This paper examines how Islamic associations use Islamic economic practices to become part of the project of development in Egypt. Using ethnographic methods, I discuss the administration and regulation of Islamic economic entities in Egypt and then analyze the role played by zakat (alms), sadaqa (charity), qard hasan (interest-free loans) and waqf (endowments) as part of an Islamic approach to poverty alleviation. I discuss how contemporary interpretations of Islamic economic principles bring aspects of secular international development into the web of activities promoted by Islamic associations. Zakat is the practice with the most specificity in terms of who is entitled to receive it as outlined in the Quran (Wilson 2006). Yet over the past ten years clerics have issued fatwas signifying a widening definition of the deserving poor. Sadaqa inherently allows for more flexibility in spending practices and thus Islamic associations use this category of donations to fund income-generating projects, small and medium enterprises development, social entrepreneurship, environmental protection, artistic development and cultural organizations. In contrast, the practice of interest-free loans (qard hasan) has declined as an economic practice with the rise of Islamic microfinance (Al-Harran, Sen, and Masri 2008). Using specific examples of how each Islamic economic practice has been carried out in Egypt by Islamic associations, I illustrate how these institutions promote particular kinds of practices as Islamic. Finally I discuss the marked absence of waqf in Egypt and argue that greater public scrutiny of foreign funding gives even greater importance to domestically funded foundations as a source of funding for Egyptian associations. I conclude with a discussion of how the ten-year old practice of establishing foundations (mo`assasat) is a replacement for waqf and serves an important role in development in Egypt (Pioppi 2004). References Al-Harran, Saad, Alfred Yong Foh Sen, and Sri Anne Haji Masri. 2008. An Islamic microfinance enterprise: The financial vehicle that will change the face of the Islamic world : The power of salam financing. Philadelphia, Pa.: Xlibris Corp. Pioppi, Daniela. 2004. From religious charity to the welfare state and back: The case of Islamic endowments (waqfs) revival in Egypt. Rome, Italy: Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, RSCAS No 2004/34. Wilson, Rodney. 2006. Islam and business. Thunderbird International Business Review 48 (1): 109-23.

It is a common assumption that political ruptures, such as the one followed by the uprising in Egypt in 2011, can lead to new political subjectivities among youth and that it might also influence them to become more conscious of themselves as a generation (Mannheim 1952, Edmunds and Turner 2002). The current paper nuances this assumption by pointing to the importance of viewing the situation of youth after political rupture in the light of their situation before. Focusing on the time both before and after the Egyptian uprising, this paper explores the formation of a specific subjectivity and generational consciousness among a group of young middle class Egyptians engaged in social service activities for the benefit of Egypt’s poor. The approach is experience-near, and in particular, my focus is on the relation between bodily practices of engagement in actual activities and influence of a specific and contemporary religious discourse on charity, voluntarism and giving. The study is based on one year of ethnographic fieldwork in the Islamic youth-based charity organization Resala in the period 2007 to 2011, and the data includes participant observation in various activities as well as interviews and life story interviews with volunteers, their parents and a wide range of activists within the field of social and political activism in Egypt. I argue that already before the uprising, the volunteers together with other young people in similar organizations were in the process of developing a historical and political consciousness of themselves as a generation. Further helped along by the Egyptian uprising and the upheaval that followed, this consciousness is the product of a specific subjectivity of bodily practices, collective narratives and intergenerational relations. Resala can be seen both as a place to engage in and learn about both moral and socioeconomic aspects of society and a way to hold on to one’s middle class status. Through practices and interaction related to the encounter with poor beneficiaries as well as socialization into a specific middle class discourse on poverty and need, the volunteers achieve a new understanding of Egyptian society and hence a better understanding of themselves and their place within it.

Many Islamic charities around the world have been accused of acting as front organizations for Islamist political parties. In the West Bank, all 93 zakat committees were dissolved in 2007, and placed under the control of the Palestinian Authority, on the charge that they were affiliated with Hamas (Levitt M. 2006, Hamas), though little to no evidence supports such accusations (Schaeublin E. 2009, West Bank Zakat committees in their local context). Such debates about political affiliation call for a refined distinction between narrow party politics, and more general efforts in redefining the social bond and collective engagement in the public realm. This paper engages with this dichotomy of hizbiyya (party politics) vs. the battle for political subjectivity. It would be a mistake, I argue, to approach these Islamic charities by ascribing to them a unique rationale, e.g. creating a reservoir for political militancy. Instead, Islamic charities are embedded in more general structural transformations taking place locally and internationally. The paper considers three Arab cases based on both primary and secondary sources – Islamic charitable organizations that are not formally attached to political parties or zakat committees in Palestine, kinship associations in Jordan, and a few Yemeni Islamic charities. These charities exemplify the gradual (for many, paradoxical) process of secularization of religious institutions in Muslim majority societies. Calls for the Islamization of society by charities have often been misread by outside observers in essentialist terms (predominance of religion over politics), when in reality they signify deep discontent with local politics and neoliberal reforms imposed from outside (relayed by complacent local regimes). Evidence from Palestine and Jordan suggest that charities are resisting “the pedagogy of neoliberalism” (Parker C. 2009, “Tunnel-bypasses and minarets of capitalism”, 111) and that they are organizing concrete responses in times of economic hardship and state failure (Baylouny AM. 2010, Privatizing Welfare). Furthermore, the fact that some Yemeni charities openly refuse the game of hizbiyya is more proof that they are de facto adapting to modern party politics (Bonnefoy L. 2009, “How transnational is Salafism in Yemen”, 339). The paper links the concept of political subjectivity with Islamic charitable work in order to understand the multi-faceted challenges of Arab societies. As party politics have not managed to yield better results in terms of enfranchisement and popular participation, many Islamic charities prefer shifting the focus of their action to more general political and social themes and promote a different political subjectivity.

