This panel deals with the complexity of issues raised, directly or indirectly, in reaction to Ghazali's ideas about the relationships among philosophy, theology, and mysticism. The first two papers deal with topics raised in two of Ghazali's works, the first with how Ghazali's criticism of an earlier author might be dealt with and the second with how one of the leading theologians of the 13th century responded to one of Ghazali's theological innovations. The third and fourth papers represent Shi'ite responses to Ghazali's integration of mysticism, theology, and law--the first an appropriation of Ghazali's masterwork and the fourth a modern rejection of Ghazali's fundamental project.
Paper one, "Taking Avicenna Seriously: Re-evaluation of al-Ghazali's Objections on Creation," deals with the problem of causality as raised in the Tahafut al-Falasifa, a classic theological issue. It argues that Ghazali's critique of Ibn Sina's theory of causality fails because it does not distinguish between metaphysical causality and natural causation. This paper is not only a might-have-been defense of Ibn Sina against Ghazali, but is also an argument for the contemporary relevance of the metaphysical debate between the two thinkers.
Paper two, "Is God Really Lightr" deals with the response of Fakhr al-Din Razi and Yahya Suhrawardi to Ghazali's interpretation of the Light Verse in Mishkat al-Anwar. Razi points out that earlier commentators had interpreted "God is the light of the heavens and the earth" allegorically, while Ghazali had taken it literally. Suhrawardi, on the other hand, begins with a literal interpretation and attempts to construct a systematic metaphysics--seemingly attempting to redo the Mishkat in a philosophically rigorous way.
Paper three, "al-Fayd al-Kashani: The Reclamation of the Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din," deals with a very specific response to Ghazali, a Shi'ite recension of his greatest work. This paper shed light on the ways in which Shi'ite thinkers responded to Sunni religious literature.
Paper four deals with a contemporary movement, the "Maktab-i Tafkik," in the Shi'ite academy of Mashhad that rejects any reconciliation between Islam on one hand and Sufism and philosophy on the other, drawing on the anti-Sufi rhetoric of the late Safavid period. A rival movement, the Shushtariya, defends both. This paper indicates the complexity of the religious currents flowing through the clerical establishment of Iran.
Taken together, these papers show the continuing vitality of Ghazali's problematic, both in the centuries following him and in contemporary Islamic thought.
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Dr. John Walbridge
Despite the popularity of the Light Verse in Islamic thought and piety, commentators were reluctant to take the first four words of the verse, “God is light of the heavens and the earth,” literally, offering instead interpretations of light as guidance or God as the cause of light. Fakhr al-Din Razi in his “al-Tafsir al-Kabir” points out that Ghazali in his “Mishkat al-Anwar” breaks with earlier commentators in interpreting this verse literally, a position that requires him to claim that God is the only true light and that the other claimants to the title of light—physical light, the light of the eyes, and the light of intelligence—cannot be said to be light in the full sense. Razi examines this position, adding to Ghazali’s arguments on such matters as the limitations of physical vision, and concedes the validity of his position.
The philosopher Suhrawardi, on the other hand, begins with the assumption that God is light and builds a systematic metaphysics on this assumption. While he does not mention Ghazali, his Hikmat al-Ishraq is either by intention or circumstance a response to Ghazali’s much less philosophical interpretation of the Light Verse. His book is thus a sort of anti-Tahafut, in which Ghazali’s position is shown to be inadequate.
The paper demonstrates the theological complexities inherent in attempts to interpret this seemingly simple verse, with even the earliest commentators realizing that it could not be interpreted literally and the later, more philosophical commentators be willing to make radical metaphysical speculations in order to preserve the literal meaning of the verse. Later philosophical and mystical commentators and the interpretation of the remainder of the verse are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Mr. Yasin Basaran
One contribution to the recent upsurge in Avicenna studies would be a reevaluation of his fundamental ideas against the criticisms of al-Ghazali. In this paper, I am dealing with the strengths and weaknesses of the Avicennan account of creation in his Remarks and Admonitions against the background of al-Ghazali’s criticisms in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. I think, by carefully distinguishing between metaphysical and natural causations, Avicenna offers a concept of creation which is much more powerful and coherent than al-Ghazali takes it to be. According to Avicenna, the efficient cause has two distinct meanings, one metaphysical one natural. When it is used in the metaphysical sense, it means the cause of being; a clear indication that the Efficient Cause creates things out of nothing. In a natural sense, however, the efficient cause is the cause of movement within the boundaries of time, space and all other natural constraints. In this case, Avicenna takes God to be ‘the condition’ of the existence of everything other than himself even though he calls God ‘the cause’. Thus, for Avicenna, creation is a purely metaphysical, timeless, and no-location concept. In two points, al-Ghazali fails to take the Avicennan distinction seriously. First, when arguing for the possibility of temporal creation, al-Ghazali is mainly busy demonstrating the inconsistency of specific arguments for eternal creation. However, his criticism falls short to appreciate the overall implications of Avicenna’s account which insists on distinguishing the ways natural and metaphysical causation work. This failure of al-Ghazali forces him to downgrade divine agency to the level of natural causation. Second, even though al-Ghazali’s argument against the necessity of the natural cause-and-effect relationship is compelling, it is far from damaging the Avicennan conception of creation. This is because al-Ghazali’s objection is valid against the natural causation but it does not fully affect metaphysical causation. Moreover, when Avicennan account of natural causation is revised in the light of al-Ghazali’s criticisms, the overall conception of creation as delineated by Avicenna gains more strength. In other words, if we combine Ghazali's account of natural causation and Avicenna's theory of metaphysical causation, we will have a more satisfactory theory of causation.
