To date, scholars exploring Islamist women’s activism assert that women have been active participants in the construction of subcultures of piety in their respective societies. In addition, scholars note the manner in which Islamist women’s public work has challenged traditional-patriarchal gender practices in their communities, as well as stereotypes held about Muslim women (domestically and in the West). There is, I argue, another dimension to Islamist women’s activism that is of critical importance: an intellectual discourse that calls into question the conversion of Muslim women into a field of academic research. Questioning the grounds and terms of exchange between Muslims and their interlocutors, specifically the intermediary role of the researcher, Islamist women intellectuals present a critical theory of knowledge production that is of significance to the scholarly discussion of standpoint epistemology and self-reflexive ethnography. This paper will focus on the writings of Islamist women intellectuals in Turkey (including Nazife Sisman, Fatma Barbarosoglu and Cihan Aktas) whose writings collectively emphasize a dissonance between their self-perceptions and their representations in scholarly accounts. These activists trace this dissonance to the inequality that exists between researchers and themselves, particularly the manner in which scholars impose sociological categories that do not fully grasp the nature of Islamist women’s lived experience. Specifically, they cite the failure of scholars to properly portray the nature of the connection between Muslim women and God. This ontological connection, at the heart of public acts of piety including veiling and participation in Islamist movements, is lost in translation when converted into sociological language. In analyzing their critical theorizing of the unequal relation between the researcher and researched woman, I aim to contribute to the scholarly debate about the conditions of possibility of representing and interpreting the ‘other’ woman.

The rise in Islamist inspired women’s activism has posed challenges to the struggle for women’s rights in post-Ben Ali Tunisia. The wave of democratization, triggered by a popular uprising for social justice and dignity early 2011, has given the opportunity to a broad mosaic of Tunisian women to take to the streets and voice their opinions and aspirations. Accordingly, the Tunisian women’s movement has become fragmented and reveals new fault lines closely situated along the secular-religious binary that is apparent in Tunisian politics. Ideological disunity, a burdensome historical legacy, political polarization and class struggle all shape the frictions in the women’s movement. Drawing on the concepts of ‘agonistic pluralism’ (Chantal Mouffe) and ‘transversal politics’ (Nira Yuval-Davis), this article seeks to understand how the Tunisian women’s movement can deal with this new, multi-faceted conflict within its ranks. Starting from the idea that cohesive women’s coalitions, i.e. coalitions across class, identity and political affiliation, can help foster positive gendered state outcomes during political transitions, the paper identifies both advantages and risks of arguing in favor of cross-ideological and cross-class dialogue and cooperation in the women’s movement. Through a discussion of the ‘Dialogue of Tunisian Women’ – a project launched by an international NGO in order to facilitate a dialogue between women of different ideological backgrounds in Tunisia – the paper concludes that a thorough understanding of the fault lines and an ‘agonistic’ engagement with Islamist women’s activism are imperative for successful coalition-building.

Female engagement and participation in the Middle East and in the Arabian Peninsula in particular—especially among ordinary women interacting within their societies—have been largely overlooked in social science literature until quite recently (e.g., Sonbol 2012; Krause 2008). Too often, the Western and global mindset emphasizes social and cultural exclusion and segregation of women, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, to argue that women are left out, oppressed, and silenced. Yet recent qualitative and quantitative research in the state of Qatar depicts Qatari women as equal to or even surpassing men on a variety of important indicators of political, economic, educational, and social engagement. One of the most significant findings point toward a particular aspect of Qatari women’s engagement with their societies: the use of majlis al-hareem (female gatherings) as a way of caring for the family, interacting with the community, and engaging with the government, on levels comparable to their male counterparts. Using the case study of Qatar, our research aims to understand the drivers and obstacles of women’s agency in the Arabian Peninsula by focusing on the use of majlis al-hareem as a locus of engagement with greater society. We hypothesize that the majlis al-hareem is a natural setting of social life for women in the Arabian Peninsula, in which the act of participation has direct implications for willingness and ability to engage in greater society. Beyond the confines of the familial home, few spaces in the Arabian Peninsula afford women the privacy and freedom to assemble and engage in conversation. The majlis is a designated, purpose-built gendered meeting space or salon, unique to the Arab world. Yet there is no existing social science literature on female participation in these types of gatherings, as Western literature traditionally depicts the majlis as a male-only place of power. Our research employs both qualitative and quantitative methodology to gather crucial empirical evidence, combining ethnographic fieldwork and interview-based research in approximately 20 different majlis al-hareem throughout Qatar (spanning family, social, neighborhood, religious, and intellectual gatherings) and a professional survey of Qatari women (of approximately 800 respondents) conducted through a local survey institution using random sampling and trained interviewers. Our data gives new insights into female engagement and empowerment in the Arabian Peninsula, filling a social science research gap and continuing the burgeoning academic conversation on the power and place of women in Middle Eastern society.

The state of Qatar ratified the CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) U.N. convention in 2009. Qatar presented its first report in 2011, and in early 2014 its progress in implementing the CEDAW provisions came under review. At that point several shadow reports were submitted by international NGOs, and one was submitted by a group of local Qatari activists. One of the major criticisms was the lack of any independent NGOs in Qatar working on women’s issues. The head of the state delegation argued that the lack of local NGOs was not due to any state restrictions on their formation, but reflected a lack of need, as the state is held responsible for the protection and progress of women. For its part the state of Qatar has made tremendous strides in what could be termed as state feminism. Since drafting a new constitution in 2005, Qatar, a constitutional monarchy, has initiated several legal reforms affecting women. In 1998 the Supreme Council for Family Affairs was established. This organization, led by the dynamic former first lady, Sheikha Moza, focuses on a range of issues involving women, children, and families, and has taken the lead in supporting legal reform. One of the most important contributions has been towards providing educational opportunity to all its citizens including women. A direct result of this is a large number of highly educated young Qataris, many of whom are becoming more critical and impatient with the perceived slow empowerment of women. These activists argue that although they are grateful for the role the state has played in promoting and protecting women’s rights, there is still much work that needs to be done. This paper will look at the role of these activists in the struggle to empower women, and evaluate their strategy. Is highlighting the state’s failures to the international community, the most effective way to promote women’s rights? I will look specifically at the campaign to criminalize domestic violence, one of the major issues that activists called for in their report, and something the state is promising to put forward. Will the state go back to playing defense in terms of silencing any dissent, or will they be more proactive and actually speed up the process of criminalizing domestic violence.