Panel 040, sponsored byAssociation for Israel Studies, 2018 Annual Meeting
On Friday, November 16 at 11:00 am
Panel Description
The Trump Administration has had a major effect both on Israeli domestic politics and on Israeli foreign policy. After some delay it agreed to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the US embassy there from Tel-Aviv. It also appeared to turn a blind eye as the Israeli government increased the pace of settlement building on the Israeli-controlled West Bank. While these actions strengthened the position of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who is under police investigation for corruption, they almost destroyed the already moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In addition, the Trump Administration made the Israeli government very happy by its continuing attacks on the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA), given the fact that Iran remains Israel's main enemy. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration's decision to remain in Syria was also greeted with satisfaction by Israel which was concerned by the build-up of Iranian-supported forces near the Golan Heights and Iran's growing influence in Syria. While the Trump Administration appeared to be losing ground in Egypt to Russia, Israeli-Egyptian security relations remained strong as the two countries cooperated in Egypt's battle against ISIS forces in the Sinai and also against HAMAS, an enemy of Israel which the Sisi government of Egypt also mistrusted. Finally, as Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman consolidated his power and pushed ahead with his reform efforts, there was increasing evidence that Iran and Israel had stepped up their cooperation against Iran. These are some of the issues to be discussed in the proposed panel, "Israel in the Trump era".
The election of Donald J. Trump to the US presidency caught the Israeli public and leadership
by surprise. Yet, the reaction of most Israelis, and particularly active politicians, has been rather
enthusiastic and atypical in terms of the otherwise negative reaction to the Trump victory in most
other countries. This paper will describe this Israeli reaction in some detail—dwelling on the entire
spectrum of Israeli politics—and then try to explain its most important characteristics. In particular,
the paper will dwell on the triumphalist acceptance of Trump by the Israeli Right, including
the current Israeli government. The proposition that the overall Trump policy in the Middle East
validates the approach of the Israeli Right will be examined, dwelling on such issues as an Israeli-
Palestinian agreement and the Iranian deal. Potential disagreements between the Netanyahu government
and the Trump administration will also be examined. But, above all, the paper will focus on the ideological
nature of contemporary Israel's politics and its foreign politic in the Trump era.
The process of the Syrian state’s disintegration and decline into bloody civil war was also followed by Israel with great interest. Official Israel did not hide its view, even if it refrained from giving it expression authoritatively or in any outright manner, that Bashar al-Assad was “the devil you know,” to whom Israel had become accustomed over the years. Therefore, Israel had no interest in his downfall. Some senior Israeli officials even took the trouble to explain that Israel preferred a weakened and bloodied Bashar in power in Damascus, focused on what was happening inside his country, over a victory by radical Islamic, such as ISIS. Indeed, many Israelis perceived the continuation of Bashar’s regime as the only guarantee that quiet and calm along the Syria-Israel border would be preserved and the only effective barrier to Islamic radical groups becoming established on the Golan Heights, such as had happened in the Sinai Peninsula.
Russian's involvement in the Syrian civil war starting in September 2015 brought, with the support of Iran and Hizballah, a dramatic change in the course of events and secure Bashar's position in power in Damascus. However, while fighting in Syria subsided, Iran continued to expand the circuit of its influence in the region while taking advantage of the United States' lack of interest to play a leading role in the Middle East. Israeli military activity aimed at preventing Iran from entrenching itself in Syria raised concerns for possible escalation that might lead to a major conflict in the northern front of Israel
Entering 2018, Saudi Arabia faces tremendous challenges, both domestic
and regional. Saudi Arabia has faced regional challenges before, beginning
with Egypt in the mid-1930’s, followed by the Hashemite monarchies
of Iraq and Jordan. Egypt again posed a challenge during Nasser’s reign.
Yet for the past several years, regional challenges have again raised
their head. This paper will analyze those challenges, and Israel’s place
in Saudi Arabia’s calculus.
This paper focuses on internal Palestinian political developments in the decade since Benjamin Natanyahu resumed power, and especially in the period since Donald Trump was elected as US president. I argue that the Likud party has been largely successful in its attempt to destroy the Palestinian national project, and I survey the varied responses, with a particular focus on Palestinian municipal government. Municipal governance is one area of Palestinian political practice and expression that serves the interests of both the Palestinian community and the Likud party goal of maintaining Israeli suzerainty over the West Bank in perpetuity. This is a situation that is reminiscent of Jordanian emphasis on Palestinian local governance in the 1950s and 1960s. The advent of the Trump presidency combined with the rise to power of Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi Arabia have accelerated the defeat of the Palestinian national project. The paper concludes with analysis of several plausible scenarios for the coming decade given these trend lines.
In January 2018 the Israeli and Jordanian governments reached an agreement that brought to an end one of the most severe crisis in their relations since the signing of the peace treaty in 1994. Six months earlier one the Israeli embassy's security guards was attacked by a Jordanian man and in response shot and killed the attacker and another person who stood nearby. Several hours later, the Israeli embassy was evacuated and the following day, Prime Minister Netanyahu gave a televised hero's welcome to the guard and the ambassador. Consequently, the outraged Jordanian government refused the return of the ambassador and her team until the guard faced legal action, a condition the Israeli government could not accept. The prolonged crisis was finally solved when Israel apologised, paid compensation to the families of the victims, and appointed a new ambassador.
The two governments' degermination and eventual success in solving the crisis is a testimony to the value the two parties attach to their ties with one another. In fact, I will argue, that in light of recent developments in the region, the Jordanian-Israeli strategic alliance has only grown in importance. Recent years have seen close cooperation on issues such as ISIS, the war in Syria and the Iranian and Russian presence in that country, and the Palestinian question. Moreover, from a Jordanian point of view, Israel plays a crucial role in its stability. Over the past year, Jordan has received cold shoulder treatments from both President Trump and the Saudi government under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, after decades during which the USA and Saud Arabia were its main allies. This is occurring at a time that Jordan faces mounting problems such as hosting a huge refugee population from Syria and Iraq, a growing deficit in the state budget and significant water shortages. All these challenges make its relations with Israel indispensable.