Many Islamic charities around the world have been accused of acting as front organizations for Islamist political parties. In the West Bank, all 93 zakat committees were dissolved in 2007, and placed under the control of the Palestinian Authority, on the charge that they were affiliated with Hamas (Levitt M. 2006, Hamas), though little to no evidence supports such accusations (Schaeublin E. 2009, West Bank Zakat committees in their local context). Such debates about political affiliation call for a refined distinction between narrow party politics, and more general efforts in redefining the social bond and collective engagement in the public realm. This paper engages with this dichotomy of hizbiyya (party politics) vs. the battle for political subjectivity. It would be a mistake, I argue, to approach these Islamic charities by ascribing to them a unique rationale, e.g. creating a reservoir for political militancy. Instead, Islamic charities are embedded in more general structural transformations taking place locally and internationally. The paper considers three Arab cases based on both primary and secondary sources – Islamic charitable organizations that are not formally attached to political parties or zakat committees in Palestine, kinship associations in Jordan, and a few Yemeni Islamic charities. These charities exemplify the gradual (for many, paradoxical) process of secularization of religious institutions in Muslim majority societies. Calls for the Islamization of society by charities have often been misread by outside observers in essentialist terms (predominance of religion over politics), when in reality they signify deep discontent with local politics and neoliberal reforms imposed from outside (relayed by complacent local regimes). Evidence from Palestine and Jordan suggest that charities are resisting “the pedagogy of neoliberalism” (Parker C. 2009, “Tunnel-bypasses and minarets of capitalism”, 111) and that they are organizing concrete responses in times of economic hardship and state failure (Baylouny AM. 2010, Privatizing Welfare). Furthermore, the fact that some Yemeni charities openly refuse the game of hizbiyya is more proof that they are de facto adapting to modern party politics (Bonnefoy L. 2009, “How transnational is Salafism in Yemen”, 339). The paper links the concept of political subjectivity with Islamic charitable work in order to understand the multi-faceted challenges of Arab societies. As party politics have not managed to yield better results in terms of enfranchisement and popular participation, many Islamic charities prefer shifting the focus of their action to more general political and social themes and promote a different political subjectivity.

This paper examines the distribution of charity by a Shi‘i political organisation – the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Notwithstanding the case of the Lebanese Hizbullah (Judith Harik, 1994 & 2005) and the still understudied Iranian bonyads (Suzanne Maloney, in Parvin Alizadeh, 2000; David Thaler et al., 2010), the literature is overall silent on the charitable dimension of Shi‘i political groups. One contribution of this paper is therefore to provide another case study of the practice of charity, one which ISCI conducted in exile until the 2003 regime change in Iraq mainly for Iraqi refugees and at home afterwards. In both cases, the organisation’s social and philanthropic role has been intertwined with its primordial political function, structurally and in practice. While the politicised conduct of charity has been thought from a clientelist perspective (Nizar Hamzeh, in Alterman and Von Hippel, 2007) based on the distribution of material rewards, I prefer to conceptualise it in terms of loyalty (Yossi Shain, 2005) and analyse the symbolic construction of identity and collective solidarity through charitable work. Because of the visibility it confers on the service provider, charity is a platform for an organisation to project and reformulate the vision it holds of itself towards its constituency. ISCI has linked the representation of its role to a narrative related to Iraq as a way of compensating continuous negative perceptions about its pro-Iranian orientation and lack of national credentials. It has combined welfare services with the display of symbols of solidarity related to the recent history of Iraqi Shi‘ism (in particular the Najaf-based religious leadership of the 1960s and 1970s) and to the shared experience of persecution at the hand of Saddam’s regime between the organisation’s leadership and common Iraqis. In exile, the practice aimed to support ISCI’s claim to be the legitimate representative of the Iraqi people and to confirm the rightfulness of its struggle against the illegitimate Iraqi regime. In the post-2003 Iraqi context, the charitable institutions affiliated with ISCI used similar religious and political symbols to engage in intra-Shi‘i competition over charity, while also integrating a more universal discourse about human development. To analyse the politicised representation of ISCI’s charitable function, the paper relies exclusively on primary material coming from within the organisation and affiliated charities (newspapers and other outreach material, websites, interviews conducted by the author, and personal observations).