Tunisian and Egyptian transitions to democracy have witnessed contradictory paths. While Tunisian elites have largely succeeded in building a working, yet fragile governance beyond ideological and political divides, the process of democratization in Egypt failed to bring a consensual governance and ended in severe authoritarianism leading an unprecedented repression in the modern history of the country. In this article, we consider the media-politics nexus and its implications on powering or hindering the transformative process. In the democratic Tunisia, the media-politics nexus thrives within a complex system of clientelism forged on shifting alliances between politicians and business tycoons, including re-capture by agents of the former regime. In Egypt, a pluralistic, yet extremely polarized media landscape, had provided legitimacy for a military dictatorship through adopting extreme antagonistic forms, effectively exacerbating polarized conflicts. This article reflects on the notion of media instrumentalization and the political marketplace and how they contributed, in the case of Tunisia, to establish a new system of clientelism between media and politics, forged on confrontation but also adaptation, while they led, in the case of Egypt, to a complete erosion of the media and political diversity, media content is being completely dictated by the censors. The article is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with journalists and politicians conducted in various phases of the political transition in the two countries since the uprisings of 2011. In the two case studies, journalists – especially those in the elite circles- played an active political role in framing the political change and engaged in an ambivalent relationship with politics, with mixed outcome on the process of democratic change.

Turkish television series are the second most globally exported series after American series, exported to more than 146 countries and viewed by more than 700 million people on television and digital platforms such as YouTube and Netflix (Ustuk, 2019; “Turkish TV series aim,” 2016). In this paper, I ask: How did Turkish television series transform from a domestic product to a global phenomenon? What is the official government discourse of the television series? I begin with a historical account of Turkish television series, leading to their global distribution, and followed by their development as a new academic endeavor. Additionally, I study official presidential discourse to uncover state intent behind the export of the series. Through a critical political economy approach I systematically analyze news, speeches, and press releases about television series published on the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey website. Since the early 1990s, neoliberal policies transformed the Turkish television industry, and with it, television content in Turkey and abroad. Though President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s words were potent and effectual in supporting the television industry with favorable policies and financial support, producers, distributors, and diplomats laid the groundwork. The government support for the Turkish TV series that followed was motivated by a desire to resurrect the Turkish economy, and with it, Turkish soft power. Though scholars of Turkish TV series tend to postulate economic factors and soft power as dichotomous elements and argue accordingly, studying the presidential discourse of Turkish TV series complicates these conceptions and points to a multifaceted Turkish appeal instigated by multiple developments, captured with neo-Ottoman cool (Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, 2013). Presidential discourse reveals that TV series are primarily valued for inbound tourism, the single most important driver of the Turkish economy, and secondarily, to supplant local representations of Turkey, and disseminate representations that are in concordance with Turkish interests. References: Kraidy, M. M., & Al-Ghazzi, O. (2013). Neo-ottoman cool: Turkish popular culture in the Arab public sphere. Popular Communication, 11(1), 17-29. Turkish TV series aim to conquer Far East. (2016, December 6). Hurriyet Daily News. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-tv-series-aim-to-conquer-far-east--106906 Ustuk, H. (2019, November 13). Turkish TV series attract audience from 146 countries. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/culture/turkish-tv-series-attract-audience-from-146-countries/1643829

Couscous goes to UNESCO On December 16, 2020, couscous was recognized as UNESCO world cultural heritage. One of the objectives of the collective bid by Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania, was to reclaim ownership of this now global ethnic food for the region known as the Maghreb. It underlined the role of couscous as expression of cultural identity, highlighted its immemorial roots, its innumerable recipes, as well as the unique culinary techniques and know-how developed to produce it. Sold in the United States as “French couscous,” “Israeli couscous,” or “Moroccan pasta,” this Berber dish has become a profitable culinary commodity, and a fully industrialized, “traditional” food. In the face of gastronomic cosmopolitanism and capitalist globalization, the intangible cultural heritage distinction may safeguard cultural diversity or help revamp couscous’ symbolic capital at home and abroad. It supports countries long deprived by European colonization of statehood and monuments in their efforts to re-capture their past to preserve it for the future. Also at stake are economic interests, including revenues from tourism, cultural branding and access to the global culinary marketplace. While UNESCO’s recognition may contribute to claim “back” and reinvent traditions, I argue that it embodies the ultimate step in the commodification of this food, a process that begun with French colonization. The ambition behind the UNESCO application bears some resemblance to colonial extractive processes as the merchandising and “fossilization” of local foodways relies on the labor of unpaid, or underpaid, anonymous women, who are presented in folkloric ways in UNESCO application videos, while keeping hybrid, industrialized, present practices conveniently off-screen. Such a recognition also brings a non-negligible surge in cultural nationalism, a welcome distraction for shaky governmental authorities facing ongoing political instability at home--such as the 10th anniversary of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the aftermath of the crack-down on the Hirak in Algeria—as well as their own regional conflicts, heightened by the reconfigurations of international alliances around Israel. Based on research conducted in Algiers in July 2019, on the visit of the "African Heritage is Back" exhibition (Algiers), and press materials, my paper explores the cultural and political stakes of couscous' recognition as (not so) intangible heritage.

