The role that social contracts play in the stability of countries and the well-being of people has recently re-emerged as a field of research. Social contracts can stabilize the relationship between state and society if they establish some predictability about the mutual deliverables between actors. They are even more effective in this regard if they are flexible for modifications to take account of changes in the framework conditions, the positions and preferences of the contracting parties, and prevailing norms, values and ideologies. The question is, thus, when, why and how social contracts change. We argue that they change more continuously in countries with institutionalized mechanisms of renegotiation, such as parliamentary debates, open public discourse and interest group lobbying. These are more often democratic countries even if changes in democratic countries can also happen suddenly and unexpectedly. Autocratic countries, though, tend to be more resistant to regular change because they lack the procedures and mechanisms. This includes most countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Here, significant changes usually only take place if something unforeseen happens, such as a price shock, a pandemic, an earthquake or an invasion by a foreign country. At these ‘critical junctures’, at least one key actor in a country – often but not always the government – must react. This actor can, but does not have to, change its previous course. If they do change course on account of sufficiently influential drivers of change, often the social contract will also change.

This paper examines the evolution of social dialogue institutions in Lebanon and Tunisia between 2010 and 2017. Both countries faced critical junctures, but their institutions pursued divergent courses. The national social dialogue institution was revamped in Tunisia to increase participation in policymaking, whereas it was reinstated in Lebanon without addressing its institutional flaws. By building on these developments, this paper makes two theoretical contributions. First, it argues that the nature of political interference in organized labour prior to the critical juncture influences its subsequent role. Labour neutralisation in Lebanon was founded on sectarian politics that co-opted national leadership and bound rank-and-file to sectarian clientelism. Labour pacification in Tunisia harmed executives, whereas local unionists remained independent. After the critical juncture, Tunisian organized labour revitalized itself, aided by rank-and-file autonomy. It then made a strategic choice to reconsolidate the tripartite system with enhanced involvement of the traditional labour and capital organisations in policymaking. Lebanese organized labour was unchallenged by its rank-and-file. It maintained ties with political elites. Second, these paths illustrate the differences between social contracts. Participation in policy elaboration is among the deliverables exchanged between political elites and social actors in Tunisia but not in Lebanon.

This paper asks to what extent national narratives drive changes in social contracts on both national and the local level. Societal and especially state actors can use narratives to underline or omit specific rights and duties in social contracts, or to privilege particular contracting parties. In the Syrian case, repression and foreign intervention triggered changes in the national social contract, yet the revanchist narrative functioned as a catalyst of these changes and entrenched them on both, the national and the city level. We show that housing, land and property (HLP) policies in (post-)war Damascus have an urban scope but a national impact. Not only wartime destruction but also post-war demolition have been particularly high in selected neighbourhoods and (re-)construction favoured upscale urban mega projects. This approach to urban planning reflects an exclusionary national narrative, which stigmatizes parts of the population as disloyal and suspects them of stirring up public disorder. In consequence, these groups are marginalized or even ‘evicted’ from the social contract. Those Syrians still covered by the social contract, the narrative seeks to offer a justification for the large-scale exclusion of fellow citizens. Our analysis is based on an extensive review of literature from human geography, with a focus on the physical and social urban fabric, and political science, on national and international power relations.

The concept paper for our panel, written by Loewe, et.al., puts forward an insightful framework for conceptualizing the drivers of change in a social contract. This paper applies the Loewe, et.al. framework to the Egyptian case from 2011 to the present. The paper begins by briefly summarizing the major changes to Egypt’s social contract since 2011. It then considers the degree to which the Loewe et.al. framework can explain these changes. It finds that the Loewe, et.al. framework could be strengthened by further exploring the following drivers of change: - balance of power within the state. In the Egyptian case, a longstanding de facto contract between the Presidency and the military collapsed in 2011. The new contract that emerged after 2013 altered the elite coalition that underlay the regime and led to change in the social contract; - structure of the labor market. The regime faced a labor market that was divided into core insiders (the military and military-related firms), legacy insiders (state workers in the civil service and the public sector), and outsiders (in the informal sector). It revised the social contract in a manner that directed substantial support to core insiders while reducing support to legacy insiders. Outsiders in the informal sector were left with little or no support. - new technologies of repression that enable the regime to monitor society more extensively, target repression more effectively, and shape the public sphere in a manner supportive of the new social contract; - international sponsors. The Gulf states and China emerged as new sources of financial and military assistance. They legitimated and funded the new social contract and the institutions that support it. The paper further concludes that de facto contracts between parts of the state and between state actors and foreign sponsors can exercise decisive influence over the composition and durability of a social contract. Furthermore, the most likely driver of future modifications to the social contract is change in the distribution of power within the military or between the military and the internal security apparatus. Any sustained modification of the social contract will also require an external sponsor who will underwrite at least some of the cost.