Islamic political parties are winning elections one after another in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the question in most observers’ mind is whether Islamic political parties are genuine actors of democratization or whether they aim the creation of an Iran-style Islamic theocracy. Meanwhile, Islamic actors have other immediate worries in mind: will the international community accept their electoral victory, or will this result in a repetition of Algeria 1991, where democracy was sacrificed in the name of secularism. And more so, will they be as successful as the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Answering these questions requires us to take a step back and understand the complexity of Islamic political parties first. Hence, in this paper I ask who “Islamic political parties” are, where they come from, and what they aim and strategize for. These are important questions to ask because many observers assume that Islamic movements tend either to be radicals eschewing party formation, or to be democratically committed because they form Islamic political parties. However, such a divide does not correspond to the realities on the ground: sometimes Islamic movements reject party formation because the political regime is not democratic enough (e.g. Justice and Spirituality Movement in Morocco), and sometimes they form political parties because it is a medium to achieve an Islamic state (e.g. Salafi Al Nour Party in Egypt). Hence, there is a need to understand the origins of Islamic political behavior first. To understand the origins of Islamic political parties, in this paper I look at (1) the political context under which Islamic political parties have been formed, (2) the Islamic movements that provide the societal base to these Islamic political parties, and at (3) the strategic mindset of Islamic political parties. My data comes from in-depth qualitative fieldwork involving party and movement documents, interviews with party leaders, and archival research in Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey, macro-level quantitative indicators, and modern Islamic political thought. I argue that strategic factors internal to Islamist movements, such as organization and strategies, play a primary role in informing the party’s political behavior and democratic commitment. By questioning the origins and internal structures of Islamic political actors, this paper offers an agential approach into ongoing socio-political transformations in the Middle East.

This paper will identify and assess the moral and legal –and essentially religious-based-- considerations for the acquisition and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the current Islamic context in Saudi Arabia. The emphasis of this study is on Saudi Arabia, given the latter's importance in the region and the Islamic world and the current interest of this issue --in particular of nuclear weapons-- in policy discourse in that country. The preliminary thesis of the study is that the Saudi policymakers have elicited and encouraged legitimacy from religious quarters as part of preparing the political environment as they consider a potential nuclear option for the country. The moral foundation is an important intangible factor for a working understanding of the practical and psychological background of attitudes and of the decisionmaking background in Saudi Arabia. The intent of focusing on moral theory is to weigh the effect of the interplay between moral considerations and the more practically-oriented Realpolitik decisions with which policymakers must deal. The research will concentrate on the moral basis for such issues as acquisition, legitimate authority, appropriate employment, determination of legitimate targets, and proportionality with respect to WMD and the interaction with decisionmaking. Key fatwas-s and other religious writings --which rely on the Qur'an and Sunna, Islamic law, and Islamic history-- will serve as the research base for this study. In addition, this study will utilize writings by and published interviews with figures associated with the mainstream religious community in Saudi Arabia, as these writings elucidate, amplify, and popularize what at times may be a more abstract and scholarly argumentation of the ideas found in the formal fatwa-s. Moreover, these ideas, when conveyed by the mass media, are likely to reach a larger audience than would than would otherwise be the case.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Moroccan monarchy has had to contend with an increasingly radicalized political and religious counter-culture spearheaded by those who Arab media describe as Salafi-Jihadi scholars, namely Hassan al-Kattani, Umar al-Haddouchi, Abu Hafs Rafiqi, and Muhammad al-Fizazi. Their call for a global resistance against American presence in the Islamic world and denunciation of the Moroccan state's collaboration with the West led to their arrest along with hundreds of Salafis after the 2003 Casablanca attacks. However, in the aftermath of North African uprisings and the parliamentary election victory of the reformist Justice and Development Party (PJD), the monarchy was forced to concede to many popular demands including the release of key figures of the Salafi-Jihadist movement in 2011 and 2012. This monarchical soft hegemony suggests that the Moroccan Makhzan may be losing its control over Islamic discourse and therefore attempting to fragment competing religious groups by allowing the participation of moderate Islamic democrats. In this paper, using primary documents, namely interviews, speeches, and fatwas of Salafi-Jihadist and Islamist democrats, I contend that the monarchy will take advantage of the participation of the PJD in government by using it in its political arbitration with other powerful Islamic groups such the Justice and Charity Party, Salafi-Jihadists and fringe Islamic groups. First I discuss possible connections between the PJD’s access to political power and the recent compromises between the monarchy and the Salafis. Second, I argue that with each attempt to prolong its authoritarianism, the Makhzan takes greater risk in paving the way for a rise in Islamic opposition that may become too big to suppress. Finally, I conclude by highlighting the relationship between the Jihadization of North African Islamic movements and its counterparts in other Arab states.

