This paper will be the first attempt in any western language to probe the famous final pronouncement of the putative Hidden Imam to Muhammad Samarri (d. 941CE), later canonized by the Twelver Shi'i tradition as the fourth and last special representative (al-na'ib al-khass) of the twelfth Imam. The statement produced by Samarri announced that there would be no further representatives or emissaries between the Imam and the faithful for the second or complete occultation - commonly referred to in later sources as the greater occultation - had now dawned. The statement went on to issue a stark warning and command: before the Imam's reappearance, there will appear many from among the Shi'a claiming to have seen him; all such claimants must be denounced by the faithful as "lying impostors." Initially, the Hidden Imam's final decree was understood to mean that he would remain incommunicado until his appearance. However, this position proved untenable to sustain before the incessant longing for direct contact with the Imam. Over the next centuries and up to our time, numerous accounts have been transmitted detailing encounters between the Imam and the most privileged of his votaries during the greater occultation, in particular from the ranks of the ulama. The accounts describing these tete-a-tetes have multiplied in number during the last century and a half. Most follow a common cadence and utilize a similar stock of devices, themes, images and tropes. They have served to cultivate an aura of sanctity for the ulama as the Imam's representatives, advancing their charisma and strengthening their religious and social influence, while in effect, serving to freeze the eschatological tensions within the tradition. This paper will analyze how three prominent scholars (Majlisi (d. 1699), Nuri (d. 1902), and Gulpaygani (b. 1919)) have negotiated the palpable conflict between the Imam's final decree and this body of narratives. The study will then proceed to compare their arguments with those posited by contemporary scholars and clerics such as Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini (b. 1925) and Hujjat al-Islam Ali-Akbar Dhakiri (b. 1960), the latter of whom has controversially argued for a literal reading of the phrase and called into question the veracity of the hundreds of encounter narratives.

The current Shii revival in much of the Muslim heartland finds its origins in early modern Iraq, where Shii scholars redefined clerical authority and their ability to produce binding legal judgments. The most important architect of this transformation was Mortaza Ansari, (1799-1864) whose texts are still considered seminal works in the Shii seminaries of Iran and Iraq. Hailed for his piety and erudition, Ansari became the first scholar ever to be recognized by mainstream Shiis as the single head of the international Shii community. As a result of his accomplishments in the field of Shii jurisprudence, Ansari was already considered by most Shiis to be the most knowledgeable jurist of his time. In fact, Shii historians have proclaimed that doctors of Islamic law after his time will always be operating within his school of thought, indicating that he brought Islamic legal theory to fruition. In his treatise on Shii law, entitled Matchless Principles (Fara'id al-usul), Ansari outlines the proper methodology for legal scholars to derive absolute knowledge from scriptural texts. Acknowledging that truth is not back and white, he divides legal rulings into four categories (certainty, conjecture, doubt, and error) and separates knowledge into two realms (absolute and subjective). Additionally, Ansari argues that all lay Shiis must choose the most knowledgeable living cleric to emulate and delineates specific criteria on which laymen must make their choice. Based on Ansari's Arabic and Persian writings as well as numerous commentaries on his work, my paper outlines the critical innovations of his conception of Shii leadership and legal theory. Further, it argues that these changes continue to be far reaching. Although authority has not often remained in the hands of a single living cleric after Ansari's death, each generation has been defined by no more than a few clerics competing for adherents. Ansari's solidification of a rationalist approach to law has allowed the Shii establishment to present a unified front at critical historical moments during the past two centuries. The establishment of clear lines of authority has also allowed high ranking clerics to collect and distribute charitable donations, which had not been done systematically since the ninth century. Further, Ansari's expansion of Shii law has allowed clerics to issue judgments on any legal question, not just those that can be found in traditional Shii sources.

It has long been known that Shi'i mujtahids represent themselves as transnational leaders whose authority reaches followers all over the world. Historically they have developed and maintained local constituencies through the strategic placement of loyal representatives who collect the khums tithe, mediate local disputes and transmit messages on their behalf. With the rise of a global information network, powered by the Internet, these mujtahids have established websites that play a vital role in the maintenance of local constituencies. Since a mujtahid bases his authority in part on his role as the keeper and producer of knowledge, the use of websites and Internet technology provides greater opportunities for constituency-building and at the same time the potential loss of control over the production and dissemination of knowledge. This paper examines the paradoxical results of the use of Internet technology by Shi'a mujtahids. Internet websites allow self-styled mujtahids to proliferate and diverse centers of authority to form. At the same time these websites have adhered to common conventions in content and presentation. To date, scholars have discussed the effects of Internet technology on the authority structures of Shi'i scholars in furthering competition for knowledge and authority. However, these studies neglect to highlight the increasing uniformity in thought that the Internet has encouraged. By focusing on the websites of the four Najaf-based ayatollahs who have come to be collectively known as the marja'iyya diniyya of Najaf - Ali al-Sistani, Bashir al-Najafi, Muhammad al-Hakim and Muhammad al-Fayad - this paper presents a case study in the paradoxical forces of decentralization and uniformity that characterizes the structures of authority in Shi'i communities in an Internet age. Drawing from the theories of Arjun Appadurai my paper positions Shi'i authority structures in a "disjunctive global economy of culture" and elucidates the creative ways in which these uniquely situated religious authorities articulate the relationship between the local and the global.

The popularisation of Islamic philosophy, particularly the writings of Mulla Sadra (d. 1640), following the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran have recounted many vicissitudes and open condemnations by Qom's scholarly community. The writings of Mulla Sadra represent the fullest and grandest expression of philosophy in Islam, one that not only benefits from a millennium of Islamic thought before it but also formulates and crystallizes in an unprecedented manner, the various latent modes and dimensions of "prophetic philosophy"; consequently, following the Islamic revolution, the figure of Mulla Sadra became that of the philosopher par excellence. Khumayni seems to have encouraged the linkage of the study of philosophy and mysticism with the political theory of vilayat-i faqih rooted in a philosophical paradigm known as the 'Unity of Existence' by which man is led to God, learns to open himself up to spiritual wisdom, and then returns to the world as one who has become united with God thereby reflecting God's divine attributes, placing Khumayni in a privileged position to maintain order in the realm of worldly politics. However, following growing dissatisfactions with clerical hegemony and the popularisation of claims by Khumayni's adepts linking their right to govern the state with divine authority, significant segments of the clerical community in Iran have begun to align themselves politically with a pre-1979 school of thought, namely maktab-e tafkik, that has made it its prime concern to separate non-Shi'i elements from so-called Islamic philosophy. How this links to dissident clerical politics is the central theme of this paper. Based on my recent field research in Qom and Tehran, and drawing on the small number of extant Arabic and Persian manuscripts by proponents of the maktab-e tafkik, my paper will argue that dissident members of the clergy in Iran have mounted an intellectual (and sometimes, ad hominem) attack on Mulla Sadra in order to break the link between Khumayni's philosophical extrapolations based on Sadrian philosophy and, the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, thereby challenging the foundational pillars that uphold the Islamic Republic of Iran. It will be seen that recent assaults by maktab-e tafkik thinkers and their political allies on state-linked philosophers are contributing to the polarisation of Qom's scholarly community and concomitantly challenging the very legitimacy of the system of vilayat-i faqih which, in the eyes of tafkikis, is built on un-Islamic foundations, a phenomenon rapidly catching on with elements of the anti-government movement.