The 1979 revolution not only changed Iran’s structure of political domination, but it fundamentally altered the relationship between religion and politics. As several scholars have pointed out, the emergence of theocratic rule ended the dual structure of political authority and religious authority that characterized the post-Safavid era. However, the post-revolutionary structure has maintained its own contradictions which manifest in the formation of parallel institutions and the dual structure of Supreme Leader versus Popular sovereignty. In a sense, there are dual governments, as one set of institutions is based on the legitimacy of the Supreme religious authority and another set of formal institutions derives legitimacy from elections. In other words, the revolution ended the dual structure of authority, but it has led to a structure of dual sovereignty. Since February 1979, impressive amounts of research have been devoted to analyzing and illustrating the institutionalization of clerical establishment in post-revolutionary Iran. Yet, ironically enough, our knowledge of the clerical elite in Iran remains limited to a few leading figures (e.g., the Supreme Leader and the leading clerics in Tehran and Qom). Scholars know very little about the characteristics of the middle and lower clerical elites, and three decades after the clergy became the state elite par excellence, no comprehensive empirical study exists that examines the recruitment, composition, and circulation of the clergy in the governmental and parallel institutions. To understand the nature of one such parallel institution, this paper will analyze the institution of Friday Prayer that is part of the Supreme Leader’s network in various cities and provinces. It examines the structure of this institution and the social background of more than eight hundred Friday Prayer Imams. The study will address the following group of questions: What are the social backgrounds of the Friday Prayer Imams? What percentage of the Friday Prayer Imams comes from urban areas as compared to rural areas? How frequently are these clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader? What percentage of the Friday Prayer Imams studied in the main seminaries? The paper maintains that, contrary to popular belief, many Friday Prayer Imams are from rural backgrounds and that their appointments were rarely the result of the traditional mode of mujtahed-student relationships. It, also, illustrates that, former Revolutionary Guard members and war veterans are a new generation of younger provincial clerics who rose to prominence as a result of their service in the course of the Iran-Iraq War.

During the 1920s-1930s in Iran, a highly unusual development took place in the clerical interpretation of a crucial feature of Sh?‘? doctrine. In the midst of an epoch altering dynastic transition and eventual entrenchment, the reformist theologian Shar?‘at Sangalag? (d.1944) openly expressed and began teaching the denial of the concept of messianic al-raj‘a (return). Not surprisingly, his initiative instigated an uproar among his fellow theologians, several of whom wrote scathing rebuttals against him. Even more surprising, however, was the response of Ayatollah ??jj Shaykh ‘Abd al-Kar?m ??’ir? (d. 1937), a particularly influential marja‘-i taql?d (source of emulation) and founder of “the Institution of Religious Teaching and Guidance” (?awza-yi ?ilmiya) in Qum. While proclaiming his own adherence to the idea of al-raj‘a, ??’ir? indicated that he did not consider it a principle of Islam or even that of Sh?‘? sect. Consequently, its denial did not put one outside of the fold of Sh??ism. What made the exchange both eccentric and a cause for dispute was the central place that the concept of al-raj‘a occupies in Twelver eschatology, dominated as it is by the figure of the Mahd? (or Hidden Imam), his manifestation at the end of time and his soteriological mandate. Al-raj‘a designates, inter alia, his emergence from occultation (ghayba) and his subsequent mission to (re-)establish justice and wisdom throughout the world. It seems, therefore, almost incomprehensible that a Sh?‘? cleric would categorically deny the validity of so fundamental a motif. Even more startling is the failure of a Sh?‘? marja‘-i taql?d to condemn such a denial. Through a close reading of the primary sources, i.e., the writings of Sangalaj?, contemporaneous journal articles, and the rebuttals written by Sangalaj?’s colleagues, this paper proposes the thesis that given Sangalaj?’s unconcealed views, a strong case can be made for the argument that his unconventional theology was intended to provide a foundation for his opposition to the supposed heresies of the B?b? and Bah?’? faiths. The even more anomalous reaction of a person in the position of marja‘-i taql?d suggests that only so compelling a concern could account for his response. As shocking as they were, Sangalag?’s views paved the way for the institutionalization of the Advent of the Hidden Imam in the form of an Islamic government. This study, therefore, can shed light on some of the hitherto understudied grounds out of which the historic developments in Iranian Sh?‘ism in the 1970s emerged.