On January 12, 2011, backed by its political allies in government, Hezbollah toppled down the cabinet so far headed by the anti-Syrian “14th of March” coalition. It then turned the Parliament in its advantage, by “converting” a sufficient number of MPs to its side, and had a new Prime Minister nominated to head a new government backed by a new parliamentarian majority. For the first time, Hezbollah is officially and openly the master of the political game in Lebanon. However, the seizure of power by Hezbollah was not a sudden event; it had been preceded by twenty years of activism on the Lebanese domestic scene, which progressively allowed the party to build a strong political practice and develop a relationship with the State and with power that remains quite unique, both in Lebanon and among Islamist groups. Unfortunately, this political dimension of the party has so far been neglected by scholars and analysts. Indeed, more than twenty-five years after its creation, Hezbollah remains a little understood organisation. It is commonly portrayed either as a military, regional player – through its wars with Israel – or as a proxy of the Syrian and/or Iranian regimes in Lebanon. No study, however, has thus far tried to address it as one of the most important political actors on the Lebanese domestic scene, for the last twenty years. This article intends to fill this gap. It proposes the first analytical model of Hezbollah’s relationship with power and with the State. Relying exclusively on primary sources (interviews, archives yet not used, participant observation), it first exposes Hezbollah’s theoretical and doctrinal understanding of politics and government. It then confronts, from both a sociological and a historical approach, that discourse to the party’s practice. Hence, this study will show that Hezbollah’s new position since January 2011 is less of a new shift in the party’s ideology and practice than a natural and consistent readjustment to what has been its mode of action since its very foundation.

The toppling of Saddam Husayn and his Iraqi Ba‘th Party government led to a series of profound political and social changes both inside and outside of Iraq. The most significant of these changes was a new sense of social and political empowerment for the country’s Shi‘i Muslims, who underwent a major revival. Shi‘i politicians rose to key positions of power in the new government and a reopening of Shi‘i religious institutions, such as the seminaries in cities such as Najaf and Karbala, and the public performance of Shi‘i religious rituals, such as the annual ‘Ashura processions, long banned by Saddam. The door was also opened for the public emergence of relatively small yet disproportionately influential, millenarian (“Mahdist”) groups among the Iraqi Shi‘a. These movements exist within the larger, complex Iraqi Shi‘i social milieu and can only be fully understand as products of the environment of widespread insecurity, unrest, and violence that followed the overthrow of the Iraqi Ba‘th Party. The paper traces the development and evolution of the contemporary millenarian trend within Iraqi Shi‘ism, with a focus on the Sadr Movement, the Ansar al-Hasani led by Mahmoud Sarkhi al-Hasani, the cultish group of Ahmad al-Hasan “al-Yamani,” and the Soldiers of Heaven, an apocalyptic cult that allegedly plotted to assassinate the grand ayatollahs of Najaf in 2007. The paper makes two central arguments. First, the Shi‘i textual tradition regarding the twelfth Imam, who is believed by Shi‘is to be in a mystical occultation or hiding until an appointed time when he will return, will likely prevent Mahdist groups from becoming widespread. Senior Shi‘i ‘ulama (religious scholars), including the grand ayatollahs of Najaf, have delivered pointed critiques of these movements and the populist millenarian sentiments that they seek to stoke. Second, despite frequent comparisons between these groups, significant ideological, social, and political differences exist between these movements. All five movements, despite their important differences, can only be fully understood as products of the environment of widespread violence and insecurity that followed the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. The paper will be will based on a careful analysis of written and visual primary sources produced by Iraqi millenarian Shi‘i movements.