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Mr. Eiyad Al-kutubi
High among the texts that have shaped Islamic culture and thought is al-Ghazālī’s masterpiece: “Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn” (the Revival of Religious Sciences). Muslim scholars both in the east and west of the Islamic world have held different opinions as to whether it reached its goal of reviving the religious sciences. Many have rejected it on the grounds that it teaches numerous beliefs that contradict the teaching of Islam while others considered it to be the best presentation of Islamic spirituality and reflecting the essence of Islamic teaching.
Muhammad b. Murtaḍa (1598–1680 C.E.), commonly called al-Fayd al-Kāshānī, was a prominent Shi‘a scholar who admired al-Ghazālī and acknowledged the originality of the “Iḥyā’” and its significant role in presenting Islamic ethics in a coherent manner. But at the same time he pointed to its shortcomings, claiming that it contained chapters alien to Islamic teaching and practices and that it relied on traditions (ahadith) that, according to his belief, are not reliable. Therefore, he undertook to edit (tahdhīb) the entire “Iḥyā’,” presenting a text that preserved the entire structure of the original work and most of al-Ghazālī’s theories but infusing it with Shi‘a traditions and beliefs. The full title of his work is “al-Mahajjah al-Bayḍā’ fi Tahdhīb al-Iḥyā’.” Since its publication this has become the standard textbook of Islamic ethics among Shi‘a scholars and communities. Moreover, al-Fayḍ mentioned that one of the reasons that led him to edit the “Iḥyā’” was his belief that al-Ghazālī later in his life converted to Shi’ism. In this paper I will analyze al-Kāshānī’s method of editing the “Iḥyā’” and examine his claim of al-Ghazālī’s conversion to Shi’ism.
The importance of al-Kāshānī’s work is that it gives the reader a clear picture of the interaction between Shi’ism and Sunnism and highlights the main differences between them in terms of their beliefs and practices. It also provides us with insight into how Shi‘a scholars received Sufism.
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Dr. SeyedAmir Asghari
If Islamic philosophy mostly developed in Iran, its severest critics of philosophy also emerged there. The puritanical movement known as the Maktab-i Tafk?k (The School of Distinction) in the contemporary Sh?`a seminaries of Iran carries on a long tradition of opposition to philosophy and Sufism. We will discuss the history of its establishment, its arguments against philosophy and Sufism, the dimensions of its influence, and the opposition to it by adherents of philosophy and Sufism, especially by the “Shushtariya” order. This aspect of modern Shi’ite intellectual history is almost unknown to scholarship.
Mirz? Mahd? I?fah?n?’s (1885- 1946) is the main figure and founder of the Maktab-i Tafk?k, though the tradition of opposition to philosophy and Sufism in the Mashhad madrasas goes back to al-?urr al-?mul? in the seventeenth century. Rather than merely making counter-arguments, I?fah?n? and his followers question the purity of the faith of philosophers and Sufis, accusing them of deviating from the path of Sh?’a Imams. I?fah?n? held that to fully grasp the teachings of the Imams, it was necessary not to be affected by alien knowledge such as philosophy and Sufism. His Abw?b al-Hud? (Gates of Guidance) explained the foundation of his opposition to philosophy and Sufism. The term Tafk?k in the works of his followers alludes to the way their school distinguishes true religious knowledge from foreign knowledge wrongly imported into the seminary education system. The Maktab-i Tafk?k aims to separate and purify, distinguishing the true mode of apprehension (shin?kht), namely the path and method of the Qur?n, from philosophy and Sufism (Irf?n), thus purifying the “Qur?nic apprehension” (fahm-i Qur?n?). There was another goal for “distinction”: gaining sound religious knowledge that completely avoids Ta’w?l (esoteric exegesis) and Mazj, integration with other forms of human thought in order to prevent the “reality of revelation” and principles of the “sound knowledge” from being mixed with human thoughts and tastes.
The rival to the Maktab-i Tafk?k is the Sh?shtar?ya order, a counter-tradition in the seminary of adherents to philosophy and Sufism. This paper will discuss their response to the Maktab-i Tafk?k.
This paper is based on Persian texts by authors of the two schools.