The purpose of this paper is to critically reframe the origins of revolutionary historiography in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this instance, the role of the clergy is paramount because they have been provided a pivotal position in the movement of history. Efforts at mythologizing the role of the clergy in modern Iranian history predate the 1979 Revolution. The pre-revolution traditional clergy began historicizing the Khomeini-led movement of 1961-1964 as a revolutionary (as opposed to a reactionary) force as early as the autumn of 1962. This is a historical conjuncture highlighted by the first instantiations of oppositional armed struggle against the monarchy and state-led passive reforms. Using the revolutionary clerical historiography and Islamic Republic of Iran’s complex web of revolutionary history institutes as objects of case study, the present paper adopts a multidisciplinary analytical framework in the politics of memory. Through the integration of classic notions such as collective memory (Halbwachs), myth-building and ideology (Sorel), and sacred time (Eliade) into an analytical framework informed by notions of state historical engineering (Wilson), this undertaking proposes a ‘clergy-centred’ approach insofar as the main historical actors are considered ‘guardians of faith and freedom’ rather than simply Islamist. This angle necessarily draws analysis into a domain of inquiry untapped by prevailing studies. A richer understanding of politics and religion in Iran today would be inconceivable without such theoretical manoeuvrings. The paper, thus, argues for a paradigmatic shift of revolutionary clerical historiography from a nativist and organic intellectual force into a memory toolkit for the purposes of state propaganda in the aftermath of the Islamic Republic’s inception. In this variation of history, a Khomeinist myth is positioned as a doctrinal Tersanctus for both the ruling elite and their loyal opposition in contemporary Iran. Clerical historiography identified the Khomeini-led movement as the historical continuation of a long-standing anti-despotic and anti-colonial movement of the great clergy that predated the Constitutional Revolution (1905-11). In so doing, it introduced a clergy-framed periodization of modern Iranian history and contested the dominant secular narratives of the time. In the post-revolutionary period, the Khomeinist clergy readily deployed this ‘narrative structure’ to build the main contours of the Islamic Republic’s official historiography. Thirty-one years later, this “clergy-centred narrative of the Islamic Revolution” functions as the official narrative in Islamic Republic of Iran and its sanctity is safeguarded by a host of state-sponsored revolutionary history institutes.

Ever since Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989—and especially in the past few years—there has been heightened interest, among regime supporters, in the revolutionary leader’s capacity to perceive particular realities. This capacity is said to have been indispensible for the very success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Tied loosely to the clerical establishment and pivotal historical figures of the Shi’i tradition, the ability to disclose esoteric dimensions of the cosmos is said to be restricted from other segments of Iranian society such as intellectuals and learned youth. According to regime apologists who maintain this position, one of the primary tasks of the theocratic regime is to impart the knowledge attained by Khomeini to the citizenry. Although much of the state’s ideological energies have been directed towards this end, efforts have been largely unsuccessful. A wholesale liquidation of previously held revolutionary motifs and the adoption, rejuvenation, and institutionalization of an apocalyptic narrative of history has been the consequence of a collection of such minute failures in the ideological efficiency of the state. One problem associated with the transmission of specialized knowledge may be located at the level of Khomeini’s epistemological foundations. Quite a few studies have been undertaken to analyze the basis of Khomeini’s later political thought where his mystical inclinations have been prominent (See, for instance: Bonaud 1995; Knysh 1992; and Moazami 2009). In this paper, it will be argued that the ruling apparatus did not take its own historiographical conclusions to heart. When the clerics were theoretically placed at the vanguard of all modern progressive movements, there was said to be something that radically distinguished them from other oppositional elements. In the case of Khomeini, it was his gnostic capacities that differentiated him from even the Marxists who believed that historical materialism would offer a similar form of downreaching exploration. Knowledge attained by these means cannot be transmitted through conventional ideological institutions. One of the great follies of the current state can be located in this misrecognition. An example of an area of mystical exploration exemplified by Khomeini that is attempted to be imparted upon the Iranian population is that of Satanology (sheytan shenasi). The ayatollah’s declaration that the United States is the Great Satan (sheytan-e bozorg) was not simply a symbolic consolidation of prevailing social opinion. Rather, Khomeini saw something that no one else saw. The paper will thus include an appraisal of this theme.

This paper aims to present a growing trend in the Islamic Republic of Iran that is localized amongst the ruling elite and their supporters. In the past few years, there has been a discernable rise in apocalyptic rhetoric, especially following the much disputed 2009 presidential elections. The events in 2009 should be analyzed in tandem with the unique concept of vil?yat-i faq?h (“Guardianship of the Jurist”). Theorized and implemented by Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989) after 1979, this system of rulership has been confronted by escalated opposition, thus hampering its legitimacy. The popular unrest it has subsequently engendered reached a violent peak after the disputed re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009. The aggressive public reproach against the highest echelons of state power has been famously coined the Green Movement. Faced with increasing public hostility towards the person of Ayatollah Khamenei (current Iranian supreme spiritual leader or val?-i faq?h) and critical discontent, the state is continually searching for ways to strengthen its legitimacy by arguing for the val?-i faq?h’s indispensability. To this effect, the marked increase in the apocalyptic and religious rhetoric that is employed by state-sanctioned media agencies can be associated with the regime’s discovery of a stabilizing ideological system. This rhetoric publicizes and endorses an increased propinquity between the val?-i faq?h and Imam-i Zam?n (the Twelfth or Hidden Imam). To achieve this end, the government and its supporters have been promoting and propagating this ideology by saturating their rhetoric and references to Khamenei with language specific to Imam-i Zam?n. Messages associated with this logic have been broadcasted through: newspapers, journals, websites, weblogs, television, sermons, and other mediums. This paper will examine the apocalyptic language deployed through various state-sanctioned mediums. In the process, an application of Foucault's theory of governmentality and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony will help clarify matters. Through applying these theories to the Iranian context, it will be argued that by heightening its apocalyptic rhetoric, the regime is implicitly aligning the idea of Imam-i Zam?n with val?-i faq?h in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and gain control over disgruntled segments of society. In addition, this paper will attempt to examine whether any limitations will be encountered while applying Gramsci’s and Foucault's theories to the current case of Iran.