda party in Tunisia. In the ten years that followed the end of former dictator Ben Ali’s rule, the party was at the center of the country’s political landscape. Contrary to general apprehension though, the party did not threaten the country’s legacy as a rather secularized country in the Arab region. Instead, Ennahda displayed a governing strategy far from classic Islamist tenets and willingness to abide by democratic principles: instead of championing an Islamic state, it agreed to establish a civil state not bound by shariʿa law; instead of considering themselves the sole legitimate office holders, it was able to share power with secular political rivals; instead of suppressing women's rights, it has endeavored to improve them; and instead of adopting a comprehensive social approach in line with the din wa dawlah dogma, the party chose to specialize in politics. This study sought to find out the roots of Ennahda’s so-called ‘ideological moderation’, a term from the literature on party moderation that designates the move to accept democratic procedures, human rights, and a market economy. Expanding on the classic Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis, which states that political openings first produce strategic behavioral change for actors willing to take advantage of a changing political opportunity structure and may or may not produce ideological moderation as a by-product, this study draws from the literature on political learning to show that Ennahda’s process of ideological moderation started well before inclusion in multiparty politics, therefore dismissing claims that its governing strategy was mere posturing. For the purpose of this study, face-to-face, phone and video in-depth interviews were carried out with about 80 individuals, including political figures from Ennahda and other political affiliations, journalists, intellectuals and civil society ativists, during 5-month fieldwork in the country. The methologies used were process tracing, discurse analysis, and open-ended interviews. The results of this investigation were partly incorporared into the author’s PhD dissertation.

This study seeks to understand why religious movements exhibit divergent views regarding their regime preferences in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Using a mixed methods approach, large-N analysis of movements across 19 Muslim-majority countries in the MENA region and a comparative case study on Turkey and Jordan, my study classifies religious communities and explains their political regime preferences. Theoretically, this paper considers Muslim majority countries as dual legitimacy systems where the constitutional authority and traditional religious authorities are in constant competition for legitimacy over the same group of people. This competition creates a “meta-constitutional space”, allowing various configurations of bargaining within and among state actors and religious authorities. I argue that the primary interest of religious groups and communities is to survive and become hegemon within the traditional religious authority while simultaneously increasing their influence compared to other state actors. Utilizing original data collected across dimensions such as sectarian characteristics, scale and scope, organizational structure, objectives, tactics, and leadership, this study aims to demonstrate that there are mainly four types of Islamic movements in the MENA region: religious communitarian, political reformist, social reformist, and radicals. Despite being commonly labelled as 'Islamic movements', they exhibit ideological differences, particularly in their attitudes towards state-religion relations, democracy, and the ideal form of governance. I argue that each movement type prefers a political regime that aligns best with its primary objectives, including survival, hegemony over other religious actors, and enhanced legitimacy for religious authority. Their preferences vary from liberal democratic regimes to Islamic democracy, and from secular authoritarian to Islamic authoritarian regimes. Religious communitarian and radical movements, due to their restrictive, non-pluralist nature, strict interpretation of religious texts, and frequent use of ex-communication, struggle to get support from larger groups of people. As a result, they tend to favor authoritarian forms of government, which provide the means necessary to achieve their goals. Conversely, social and political reformist movements are more likely to gain wider societal support due to their inclusive and pluralist nature. Therefore, democratically oriented regimes, whether Islamic or liberal, are more conducive to the objectives of these movement types. Keywords: Regime preferences, MENA, Islamic movements, state-religion relations