The Israeli elections of January 2013 resulted in a rather unusual political coalition. First, the various partners in this coalition government have diverse and sometimes contradictory goals, particularly on foreign policy matters (such as the reopening of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority). Those diverse political goals will be analyzed in this paper and the relationships between domestic politics and foreign policy will be specifically highlighted. Particular attention will be given to the fact that the January 2013 elections produced Israel's first post-Arab Spring government. It should be specifically noted that the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has assumed, in effect, a role as Israel's chief doomsday predictor, adopting a strong, thoroughly negative stance against any any all aspects of the so-called Arab Spring. The paper will explore Netanyahu's position as it relates to his overall attitude toward issues of peace and war, particularly between Israelis and Palestinians.

The "Arab Spring" that erupted at late 2010 has long since metamorphosed into an Islamic Winter. While in Tunis, Egypt and Libya, one can speak about the "end of the beginning" of these revolutions, so it seems, in Syria the uprising has turned into bloody civil war between segments and factions divided for the most part along social or communal lines. Year 2013 was expected to be the year of Iran, but instead it turned to be the year of Syria. Indeed, the Arab Spring, which has left the Syrian regime mired in a bloody civil war the past two years, has also increased Israel's freedom of operation to levels not seen in years. Indeed, since the beginning of 2013 Israel has tried to exploit Bashar al- Asad's weaknesses by introducing new rules, among them that Israel can veto any arms shipment to Hizballah that includes advanced weapon systems. Israel would also like veto power over the Syrian military's acquisition of advanced weaponry such as the S-300 surface to air missile system. However, the increased tension between Israel and Syria has coincided with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's recent military victories. Asad's regime has regained the offensive in the Syrian civil war. His forces have successfully repelled the rebels' attacks on the capital and on Aleppo, the second-largest city in Syria. With the help of his allies, Hezbollah, he has regained control over several strategic sites that had been bitterly contested for several months. It seems, then, that the expert analyses that predicted Assad's imminent downfall were premature. Although Bashar al-Asad has so far stayed away from a confrontation with Israel, he may ultimately conclude that perpetual restraint is a form of weakness. It could hurt him more than a an all-out war with his neighbor to the south. Thus, Like Syria's other neighbors Israel is left with the question of who it should root for in Syria. This dilemma dates back to the earliest stages of the Syrian revolution. Would its interests be better served by a Hezbollah-and-Iran-backed Assad holding on to power, or by having the Islamic opposition emerge victorious. In the meantime, Israel seeks to maintain the status qua in its relations with Egypt, under President Mursi, Jordan and with the Palestinians, believing that its strategic goal should be managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not solving it.

Iran and Israel are two countries at loggerheads. Former Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s explicit statements threatening the very existence of the state of Israel and speculations on a possible Israeli attack on Iran have headlined the news on a regular basis. When evaluating Iran and Israel, one should keep in mind some general remarks with regards to the nature of their relations. The two have no direct territorial conflicts and have never engaged in war against one another. Besides the ideological legitimacy that Israel provides Iran, the conflict is essentially a strategic one. Although employing Islamist arguments and giving support to Islamist movements such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad, who have given new meaning to the Arab-Israeli conflict by defining it as a religious crusade rather than a national conflict, Iran’s actions have been strategic. Iran has thereby been able to directly involve itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict on several fronts while positioning itself as a powerful contender for leadership in the Middle East arena. The new president-elect Hasan Rohani offers a more moderate perspective on Iran's foreign policy. It seems that Rohani, who is fully committed to his voters and would like to deliver on the economic and social fronts, will have to modify Iran’s approach to its nuclear project in order to ease the sanctions on Iran. However, this poses Israel with a new challenge. Yet Rohani concurs with hardliner Ahmedinejad’s view that Iran has the right to a nuclear program; as such, even if he adopts a more moderate foreign policy, he will continue to strive for a nuclear Iran. Israel must get ready for such a challenge, particularly if and when the U.S. puts Iran under Rohani to the test. The U.S. is likely to offer Iran a grand bargain on all the regional security issues. It is reasonable to suppose that the U.S. will give Israel assurances that such a bargain will not compromise Israel's vital security interests. Nevertheless, such a bargain presents Israel with a real security dilemma. If a deal is made, and the safeguards are not rock solid, or Iran pursues its nuclear program in secret (or attempts a plutonium backdoor), then Israel may face an economically healthy nuclear-armed Iran in the near to midterm.

Israel's January 2013 elections focussed on internal issues of the economy and on the burden-sharing of military service. Yet Israel's strategic regional environment has not changed. Israeli concerns about Syria's chemical weapons, its Islamic insurgency, and the reignition of the Golan Heights border continue. Israel views with trepidation the threats to the neighboring Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, with which it has a peace treaty. Finally, as Iran heads speedily towards a nuclear weapon, Jerusalem prepares for the worse. All of these concerns are shared by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly the most important of them, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis want to see the end of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's regime as soon as possible, yet seem as concerned as everyone else about the implications of an Islamist regime in Damascus. Jordan is a fellow monarchy and has even been discussed as a future member of the GCC, which is essentially an Arab monarchies club. The Saudis are fearful of an "Arab Spring" demonstration effect on the Hashemite regime. As for the prospect of a nuclear armed Tehran across the Gulf -- Riyadh is apoplectic with worry. This confluence of interests has Israel and the GCC countries cooperation at unprecedented - albeit necessarily mostly secret - levels. Recent visits by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry to Jerusalem and the Gulf have underscored the common interests of all three countries. The April 2013 announcement of a $10 billion joint arms sales to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- Israel made no protest -- only confirms that Israel and the GCC are cooperating despite past differences. Secretary Kerry's half-heated attempt to revive the moribund Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace Initiative seems like a sop to Saudi pride, but it hardly appears necessary. Mutual interests -- Syria, Jordan, and Iran -- are what drives cooperation between Israel and the GCC. This a constant, no matter who hold a majority in the Knesset.