Since 2011, political developments in Syria have predominantly been assessed from the perspective of identity politics. A new master narrative now claims that Syria, and more broadly the Middle East, is locked into cultural and religious conflicts. This approach reduces the variety of political and strategic developments to explanations based on the immutable essence of ‘sectarian’ strife.This paper contends that identity is but one factor in the unfolding of the Syrian tragedy, and that power politics matter and continue to drive the process of communal, religious and ethnic solidarity. Building on an understanding of sectarianism as a construction of differences, I argue that the shift to sectarian strife was the result of a political process of sectarianization rather than inherent identity clashes. I further argue that the construction and deconstruction of differences took place through the production of knowledge and practices of violence. My research defines notions of identity in the context of Syria; I draw upon new evidence on the Syrian conflict from primary and secondary sources, and interviews carried out with defectors, combatants, activists and refugees. I also explore the contending narratives and practices in the context of the Syrian uprisingand its aftermath. The paper concludes that rather than reflecting an inherent clash or hatred between Sunnis and Shi’as, the new ‘struggle for Syria’ is about the ideological and strategic turn of the revolution, with regional and international power rivalries over definitions of identity built on strategic interests. Syria’s tragic descent into war cannot be understood outside the context of Iraq’s predicament since the US-led war of 2003. The Syrian war was, in turn, exported to neighboring countries. Identity has become an instrument of power and geopolitics; it has also taken on a momentum of its own within the region. Ultimately, the purpose is to provide a theoretically and empirically grounded analysis of post-2011 Syria, and possibly outline recommendations for the future of the country.

This paper challenges the notion that 2003 marks the dividing line between a ‘sectarian’ and a ‘non-sectarian’ Iraq. It begins by outlining how the confused understanding of an as yet undefined but widely used term, namely ‘sectarianism’, has served to blur our understanding of many issues relating to sectarian identities and sectarian relations. Once the definitional issue is addressed we can then discuss sectarian relations in pre-2003 Iraq and the Middle East. The argument will be made that, like many other forms of communal relations, Sunni-Shi’a relations were marked by varying degrees of relevance throughout the 20th century. More importantly, it will be argued that nation building and state building in the modern Middle East have never adequately addressed the fact of sectarian plurality, opting instead for a policy that advocated a unity based on the negation, rather than acceptance, of sectarian identities. Similarly, some sectarian groups – those with an awareness of their sectarian ‘otherness’ such as was commonly found amongst Iraqi Shi’as – often resisted the modern Arab state’s attempts at absorption through dilution in an avowedly a-sectarian model. Crucially, due to socio-historical reasons that will be discussed, this was always less problematic for Sunnis than it was for Shi’as or, to be more precise, for those Shi’as for whom Shi’a identity and Shi’a religious and social structures formed a crucial par of their self-conception. This paper will argue that many of the destructive sectarian dynamics seen since 2003 are the end result of a cumulative process extending far back into the 20th century. Only by understanding the subtleties of sectarian relations in the 20th century – in both their negative and positive aspects – can we understand how a culture of sectarian mobilisation grew in the first place which in turn explains why sectarian forces were best positioned to dominate politics in Iraq in 2003. At heart the issues that have animated these dynamics relate more to modern contentions regarding the state rather than religion or sectarian dogma. In many ways, the Sunni-Shi’a issue in modern Iraq has been animated by divergent views regarding the legitimacy of the state – something that appears more relevant than ever in today’s Iraq.

It will be argued in this paper that the “sectarianization” of post-2003 regional political conflicts is the outcome of a more profound crisis of legitimacy within the regional state system and its destabilization by a long and chequered history of foreign backed authoritarian regimes and imperial interventions. This issue will be examined through the lens of the Islamic Republic’s tried and tested policy of supporting politically receptive co-sectarians and its reliance on weak central states and civil conflict for its operation, expediting the erosion of already fragile political orders, while paradoxically underwriting the Islamic Republic’s own raison d’état. More specifically the paper will compare Iran’s political and military interventions in Iraq post-2003 and Syria following the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011. It is hoped that a comparison between the discursive framing of the two interventions in Iranian elite political discourse and an analysis of the nature and modus operandi of the material support provided to receptive groups in these two countries will shed light on the valences and processes of “sectarianization” in the Middle East post-2003. Moreover, it will be argued that the Islamic Republic’s “sectarian ambivalence” is linked to manifold countervailing logics inscribed at both the discursive and institutional levels of the politico-ideological nizām, which comprises part of the inter-state system. This is while powerful political forces within the Islamic Republic continue to view the “Islamic Revolution”, as exceptional, and thus ultimately unconstrained by the norms of that system. This politico-theological tension in tandem with the proven “efficacy” of patronizing receptive co-sectarians in weak states, has fundamentally undermined a quest for hegemony and the construction of a historical bloc under the imprimatur of the Islamic Republic’s putatively ecumenical leadership. This is despite the longstanding efforts of the post-revolutionary Iranian state and state-sponsored organizations to appeal to ecumenical narratives, including support for the Palestinian resistance and the sponsorship of initiatives calling for “Islamic unity”. Rather than simply label the Islamic Republic “sectarian” an attempt will be made to analyse the institutional and ideological rivalries within and between Iranian state institutions which propound antagonistic conceptions of the “national interest”, “regional security” and “transnational commitments” to fellow Muslims. These floating signifiers are not essentially “Shiʿi”, but represent a systematic attempt to construct an authentically “Islamic” narrative, while concomitantly marginalizing ideological adversaries, including co-sectarians.

This paper will focus on the emergence of sectarianism as a framework for political mobilization as well as for the distribution of violence in the Syrian uprising. In order to do that, it will take into account the social actors involved in the uprising; the impact of the repressive strategies of the Ba’thist regime; and the use of Islamic vocabulary, symbols and spaces as a cultural idiom in the protests. The protests against Bashar al-Assad’s government started in early 2011. By April several cities and towns in Syria were in open rebellion against Ba’thist rule. The protesters were mainly urban and rural workers who became impoverished and politically marginalized during the decade of neo-liberal economic reforms fostered by Bashar al-Asad’s government. The use of religious (mainly Sunni Muslim) vocabulary, symbols and spaces in the protests was also a major feature of the Syrian uprising, reflecting the importance that religious nationalism acquired under Bashar al-Asad. The regime accused the protesters of being radical Salafis, to which the protesters responded with slogans and videos stressing their plural and non-sectarian character. However, the unequal distribution of violence by the government deepened the tensions and divisions between the Sunni population and other religious groups. As Sunni clerics, some with a decidedly sectarian discourse, tried to claim leadership roles in the uprising, many Christians and ‘Alawis refrained joining the protests and became increasingly supportive of the regime. These rising sectarian tensions gave political meaning to the religious identities present in Syrian society. The militarization of the uprising and its descent into civil war deepened this process with the rapidly growing importance of jihadi groups in the conflict. The appearance of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS/Daish), with its brutal use of violence against those who do not conform to its religious views, led to the consolidation of sectarianism as the main discursive and practical framework mobilized by all sides in the conflict. My analysis of the Syrian conflict allows us to understand how sectarianism was produced by the political mobilization and manipulation of differences and tensions between religious groups in Syrian society, rather than as a pre-existing element that informed the conflict from its beginning.