In recent years, following the narrative tradition of American soap operas and Spanish telenovelas, Turkish television series, known as dizis (serial, row, sequence) are growing in popularity in both domestic and foreign markets. The Turkish dizi genre are particularized television serials, telling historical and contemporary stories of love, familial, ethnic and class conflict, often two hours in length per episode, relying heavily on “familiar ethnographic imagery,” including “scenes from Turkish ordinary life and dialogues with traditional sayings” (Öztürkmen). Despite this focus on regional storytelling, Turkey is now second only to the United States in worldwide TV distribution, whereby dizi exports to the MENA region, Balkans and Central Asia, parts of Africa and South America estimate at an exceeded $350 million. This paper looks at the cultural impact of what author Fatima Bhutto terms “dizi imperialism.” We will analyze plotlines, characters and dialogue in both current and past series to consider two points of inquiry: First, we will look at the fictional world of dizis as a lens to translate cultural codes and traditional norms in Turkey. More specific, we will show how, by turning its performance gaze inward, away from the West, dizis provide a space of cultural encounter with clear ideological boundaries (distinctly Eastern) centered on tradition. We will argue that by sidelining the West as the “Other,” and conflating Turkish modern identity with authentic masculinities and femininities and honor-based morality, dizis empower hegemonic identity formation, and maintain social control. Second, we look at the success of Turkish dizis on a global stage. Here we will look at how stories, inherent to Turkey’s social and cultural landscape, characterized by Fatima Bhutto as “not-always-secular modernity with traditional values in urbanized settings,” resonate with a global audience. We will ask the question: How can regional knowledge production reframe global hierarchies? We will argue that by offering global viewers a site with a perceived similar value system in terms of gender and class, dizis force us to revaluate our understanding of modernity, asking the question: Can we read the popularity and defense of cultural values in dizis as a signal of the global decline of Euro-American cultural appeal, and instead, the rise of a newly constituted Eastern modern sensibility ?

This is a study of images of the cleric in contemporary Iranian comedy-drama films, namely Lizard (Marmulak, 2004) and Scandal (Rosvayi, 2013). Both films employ comedic methods in conveying their messages while providing a taboo-breaking criticism of sharia-minded individuals in Iranian society. Despite this sharp criticism, both comedy-drama films have religious messages that make the films Islamic/Islamicate and acts of commanding the good and forbidding the wrong (amr-e beh mar’ruf va-nahy az monkar). These two films are chosen for this study because of their popularity and their many shared features, such as the portrayal of the image of the cleric as a protector. The main character of both films commits theft and is attempting to escape, only to be protected by a cleric and the cloak of the cleric. I start this study by showing that these two films' creators are connected to some of the creators of eight other contemporary Iranian films (from 2004 to 2014) that portray the cleric as a main character. I then analyze the comedic features of the films that are interestingly linked to the segregation in Iranian society. I show how the segregated groups, from conservative religious to "liberal" individuals, interact in the films and occasionally cause humorous reactions and scandalous events. Filming techniques, such as colors, lighting, and camera angles, highlight the separation between the characters. Moreover, both films are social commentaries on social injustices portrayed in the two films. The films' social commentaries extend from criticism of certain clerics to criticism of certain characteristics of the sharia-minded and judgmental individuals in the society. Both films have cause-effect narratives due to a series of coincidences that could be perceived as magical, divine, or religious. Both films' narratives employ typological figurations as sophisticated methods to tell/retell religious stories. For example, Lizard portrays a scene that reminds the viewer of the Quranic story of Adam in the Garden. And, Scandal tells a story similar to the famous legend of Mir Damad (d. 1631), who is said to have burnt his fingers to stop his temptations from sleeping with a princess who had sought refuge in his home. Both Lizard and Scandal portray the image of the cleric as a protector who knows what others will realize at the end. However, the films show that the respect clerics receive in Iran is conditional.